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Venezuela and the Andean Common Market
BEVERLY MAY CARL* and LAWRENCE JOHNSON**

Since the founding of the Andean Common Market in
1969, one member, Chile, has withdrawn while another more
prosperous neighbor, Venezuela, has opted to join the Market.
Chile is doubtlessly suffering her own unique withdrawal symptoms. This article, however, will focus on the legislative and
commercial adjustments which had to be made by Venezuela
to integrate into a preexisting common market.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Theoretical Basis for Common Markets in Developing
Regions
Regional economic integration units such as the Andean
Common Market can be of major importance to the economic
development of less developed countries.' These integration
schemes are intended to promote economic growth through the
division and specialization of labor. The elimination of internal
trade barriers should also provide the potential investor with a
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; J.D., University of Southern
California; LL.M., Yale University.
** J.D., Southern Methodist University.
1. Formation of the Andean Common Market was designed to accelerate the
economic integration of its members within the broader context of the Latin American
Free Trade Association (LAFTA). Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Area and Instituting The Latin American Free Trade Association (Montevideo Treaty, 1960). This
treaty has been printed in Inter-American Institute of Legal Studies, Instruments
Relating to The Integration of Latin America 207 (1968). LAFTA's primary goal was
to reduce tariff and trade barriers among member countries by 1973 (this date later
extended to 1980 by the Caracas Protocol). See S. DELL, A LATIN AMERICAN COMMON
MARKET? (1966); W. KRAUSE & F. MATHIS, LATIN AMERICA AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
REGIONAL PLANNING FOR DEVELOPMENT (1970); LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS (M. Wionczek ed. 1966); WALTER & VrrzTHUM, THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET: A CASE STUDY ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING REGIONS (N.Y.U., C.J. Devine Inst. of Finance, Bull. No. 44, May 1967).
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larger market 2 in which to sell its products. Because of economies of scale, a company can then produce each item at a lower
per unit cost. Since the individual product will thus be
cheaper, more people can buy it. This means more profit to the
manufacturer who can then reinvest such funds.
Protected access to regional markets opens the possibility
for new investment to take place in industries which would not
be viable if confined to individual national markets.3 Also, the
resulting economies of scale and degree of specialization may
even reduce production costs for preexisting industries. In due
time this cost reduction should make the products of these
industries competitive in world markets.
The importance of economies of scale should be stressed.4
The national markets of most less developed countries are too
limited to provide an adequate volume of demand for cost efficient mass production industries. Given the situation of a small
self-contained national market, the tendency is usually for
local industry to seek a high degree of protection from outside
sources of competition. Such protection then fosters low productivity and artificially high costs. Regional economic integration tries to solve these problems by 'Making it possible to establish modern plants of optimum size, with an adequate level
of specialization, and to industrialize in those sectors where it
was not previously feasible due to domestic market limitations.'
Proponents of regional economic integration units contend
that formation of such units will play a direct role in alleviating
those conditions which currently restrict economic growth and
development! Not only will overall market conditions be
greatly improved, but also the combined economic power of the
integrated unit will permit it to bargain more effectively with
outside nations on trade and investment questions.
B. Organizationof ANCOM
The basic structure of the Andean Common Market
2. S. DELL, supra note 1 at 17.
3. Id. at 17-18.
4. Id. at 18.
5. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION
LEMS IN LATIN AMERICA 156 (1970).
6. Id. at 160.

FOR LATIN AMERICA, DEVELOPMENT PROB-
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(ANCOM) was established by the Cartagena Agreement of
1969.! The initial members were Colombia, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Although Venezuela participated in the negotiations on that accord, she decided not to sign or ratify it at
that time.
The aim of ANCOM was to achieve formation of a functional subregional common market, carefully intertwined with
the larger preexisting Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA).8 Members of LAFTA not included in ANCOM are
Mexico, Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, Uruguay, and, today,
Chile. All legal obligations incurred under LAFTA remain in
effect under the ANCOM charter.'
Techniques to create a common market within the Andean
region include internal free trade, a common external tariff,
regional allocation of selected industries, and harmonization of
certain laws.' 0 Implementation of these objectives is entrusted
to the two principal administrative institutions, the Commission and the Board (or Junta)." The Commission, the highest
authority in ANCOM, is comprised of one cabinet level representative from each member country. It is charged with formulating general policy, resolving disputes and ensuring implementation of the Cartagena Agreement. 2 The Board, a permanent three member body selected by the Commission, is responsible for developing proposals for submission to the Commission. 3 These draft proposals, if approved by the Commission, are promulgated as its official Decisions. 4
7. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, signed May 26, 1969, reprinted
in 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 910-39 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as the Cartagena Agreement].
8. Id. art. 110.
9. Id. art. 114.
10. Id. arts. 1-3.
11. Id. art. 5.
12. Id. arts. 6-12.
13. Id. arts. 7(c), 13-18.
14. Although the word "Decision" has been translated into the English
"Decision," the American reader should not confuse these "decisions" with our administrative or judicial decisions. In fact, the so-called Decisions of ANCOM are supranational legislation. The Andean Commission's Decisions, of which over 100 have been
issued to date, should be distinguished from the Venezuelan Decrees which are domestic legislation enacted by the Venezuelan Congress. In many cases Venezuelan Decrees
specifically embody the previously promulgated Decisions of the Andean Commission.
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C.

Venezuela's Accession
Venezuela's decision to join ANCOM was announced by
President Caldera in 1973. This was by no means universally
acclaimed within the country. Bitter political and economic
disputes raged over the anticipated ills or benefits of Venezuelan membership in the subregional common market.15 The decision to join ANCOM in 1973 and the earlier decision to join
LAFTA in 1968 represented a major change in attitude by Venezuela toward regional economic integration units. Domestic
political pressures" from private commercial interests 7 had
previously caused Venezuela to refrain from joining the larger
integration units of LAFTA and ANCOM. However, by 1972,
it had become apparent to many of the nation's decisionmakers
that participation in these organizations was essential if Venezuela were to continue its economic growth and to avoid exclusion from important trading markets.
President Caldera's 1973 action represented a complete
reversal of the position taken four years earlier by his ruling
Social Christian Party (COPEI) toward ANCOM. This change
was somewhat confusing at the time it was made, since
COPEI's main rival, the Accion Democratica (AD) had previously gone on record in 1969 as being strongly in favor of
Venezuelan membership in ANCOM. COPEI's abrupt aboutface opened it to charges of political opportunism. All of this
debate took place within the heated controversy of the upcoming 1973 national elections."5
15. Venezuelans Form Battle Lines on JoiningANCOM, 1971 Bus. LATIN AMERICA
272.
16. Venezuela's early attitude is somewhat reflected in a 1960 Statement by an
official of the Bank of Venezuela: "Any common market or free trade area will leave
us producing nothing but petroleum and iron ore, and importing everything else. Our
textiles cannot compete with Brazilian textiles, our coffee cannot compete with Colombian coffee and our meat cannot compete with Uruguayan meat. For us a free trade
area is utopian at the present time." BANCO DE VENEZUELA, BOLETIN DE ECONOMIA Y
FINANZAS, Sept. 1960.
17. However, it would appear the stakes were not really that significant. One and
one-half years after its entry in ANCOM Venezuelan trade with ANCOM countries
had accounted for only 2% of Venezuela's exports and only 1% of the country's total
imports. Ecuador and Peru take most of Venezuela's ANCOM exports, while Colombia
and Peru provide the bulk of her ANCOM imports. INVESTING, LICENSING & TRADING
CONDITIONS ABROAD (Bus. INT'L), Venezuela 21 (Aug. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
IL&T].
18. Venezuelans Form Battle Lines on Joining ANCOM, supra note 15.

1978

VENEZUELA

AND

ANCOM

Domestic political considerations were strongly influenced
by the economic interests perceived to be at stake by the various opposing groups. COPEI's new position toward membership in ANCOM met with bitter resistance by the private sector business interests. These private interests voiced their opposition through the federation of chambers of commerce
(FEDECAMARAS) and the Asociacion Venezolana de Industrias (an industrial group representing Venezuela's mediumsized industries)."
The private sector representatives predicted that Venezuelan membership in ANCOM would result in economic disaster.
It was claimed that Venezuela's unique political and economic
system was incompatible with those of the other ANCOM
countries. Factors cited in support of this claim included Venezuela's economic independence based on its petroleum wealth
and proven ability to pay for imports, a traditionally low inflation rate, an allegedly narrower industrial base than its three
potential rivals within ANCOM (Colombia, Chile, and Peru),
and an alleged inability to compete with the other subregional
producers because of higher production costs (especially labor).
Also, the private sector contended that ANCOM's restrictive
measures on foreign investment (especially technology transfer) would only discourage new investment and
technology at
2
a time when Venezuela was in need of both.
The private sector spokesmen relied upon two particularly
emotional issues to advance their cause. 2' The first one raised
the prospect of free movement of labor among the ANCOM
countries. This claim was obviously intended to raise the specter of a loss of jobs for Venezuelans. Given the fact that Venezuela was then, and still is today, beset by the rather severe
problems of Colombians illegally working in Venezuela, the
threat was perceived by many workers as being real. This fear
was, however, unjustified since the Cartagena Agreement does
not provide for the free movement of labor.
The second issue, and the one which most concerned small
19. Id.
20. Summary and Highlights of Seminar on the Andean Pact Held at the American Chamber of Commerce of Peru on June 6, 1973 (Lima, Peru), in ANDEAN PACT:
DEFINITION, DESIGN, AND ANALYSIS 77, 78-79 (Council of the Americas ed. 1973).
21. Venezuelans Form Battle Lines on JoiningANCOM, supra note 15.
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and medium-sized businessmen was the reduction or disappearance of high protective tariffs vis-a-vis other ANCOM nations for manufacturers. As in many developing nations, these
manufacturers were import substitution oriented. Private industrial spokesmen questioned their ability to compete with
cheaper imports from other ANCOM countries. Further, the
opponents claimed, Venezuelan and foreign capital would flow
toward those countries with cheaper labor.
COPEI's new attitude toward ANCOM was strongly supported by representatives of heavy industries, whose larger
manufacturing capacities would need additional marketing
outlets. Due to diminishing petroleum reserves, Venezuela
wished to diversify its economic base. Membership in
ANCOM, by providing an expanded market, hopefully would
encourage not only major producers for the entire region, but
also stimulate a number of local satellite industries. 2 The possibility of obtaining exclusive or semi-exclusive assignments of
particular industries under ANCOM's Sectorial Program was
perceived as an additional means of furthering the nation's
economic growth.23

In deciding to join ANCOM, the Venezuelan Government
apparently made two basic assumptions.2 4 First, it perceived
Venezuela as becoming economically isolated in Latin America
if it did not join. Should ANCOM become economically viable,
then Venezuela would be in the unenviable position of having
to compete in the international market against this powerful
economic force, as well as against the traditional Latin American economic powers (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico). Second,
Venezuela was confident of its ability to compete inside
ANCOM, possibly even dominate it, yet still preserve its national sovereignty. In the two years since Venezuela has been
a member of ANCOM there has been a noticeable change in
attitude by the previous opponents. It appears that opposition
has subsided and that emphasis today is placed on working
within the framework of the system and deriving to the fullest
extent possible those economic benefits which are available.
22. Note 20 supra.
23. Id. at 83, 85-86.
24. Id. at 79, 83.
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LEGAL ADAPTATIONS MADE By VENEZUELA

Since becoming a member of ANCOM in 1973,5 Venezuela
has had to enact new legislation to fulfill its obligations as a
member of the organization. Following is a description and
analysis of such legislation. Within this context, four major
areas of law and economic policy are considered: (A) internal
free trade; (B) common external tariff policy; (C) sectorial programs; and (D) control of foreign investment.
A. Internal Free Trade
By definition, an integral component of a common market
is a customs union. A customs union consists of internal free
trade among its member states and a common external tariff
erected around the entire region against products from outside
the area. Thus, the first essential step in creating the Andean
Common Market was to establish a mechanism to achieve internal free trade among its members. To provide adequate protection to existing industries, the internal free trade goal is
achieved in most customs unions through a gradual process of
internal duty reductions.
The ANCOM documents refer to this element of internal
free trade as "subregional trade liberalization." The ANCOM
structure uses four different, but complementary, mechanisms
to reach this objective for Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru"6 by
1983 and for Bolivia and Ecuador17 by 1988. For this purpose
all products are divided into four distinct categories: (1) goods
on LAFTA's Common Schedule; (2) goods reserved for the Sectorial Programs; (3) goods not produced in the region; and (4)
the remaining nonscheduled goods. By December 1970, all nontariff barriers (e.g., quotas) were to have been removed.2 8
25. Final Act of the Negotiations on the Entry of Venezuela into the Cartagena
INT'L LEGAL MAT'L5 344 (1973)
[hereinafter referred to as the Accession Agreement]. This Agreement, the Cartegena
Agreement, and ANCOM Decisions Nos. 24, 37, 37-A, 40, 46, 50, 56, and 70 were
approved by the Venezuelan Congress and President on September 3, 1973. Gac. Of
1,620 of Nov. 1, 1973, [1973] Gaceta Legal No. 357, at 2 (Ven.), reprinted in G. Pico
MANTILLA, LEGISLACION ANDINA DE INVERSIONES EXTRANJERAS Y TECNOLOGIA 265 (1975).
26. Lima Protocol Amending the Cartagena Agreement, done Oct. 30, 1976, art.
8, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 235 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as the Lima
Protocol]. The following textual discussion reflects the latest changes incorporated in
the Lima Protocol, ratification of which is currently pending before the Venezuelan
Legislature. Ancom Implements Investment Code Rules But Falters on Sectorials,

Agreement done Feb. 13, 1973, reprinted in 12

1978 Bus.

LAIN AMERICA

116.

27. Id. art. 9.
28. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 42 and 46; Accession Agreement,
supra note 25, Annex B, art. 38.
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1. LAFTA Common Schedule Goods
Under the LAFTA Treaty, the member states were required at three-year intervals to agree on lists of goods which
were to circulate duty free within the LAFTA region; 29 these
lists were designated the "Common Schedules." At each of
these three-year sessions, the members were to have agreed to
place on these Common Schedules goods amounting to 25% of
the aggregate value of all trade within the region.10 Had that
objective been fulfilled, by 1973 there would have been total
free internal trade within the LAFTA region.
The 1964 negotiations succeeded in placing only 175
items3 on the LAFTA Common Schedule. The second Common Schedule negotiations, planned for 1967, never took
place.32
Since the ANCOM members were still bound by their
LAFTA obligations, the Cartagena Agreement provided that
all goods included in the first stage of the LAFTA Common
Schedules, i. e. the 175 items, would also be free of duties within
the ANCOM region.3 ANCOM's Board is further empowered
to grant similar treatment to any Common Schedules which
may be negotiated in the future.3 4 Under the Accession Agreement, Venezuela was likewise obligated to permit these items
duty free entry.3 5 One should note that these particular articles
may enter Venezuela free of tariffs, not only if they come from
ANCOM members, but also if from any other LAFTA nation,
such as Brazil.
2. Goods Reserved for the Sectorial Programs
Almost 2,000 goods, amounting to about one-third of all
29. Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Area and Instituting the Latin America Free
Trade Association, Feb. 18, 1960, art. 7, printed in INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES,

1 INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA

AND INTHE CARRIBEAN 3 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as the Montevideo Treaty].
30. Id.
31. Note, Latin American Experience with Economic Integration, 10 VA. J. INT'L
L. 139, 153 (1969).
32. Id.
33. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 49.
34. Id.
35. Accession Agreement, supra note 25, Annex B, art. 1 (a); see Ven. Decree 338
(1974), Gac. Of. 1,675 Ex. (Aug. 30, 1974); Ven. Decree 339 (1974), Gac. Of. 1,676 Ex.
(Aug. 30, 1974).
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the items on the tariff schedule" have been reserved for the
Sectorial Programs. 37 Each article under the Sectorial Programs will have its own duty arrangements both for goods produced inside the ANCOM region and for those coming from
outside the area (see Part fl-C for a detailed description).
Items which were previously reserved for the Sectorial Programs but which, in fact, have not been incorporated into a
specific Sectorial Program by the end of 1978 will become free
of internal duties under certain conditions.3 Such articles, if
not already produced in the ANCOM area, will circulate duty
free as of December 31, 1978. 31 However, the Commission may
authorize the reservation of certain of these items not yet produced in the region for manufacture by Bolivia and Ecuador'0
and may determine whether such items shall be subject to
internal duties.
The remaining articles, previously reserved for the Sectorial Programs but not actually incorporated in a Sectorial
Program by December 1978, will enter Colombia, Peru, and
Venezuela duty free if coming from Bolivia or Ecuador." As to
such items originating in Colombia, Peru, or Venezuela, the
remaining duties should be eliminated by five annual successive reductions of 5%, 10%, 15%, 30%, and 40% starting by
December 1979, so that they will be duty free within the
region by 1985.42

3. Goods Not Produced in the Region
Goods not produced in the region and not reserved for the
Sectorial Program were to be duty free 3 by 1971. However, the
Commission could reserve certain goods not yet produced in
the region for manufacture by Bolivia or Ecuador; any internal
36. Fulmer, The Andean Common Market: Implications for U.S. Business,
ANDE
PACr: DEFINION, DESIGN, AND ANALYSIS 1, 7 (Council of the Americas ed.
1973).
37. See also Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 34, 45(a); Accession Agreement, supra note 25, Annex B, art. 38.
38. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 47, 53; Lima Protocol supranote 26,
art. 4.
39. Lima Protocol, supra note 26, art. 4(a).

40. Id.
41. Id. art. 4(d).

42. Id. art. 4(c).
43. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 50, 52.
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duty structure created for such goods must be for the benefit
of Bolivia or Ecuador."
Products not yet produced in the region and not allocated
to the Sectorial Programs could also be reserved for manufacturing by Colombia, Venezuela, or Peru. However, such products when produced by any of these three nations may enjoy
the protection of internal tariff barriers only until the end of
1983.11
4. Nonscheduled Goods
The bulk of the products fall within the nonscheduled
goods category, subject to the automatic tariff cutting provisions. As a first step, each nation had to designate, as its base
rate from which the automatic cuts would be made, the lowest
rate applied by that nation on the item prior to joining
ANCOM." Such base rate, moreover, could not exceed the ad
valorem, CIF, price of the item by more than 100%.11
Annual reductions of duties on nonscheduled goods must
be made by each nation. Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru, starting in December 1976, must make seven successive annual reductions of 6% each and a final reduction of 8% by December
31, 1983. Hence, by the end of 1983 all these nonscheduled
goods should enter Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru duty free.4
Bolivia and Ecuador must begin making the automatic
duty reductions on nonscheduled items with a 5% cut by December 31, 1979; five cuts of 10% each annually from 1982 to
1986; a 15% cut in December 1987; and a final reduction of 20%
by December 31, 1988."9 Hence, the nonscheduled articles from
ANCOM nations should enter Bolivia and Ecuador duty free
after 1988.
In August 1974, Venezuela began to reduce tariffs for intrasubregional trade in compliance with the automatic tariff
cutting program ° In conjunction with the automatic tariff
44. Id.
45. Id.; Accession Agreement, supra note 25, Annex B, art. 1(b); Lima Protocol,
supra note 26, art. 3.
46. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 52(a); Lima Protocol, supra note 26,
art. 3.
47. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 52(a).
48. Lima Protocol, supra note 26, art. 8.
49. Id. art. 9.
50. Decree 339 of Aug. 30, 1974, [19741 Gaceta Legal No. 384, at 36 (Ven.).
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reduction program, Venezuela adopted ANCOM's tariff
nomenclature, referred to as the NABANDINA. This is an
eight-digit code based on the Brussels nomenclature. 5'
An integral part of the automatic tariff reduction program
under the Cartagena Agreement was a list of general and specific exceptions. Each member was permitted to exempt a certain number of products until 1988 from the duty reductions;
however, goods on the Common List could not be so ex5
empted. 1
Under the Accession Agreement, Venezuela was allowed to
exclude not more than 250 items. 3 In 1974 she, in fact, excluded 236 articles from the general tariff reduction program.54
This list seems to be characterized by labor-intensive products
of small and medium-sized industries. Included were such
items as basic foodstuffs, leather goods, yarns and textiles,
footwear, and furniture.
Venezuela was also authorized to exclude an additional
200 items from the tariff cutting on a single country-of-origin
basis. This exceptions list is applied against specified items
from Colombia or Peru. 5 These specific exceptions are intended to be short term only.5 Venezuela may not direct specific tariff discriminations against more than 110 articles from
any one country. 7 Conversely, Peru may apply discriminatory
tariffs against thirty items from Venezuela. Peru may also impose discriminatory duties against an additional number of
items from Venezuela equivalent to the number of products
from Peru against which Venezuela has discriminated. Colombia enjoys the same rights as Peru in this regard.58
For example, assume Venezuela had discriminated against
the maximum permissible number of items from Colombia, i.e.

1.

51. Decree 338 of Aug. 30, 1974, [1974] Gaceta Legal No. 384, at 36 (Ven.).
52. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 55; Lima Protocol, supra note 26, art.
53. Accession Agreement, supra note 25, Annex A, art. 2.
54. IL&T, Venezuela 22 (Aug. 1975); see Ven. Decree 338 (1974), Gac. Of. 1,675
Ex. (Aug. 30, 1974); Ven. Decree 339 (1974), Gac. Of. 1,676 Ex. (Aug. 30, 1974),
implementing the Accession Agreement, supra note 25.
55. Accession Agreement, supra note 25, Annex A, art. 3.
56. Id. art. 8.
57. Id. art. 3(a).
58. Id. art. 4.
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110 articles. Colombia would now be entitled to discriminate
against an additional 110 articles to bring her total discriminations against Venezuelan products up to 140 different goods.
Venezuela has in fact used this discriminatory power
against certain products from Colombia such as foodstuffs,
beer, lubricants, vinyl fibers, cement, bicycles, and footwear.
Likewise, Venezuela has discriminated against canned fish,
coffee, footwear, copper bars, and various other articles from
Peru."'
Bolivia and Ecuador may also apply discriminatory tariffs
against thirty items from Venezuela. 0 However, if the product
discriminated against by a particular nation is not produced in
that country, the Board of ANCOM may disallow the exception.'
B. The Common External Tariff
As stated previously, in a customs union, the individual
nations must eventually cease applying their own tariff rates
to goods coming from outside the customs union and create
common tariffs applicable to goods entering any country in the
region. In contrast, under a free trade association, the member
nations, although aiming toward free internal trade among
themselves, will continue to apply their own individual rates
as against products from outside the area. Thus in LAFTA, a
free trade association, the member states continue applying
their own individual duty rates to articles from outside the
region. As a common market, however, ANCOM has to construct common tariffs applicable to goods from outside the
area. This means, for example, Venezuela will eventually have
no individual Venezuelan duties, but will simply apply the
common rate which ANCOM has established for all its members in reference to a particular product.
In building this common external tariff, the Cartagena
Agreement provided for a two-step procedure. 2 The first step
called for the creation of a minimum common external tariff
for each NABANDINA item. For goods with duty rates below
those established by the minimum common external tariff, the
59.
60.
61.
62.

IL&T, Venezuela 22 (Aug. 1975).
Accession Agreement, supra note 25, Annex A, art. 5.
Id. art. 7.
Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 60, 61.
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member states were required to have raised their tariffs up to
the level of this minimum common external tariff by 1975.63 For
products with duty rates above those minimum common external tariff levels, the individual nations could retain their existing duties for the time being. Although this requirement was
particularly difficult for Venezuela because of her traditionally
low duty structure, she complied with the obligation in 1974 by
raising most of her duties up to that minimum level.6 4
A special hardship clause in the Cartagena Agreement
makes it possible for a country to seek temporary suspension
of the minimum common external tariff. 5 Venezuela exercised
the right in 1975 when it requested suspension of the minimum
common external tariff on some sixty items. Permission was
granted to suspend it on forty-five of the items. Included in the
suspension list were certain essential raw materials and foodstuffs. This was permitted because the necessary goods were
not available from other member countries.
The second step in establishing the common tariff against
products from outside the region is the fixing of the final common external tariffs. The rates ultimately set should be sufficiently high to protect new industries in the region and yet low
enough to permit some foreign competition as an inducement
to increased efficiency on the part of Andean manufacturers.
The ANCOM Commission is to set the rates of the final
common external tariff by the end of December 1978. By December 31, 1983, Venezuela, Peru, and Colombia must have
brought all their duties into line with that final common tariff;
Bolivia and Ecuador have until 1988 to reach this goal. 7 It
should be noted that neither the minimum nor the final common external tariffs apply to products reserved for the Sectorial
Programs, since goods under these programs will be governed
by their own special tariff arrangements. 6
63. Id. art. 64.
64. Decree 484 of Oct. 8, 1974, [1974] Gaceta Legal No. 379, at 57 (Ven.); Ven.
Decree 339 (1974), Gac. Of. 1,676 Ex. (Aug. 30, 1974); Accession Agreement, supra note
25, Annex B, art. 8.
65. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 67.
66. Ancom Actions on Outer Tariff Could Aid Firms in the Region, 1975 Bus.
LATIN AMERICA 132.

67. Lima Protocol, supra note 26, art. 2.
68. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 34(f), 46, 65(a).
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As indicated before, ANCOM was meshed into LAFTA so
that all obligations incurred under the LAFTA Treaty still
apply to the ANCOM nations. Thus, the question arises, how
does the ANCOM common external tariff affect imports from
the LAFTA nations which are not members of ANCOM?
Generally, products from LAFTA nations entering the
ANCOM region will be subject to the ANCOM common external tariff, with two major exceptions. First, as already explained, all goods placed on the LAFTA Common List will
circulate duty free within the ANCOM region if they originate
from any LAFTA nation."
However, the LAFTA Treaty provided, in addition to the
Common List, a second technique for reducing internal duties
among its members. Under article 5 of the LAFTA Convention,
each member was obligated to enter into bilateral negotiations
with other member states in which they agreed to reduce duties
on certain items. For example, Venezuela might have negotiated with Brazil to lower the duty on Brazilian widget X entering Venezuela from 50% to 30%. Once such bilateral agreement
is concluded, under the most favored nations clause of the
LAFTA Agreement,70 Venezuela is required to extend that
most favored nations rate of 30% on widget X's from every
other LAFTA nation. Each LAFTA nation was obligated to
reduce its total tariff structure by a weighted average of 8% per
year 7' through these National Schedule negotiations. Unable to
reach this 8% goal, the LAFTA nations in the Protocol of Caracas reduced this obligation from 8% annually to 2.9% yearly.7"
As of 1964, more than 8,000 bilateral concessions7 3 had been
made. Few additional concessions have been concluded. Under
the Cartagena Agreement, an ANCOM nation must continue
to grant the lower duties conceded under a National Schedules
negotiation to all LAFTA members.7
Suppose, as in the above hypothetical, Venezuela did
69. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 49.
70. Montevideo Treaty, supra note 29, art. 18.
71. Id. art. 5.
72. Protocol of Caracas Modifying the Treaty of Montevideo (Dec. 11, 1969), art.
6; [19701 Gaceta Legal No. 288, at 5 (Ven.). Note that Bolivia and Ecuador are
exempted from the strict application of these rules.
73. Note, supra note 31, at 151.
74. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 114.
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agree with Brazil to reduce its duty on widget X under a
LAFTA National Schedules negotiation from 50% to 30%.
ANCOM now sets the minimum common external tariff on
widget X's at 75% and the final common external tariff at 85%.
Widget X's from Brazil, Mexico, and all other LAFTA nations
outside ANCOM will still enter Venezuela at 30%. On entry
into Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, or Bolivia, widget X's from
LAFTA nations outside ANCOM will have to pay the ANCOM
common external tariff rate (75% and later 85%). In other
words, Venezuela's duty of 30% will be an exception to the
general applicability of the ANCOM common external tariff.
In contrast, assume Venezuela had a duty rate of 80% on
widget Y ANCOM sets a minimum common external tariff of
110% on widget Y Venezuela will have to raise her duty on
widget Y from LAFTA nations outside ANCOM because the
prohibition in the LAFTA Agreement against increasing tariffs
has been interpreted to apply only to items on which a LAFTA
concession has been made. 5 Since Venezuela's duty of 80% on
widget Y was not the result of a LAFTA concession, Venezuela
would have to bring the tariff on this item up to the ANCOM
common external tariff level of 110%.
In all future trade negotiations with LAFTA and with
other world trade organizations, such as GATT, ANCOM must
negotiate as a unit."6 Thus, for example, Venezuela may no
longer on its own enter into tariff agreements with any outside
countries.
C. The Sectorial Programs
Had the members of ANCOM simply created a customs
union without more, new investments would have tended to
flow into the areas with the most highly developed infrastructure and the most sophisticated commercial foundation. Thus,
development throughout the region would have been uneven,
with the wealthier nations attracting increasing amounts of
investment, while the poorer nations lagged progressively further behind in new capital formation. This vicious circle could
have prevented Bolivia and Ecuador from ever reaching the
takeoff point in the development process. Thus, the framers of
75. Ereli, The Andean Common Market, 8 Hous. L. REv. 487, 494 (1971).
76. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 26(e).
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the Cartagena Agreement had to build in certain compensatory
mechanisms to ensure a more balanced development within
the region.
One technique, already discussed in Part II-A and 11-B,
was to grant Bolivia and Ecuador longer time periods in which
to reduce their internal and external tariffs to the prescribed
levels. Another was the establishment of the Andean Development Corporation, capitalized at $25 million. Authorized to
provide financial and technical assistance, this organization is
charged with fostering "an equitable distribution of investment
in the region.""
Moreover, the potential gain from integration of a number
of small markets derives from the more rational allocation of
new investment on a multinational regional basis. Consequently, the scale of new industries may be closer to optimal,
thereby reducing costs below what they would be in small national markets protected by tariffs.7" Duplicate production of
an item by different small manufacturers on a local level may
be viewed as inefficient. To maximize the gains from the improved allocation of new investment, the ANCOM nations
have resorted to regional economic planning.
Finally, the planners of an integrated multinational economy must take steps to curb the natural tendency of their
individual member nations to compete with each other for new
industries through offering more attractive investment and tax
incentives. To restrict this particular form of competition, the
Cartegena Agreement provided that the member states should
harmonize their laws on industrial incentives.7 9 Although the
countries in ANCOM have not yet accomplished this objective,
they did recently agree to refrain from establishing any foreign
investment incentives more favorable than those currently existing.1s In addition, ANCOM has approved Decision 40 on the
Avoidance of Double Taxation. 8'
77. Agreement Establishing the Andean Development Corporation, signed Feb. 7,

1968, arts. 3,4,5, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 940 (1969).
78. WALTER & VrrzTHuM, supra note 1, at 12 et seq.
79. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 28, para. 2.
80. Temporary Provisions promulgated as Decision 103 and modified by Decision
109, amending Decision 24 of the Commission of the Cartegna Agreement, as amended
(Andean Foreign Investment Code) (Nov. 30, 1976), reprintedin 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS
138, 155 (1977).
81. As cited in Furnish & Atkin, The Andean Group's Program for Industrial

1978

VENEZUELA AND

ANCOM

Nonetheless, the Sectorial Program for Industrial Development is the most important mechanism established by
ANCOM to achieve a more equitable distribution of new investment and to ensure "rational specialization of production. ' 8 Under the Sectorial Programs, production of various
goods is to be assigned either on an exclusive or a shared basis
to a particular nation or nations, hereinafter referred to as the
"favored" nation(s). Such assignments do not technically create a monopoly since companies in nonfavored countries are
not prohibited from manufacturing the same item. However, a
preferential tariff structure is temporarily established to benefit the favored nation(s) and certain applicable legal provisions
may limit or discourage the production of the same article in
the nonfavored nation(s).
In constructing a Sectorial Program, the ANCOM Commission deals with an entire industrial segment, determines
what products are to be included therein,83 and assigns each of
these items to one or more favored nation(s). Special internal
duty structures and common external tariffs" are created for
every product in a particular Sectorial Program.
To date, two Sectorial Programs have been approved: (1)
the metalworking sector and (2) the petrochemical sector. An
analysis of the legal framework of these programs will reveal
how this multinational planning tool is intended to achieve the
desired allocation of industries.
1. The Metalworking Sector
In August 1972, the ANCOM Commission, by Decision 57,
adopted its first Sectorial Program for the metalworking industry. Initially, 128 items in the NABANDINA classification list
had been reserved for this sector.85 Ultimately, however, only
seventy-two units were assigned under the program. The remaining items originally reserved for this Sectorial Program
but not actually assigned now fall into a different category, and
Development of the Metalworking Sector: Integrationwith Due and DeliberateSPID,
7 LAW. AM. 29, 36 & n.55 (1975).
82. Agreement Establishing the Andean Development Corporation, signed Feb. 7,
1968, art. 3, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 940 (1969).
83. Cartegena Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 47, 50.
84. Id. arts. 34(f), 45(b), 49.
85. Furnish & Atkin, supra note 81, at 42.
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internal duties on these must be gradually reduced to zero by
all members as set forth in Part II-A-2.
Forty-five units were assigned on an exclusive basis to individual nations. Bolivia and Eduador received twenty of these
exclusive assignments. The remaining units were assigned on
a shared basis to two or three nations. 6 Examples of products
included within these metalworking sector assignments include
drill bits, agricultural machines, mining equipment, generators, and clocks. 7
Once a nation has received an assignment, it must submit
to the ANCOM Board a feasibility study on the production of
the item within a stipulated time period-two years for Colombia and Peru, s8 and three years for Bolivia and Ecuador. 8 Production of the assigned items must begin within three years
after delivery of the feasibility study. In exceptional cases the
Board may extend this production startup deadline, but by no
more than one additional year for Colombia and Peru. 0
If the feasibility study shows that it is not practical to
manufacture an item, or if the favored nation(s) fails to meet
the production startup deadline, then the item shifts out of the
Sectorial Program and internal duties on it must be reduced as
described in Part H-A-2 above."
Within thirty days after Decision 57 was approved, all nontariff barriers (e.g., quotas) were to have been removed on the
assigned products. 2 Also on that date a discriminatory tariff
structure went into effect, thereby creating a preferential margin for the benefit of-the favored nations. For items from outside ANCOM, all members have to apply the common external
tariff rates for assigned products, starting on December 31st of
3
the year preceding the scheduled production startup date.
The operation of this preferential tariff structure can best
86. Id.
87. Id. at 43.
88. Decision 57 of Aug. 23, 1972, Annex A, arts. 4, 5.
89. Id. art. 6.
90. Id.
91. Id. art. 8.
92. Id. art. 14.
93. Id. art. 17. A member state may petition the Board for temporary relief from
the common external tariff when necessary to relieve a "deficiency in supplies." Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 67.
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be illustrated by a hypothetical case. (Venezuela has been
omitted from this example because she was not a member of
ANCOM when Decision 57 was approved; but for future analytical purposes Venezuela should be classified with Colombia
and Peru in thinking about Sectorial Programs.)
Assume that widget X was exclusively assigned to Bolivia,
that the common external tariff was set at 75%, and that
Bolivia has begun producing the item. Assume further that
prior to Decision 57, the duties on widget X were as follows:

Bolivia
Colombia
Peru
Ecuador

Pre-Existing Rate
95%
85%
25%
65%

Now let us explore what happens under Decision 57 when
widget X enters an ANCOM nation.
a. From Bolivia to Colombia or Peru? The rate would be
zero, because the nonfavored nations must immediately eliminate all duties on assigned products from the favored nations. 9
b. From Bolivia to Ecuador? Again the rate would be
zero. Although for many purposes Ecuador is accorded special
treatment as a poorer nation, Ecuador too must eliminate her
duty on assigned products from favored nations. 5
c. Colombian Widget X's entering Peru? A duty of 25%
would be imposed on the Colombian widget X's. Member nations are to continue applying their existing duty rates on assigned products from nonfavored nations. However, after
1980, such duties must be eliminated on these products even
if they are manufactured in a nonfavored nation. 7
d. Peruvian Widget X's entering Colombia? The duty
would be 75%. The rule would have been the same as in "c"
above (i. e. 85%), except that Decision 57 prohibits any member
from applying a rate higher than the common external tariff,
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. art. 10.

Id.
Id.; Furnish & Atkin, supra note 81, at 45.
Decision 57 of Aug. 23, 1972, Annex A, art. 10.
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i.e. 75%.98 Again this charge will have to be eliminated after
1980.11
e. Colombian Widget X's entering Ecuador? The duty
would be 65%. Ecuador may impose her existing tariff against
assigned items from nonfavored nations, but she too will have
to eliminate it after 1980.10
f. Colombian or Peruvian Widget X's entering Bolivia?
The duty would be 75% since no member can charge in excess
of the common external tariff rate. 0°1 As a favored nation for
this product, Bolivia will be able to apply this rate until 1985,
after which she may impose no duty on this item if it is produced in any ANCOM nation. 02 The same result would follow
if the assignment had been made to Ecuador. However, if the
assignment had been made to Colombia or Peru, they would
have to cease applying duties to widget X's from ANCOM
nations by 1981.101
g. Widget X's from the United States to any ANCOM
Country? Widget X's are subject to the common external tariff
of 75% and that rate will continue to apply to these widgets
from outside the ANCOM region indefinitely.
h. Widget X's from Brazil into any ANCOM nation?
Normally, they would be subject to the 75% common external
tariff. However, as explained in Part II-B above, if any
ANCOM member has made a LAFTA concession on widget X,
that country must continue offering that lower duty rate to all
members of LAFTA, including the six LAFTA nations outside
of ANCOM.
Assuming the same preexisting duty rates postulated
above, what would be the situation if the assignment had been
made to both Bolivia and Ecuador? As indicated supra, Ecuadorean and Bolivian widget X's would enter Peru and Colombia duty free. Likewise, widget X's from nonfavored ANCOM
nations would pay 25% on entry into Peru and 75% on entry
into Colombia. After 1980, they would be duty free.
98. Id. art. 13.
99. Id. art. 10.
100. Id.
101. Id. art. 13.
102. Id. art. 11.
103. Id.
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What about widget X's entering Bolivia or Ecuador? Decision 57 requires that where a shared allocation has been made,
the lowest preexisting duty rate among the favored nations be
the rate applied by all those favored nations to that item.0 4
Since Ecuador's duty was 65% and Bolivia's 95%, both Ecuador and Bolivia may now impose only a 65% duty on widget X's
from any ANCOM nation. Moreover, three years after production has begun in any one of the favored nations, they too must
eliminate duties on that item. Thus, if Ecuador began producing widget X in 1978, both Bolivia and Ecuador would have to
reduce their duty for widget X's from other ANCOM nations
by 40% in 1979, by an additional 30% in 1980, and a final 30%
in 1981.105 By 1982, all widget X's from ANCOM countries
would circulate throughout the region duty free.
It should be noted from the above analysis that if an item
has been assigned exclusively to Colombia or to Peru, it will
circulate throughout the region duty free after 1980, even if it
is manufactured in a nonfavored nation. If widget X is assigned
exclusively to Bolivia or Ecuador, then widget X's from the
favored nation (Bolivia or Ecuador) will have to compete
equally after 1980 with widget X's from nonfavored nations in
ANCOM countries, except in the countries which received the
assignment. The favored nation (Bolivia or Ecuador) may continue protecting its own infant industry in this widget X a few
years longer by maintaining its own tariffs against widget X's
from other ANCOM nations until 1985.
If widget X is assigned to two or more countries, widget X
from those favored nations must compete equally in nonfavored nation markets with widget X's produced in nonfavored
nations after 1980. The favored nations, however, may apply
duties to protect their own industry against widget X's from
nonfavored countries until three years after production of the
widget has begun in one of the favored nations. Upon expiration of that three years, widget X's will circulate duty free
through the entire region.
The above analysis shows that the Metalworking Sectorial
Program should not be described as a "monopoly." Competing
104. Id. art. 12(a).
105. Id. art. 12(b).

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 7:151

firms in nonfavored nations may still produce the product.
Within their home-nation market, they would be selling on an
equal basis with companies from the favored nation(s), although economies of scale could theoretically give the favorednation producer certain cost advantages. Moreover, the manufacturer in the nonfavored nation may even be able to sell the
item in other ANCOM nations, if his efficiency is such that he
can absorb the cost differential of the tariff from which the
favored-nation competitor is relieved. Finally, all these discriminatory tariffs are scheduled to disappear within a few
years.
Member countries are obligated to refrain from encouraging competing projects in nonfavored nations. They may not
render assistance of a positive nature, such as government
loans, tax benefits, or investment incentives, to new projects
to produce such items. 06 (Preexisting obligations of a member
government may still be respected.) Likewise, a nonfavored
nation may not authorize new direct foreign investment to
manufacture the assigned item. 017 Both the foregoing prohibitions will cease after 1982 for items assigned to Colombia
or Peru and after 1987 for goods assigned to Bolivia or Ecuador.' " ' An existing foreign owned producer of the item is free
to continue producing it in nonfavored countries, and there is
nothing in the law to prevent a locally owned company from
starting up a new project to manufacture this item in a nonfavored nation.
Since Decision 57 was promulgated prior to Venezuela's
joining ANCOM, considerable difficulty was encountered in
meshing this country into that preexisting scheme. The Accession Treaty did provide that a revised Metalworking Sectorial
Program would be developed to include Venezuela.0 9 Meanwhile, Venezuela was relieved of any obligation to permit duty
free entry of the assigned products from the favored nations." 0
Also during the interim period, Venezuela promised to refrain
from encouraging production in its territory of the assigned
items."'
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. art. 24.
Id.
Id. art. 26.
Accession Agreement, supra note 25, art. 27.
Id.art. 29.
Id.
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The withdrawal of Chile from ANCOM provided an opportunity to solve this problem. Products which had previously
been assigned to Chile were reallocated to other ANCOM
members and thirty of the reassigned items went to Venezuela.
This included products such as harvesters, railroad equipment,
and fuel pumps. The final draft of this revised Metalworking
Sectorial Program was completed" 2 at the end of 1977.
The most widely publicized dispute arising under the Metalworking Sectorial Program involves an investment by Dresser
Industries in Cia. Andina de Tricones (CATSA), a Bolivian
joint venture, to produce tricone drill bits. These bits had been
exclusively assigned to Bolivia. However, after two years,
CATSA found itself unable to export these bits to other
ANCOM nations and was forced to shut down.
It has been alleged that this failure was due to other
ANCOM members not honoring their obligations. However, an
analysis of the applicable laws may lead to a different conclusion. First, the ANCOM common external-tariff for tricone drill
bits had been set at 55%, but some of the ANCOM nations had
previously granted LAFTA concessions on tricone drill bits.
Thus the 55% rate was not applied on the bits when they entered those countries. This permitted long established manufacturers in Brazil and Argentina to sell their bits in those
ANCOM states more cheaply than the new Bolivian company." 3 Such result though merely represents compliance with
the law, since the ANCOM nations are still bound by their
LAFTA obligations.
In addition, new plants producing tricone drill bits were
reportedly established in Venezuela and Peru."' Decision 57
does prohibit direct foreign investment in the nonfavored nations, but, as to local manufacturers, the government is only
obligated to refrain from encouraging them. Hence, the facts
as reported do not seem to provide any basis for a claim of
illegality.
112. Ancom 's Revisions of Metalworking SectorialAre Upbeat Sign for Pact, 1977
Bus. LATIN AMERICA 398.
113. The Pullout of Dresser from Bolivian Operation Shows Problems of Ancom,
1977 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 57.
114. Id.
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2. The PetrochemicalSectorial Program
On August 29, 1975, ANCOM approved Decision 91 on the
Petrochemical Sectorial Program," 5 covering more than 150
products."8 Some fifty were assigned to member states, most
on a shared basis." 7 Of these Venezuela received twenty-four
items, including carbon black, chlorofluoromethanes, and
PVC.11 s On an exclusive basis, she was allocated methanol,
epoxy resins, and toluene diisocynates." 9
The internal tariff structure of the Petrochemical Sectorial
Program parallels that of the Metalworking Sectorial Program,
except for the following modifications. Against assigned products from nonfavored nations, the members will apply the common external tariff rate instead of their individual preexisting
rates. 2 Likewise, the favored nations will apply the common
external tariff rate to protect their own assigned products until
1985 in the case of Bolivia and Ecuador and until 1980 for the
other three countries. 2 ' Of course, any lower rates established
under LAFTA concessions would still be applicable.
Where an assignment is shared by more than one nation,
those favored countries will apply to the assigned items from
nonfavored nations the rates stipulated in Annex IV of Decision
91.'2 On some items, such rates are higher for Bolivia and
Ecuador than for the remaining members. The protective tariffs maintained by the favored nations must be removed after
1985 in Bolivia and Ecuador and after 1980 in the remaining

states. 123
The products previously reserved for this sector but not
115. Reprinted in [19761 Gaceta Legal No. 428, at 2 (Ven.). See also Molins,
Andean Common Market, The Sectorial Program for the Development of the Petrochemical Industry, in BUSINESS AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF LATIN AMERICAN TRADE AND
INVESTMENT 85 (D. Shea & F. Swacker eds. 1976).
116. Id. Annex I, at 6.
117. Ancom Approves Petrochemical Program;Auto Allocations Set, 1975 Bus.
LATIN AMERICA 297.
118. Decision 91 of August 29, 1975, Annex II, reprinted in [1976] Gaceta Legal
No. 428, at 2 (Ven.).
119. MNCs, Ancom ProgramsAre Slotted Into Venezuela's Auto and Petrochemical Plans, 1975 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 390.
120. Decision 91, supra note 118, art. 12.
121. Id. art. 13.
122. Id. art. 14(a).
123. Id. art. 14(b).
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actually assigned under Decision 91, were divided into two categories. The first group, consisting mostly of goods not produced in the region become duty free through the common
market almost immediately.'24 The second group of products
will eventually be duty free throughout the market. Those entering into Bolivia or Ecuador from the other ANCOM nations
will be subjected to duties which will progressively decline
until they reach zero after 1985.125 Those items originating in
Bolivia or Ecuador will enter the other three nations duty free
today. 2 As to such products manufactured in Colombia, Peru,
or Venezuela, duties may be applied on the entry of such items
into any one of these three nations; such tariffs must be pro'
gressively reduced to zero by the end of 1980. 27
The Petrochemical Sectorial law also prohibits nonfavored
nations from encouraging new investment in assigned items'28
and forbids approval by nonfavored nations of new direct foreign investment in such products. 29' In addition, this Decision
prohibits contracts for technology transfers from foreign companies to produce the assigned items in nonfavored nations.'3 0
One of the prime goals of Venezuela has been the creation
of a major petrochemical export industry by the mid-1980s. In
1975, the Venezuelan National Petrochemical Council was established to undertake the economic planning necessary to
achieve this goal.1 3' Consequently, it was vital to this nation
that the allocations made under the Sectorial Program not deprive her of the possibility of building a strong petrochemical
industry oriented toward exports to the outside world. Hence
she bargained for and obtained a crucial exception to the general rules of the Sectorial Program.
That exception provides that the prohibition against nonfavored nations stimulating investments in the assigned items
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. art. 15 (a).
Id. art. 15(b)(iii).
Id. art. 15(b)(ii).
Id. art. 15(b)(i).
Id. art. 26.
Id. art. 27.
Id.
Decree 707 of Jan. 14, 1975, [1975] Gaceta Legal No. 387, at 2 (Ven.).
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will not apply, if all the production of such goods is exported
outside the common market. Likewise, the prohibition against
foreign direct investment and foreign technology transfer contracts will be inapplicable in this situation.'3 2 Some additional
conditions must be satisfied to avoid those prohibitions. All the
raw materials for such excepted projects must come from
within the ANCOM region, unless there are insufficient supplies therein.'3 Also, the authorization of an excepted project
must not have a prejudicial effect on other ANCOM nations,
especially the country to whom the product has been assigned.'3 ' Finally, the interested government must conclude a
contract with the excepted firm ensuring compliance with the
foregoing conditions. 35 In the event of shortages of the item
concerned, the ANCOM Board may authorize the sale of such
products from the excepted company inside the common market, subject to a duty rate equivalent to the common external
tariff. If the product is sold inside the nation where the excepted company is located, such country shall impose an internal charge equivalent to the common external tariff. The Board
may authorize a reduction in or suspension of these internal
duties or charges. 3 '
Decision 91 also provides that where an assignment is
shared with either Bolivia or Ecuador, an agreement must be
concluded with or steps taken by the other favored nation to
"ensure equitable participation" in the market by Bolivia or
Ecuador. 37 Pursuant to this provision, Venezuela, which shares
38
an assignment of high density polyethylenes with Bolivia,'
agreed to yield this market to Bolivia until 1991. As soon as
Bolivia begins producing this chemical, Venezuela will direct
all of its sales thereof to nations outside ANCOM. 39
3. Other Sectorial Programs
By the end of 1977, ANCOM had negotiated the terms of
an agreement on the Automotive Sector. Under this proposal,
Decision 91, supra note 118, art. 41(b).
Id. art. 41(c).
Id. art. 41(a).
Id. art. 41(d).
Id. art. 44.
Id. art. 36.
Id., Annex II.
Ancom Approves Petrochemical Program; Auto Allocations Set, 1975 Bus.
AMERICA 297.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
LATIN
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Bolivia and Ecuador would have duty free access to the markets of the other three nations by 1983 for these products. Such
items will be traded duty free between Venezuela, Colombia,
and Peru by 1983. Bolivia and Ecuador would have to institute
progressive duty cuts on these products beginning in 1983 to
achieve a zero rate by 1989.
To qualify for the preferential tariff treatment, strict local
content rules will have to be satisfied. At present, the local
content of the three producing nations averages about 35%.
Under the proposed program, Venezuela would have to reach
a local content level of 75% by 1980.140
A key element of this program is the emphasis placed on
coproduction of automobiles rather than on individual allocations of items. For example, Ecuador and Venezuela have
made an agreement under which Ecuador will produce compo41
nents for cars manufactured in Venezuela.
The common external tariffs have been agreed upon. They
average around 50% for component parts and range from 40%
to 155% for chassis and finished vehicles. These common exter4
nal tariffs are provisional and are to be reviewed in two years. 1
Negotiations are currently pending on a sectorial program
for the fertilizer industry. The planners hope to achieve an
internal duty structure which will promote fertilizer production
4
on a region-wide basis. 1
D.

Control of Foreign Investment
One of the most important legislative acts of the Andean
Common Market was the promulgation of Decision 24 in
1970,14 hereinafter referred to as the Andean Foreign Invest140. Ancom Sets Final Terms on SectorialProgramfor Automotive Industry, 1977
Bus. LATIN AMERICA 327; Decree 921 of May 16, 1975, [1975] Gaceta Legal No. 394,
at 27 (Ven.). See also Regulations for the Development of the Automotive Industry
(Ven. Ministry of Development, Aug. 28, 1975), [1975] Gaceta Legal No. 402, at 20
(Ven.).
141. Ancom Automotive Program Is Ready for Signing With Something for All,
1977 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 286.
142. Note 140 supra.
143. Recent FertilizerSeminar May Serve To Bolster Ancom 's SectorialProgram,
1977 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 271.
144. Decision 24 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Common Re-
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ment Code. This law governs direct foreign investment, foreign
private loans, and technology transfers from abroad. The Code
establishes a minimum level of restrictions which each member
state must impose on these foreign inputs; however, the individual nations remain free to impose other limitations in addition to those stipulated in the Code.
On joining the common market, Venezuela had little difficulty in accepting the philosophy underlying this Code. As
early as 1971-two years before she joined ANCOM-the Venezuelan government had proposed national legislation which
incorporated many of the basic concepts of the Code."' As part
of her adhesion to ANCOM, she adopted the Code and shortly
thereafter enacted Decree 62146 and Decree 631"1 to implement
the Code. Recently, she replaced Decree 62 with Decree 2,03111
and Decree 63 with Decree 2,44211 to bring her domestic law
into conformity with the 1976 amendments to the Andean Foreign Investment Code. 15°
Both the Code and Venezuela's internal laws require all
new and existing foreign investments to be registered with and
approved by the government. 5 ' Loans from foreign sources to
companies in Venezuela must also receive prior governmental
authorization.'5 2 All contracts to import technology, as well as
those to use patents or trademarks, must likewise be approved
and registered.'5 Failure to comply with these registration requirements will result in the loss of the right to remit earnings'54
gime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and
Royalties, as amended (1976), reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 138 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as AFIC]. See also note 25 supra.
145. Venezuela's Proposed Investment Law Shows Influence of Ancom's
Regulations, 1972 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 71.
146. Apr. 28, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1220 (1974).
147. Apr. 28, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1221 (1974).
148. Feb. 8, 1977, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'IS 1531 (1977) and in Gac. Of.
31,171 (Feb. 9, 1977) (Ven.).
149. Nov. 8, 1977, Gac. Of. 2,100 Ex. (Nov. 15, 1977) (Ven.).
150. See Decision 103 of Oct. 30, 1976 and Decision 109 of Nov. 30, 1976, integrated into Decision 24 reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 138 (1977).
151. AFIC, supra note 144, arts. 2, 5; Ven. Decree 2442 supra note 149, arts. 13,
20.
152. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 14; Ven. Decree 2442, supra note 149., art. 55.
153. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 18; Ven. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 63.
154. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 37; Ven. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 32.
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or capital,' 5 to make payments on principal or interest,' 6 as
well as to transfer royalties abroad.' 7
The agency in Venezuela charged with supervising these
foreign inputs is SIEX (the Foreign Investment Agency), responsible to the Ministry of Finance.' 5 SIEX must decide
whether to approve a direct foreign investment within 180 days
after filing of the completed application.'5 9
Inspired by Professor Hirschman's thesis that foreign companies should gradually begin divesting themselves of equity
investments in Latin America,' 0 the decisionmakers of
ANCOM built into the Andean Foreign Investment Code provisions to compel periodic sales of foreign held shares to nationals within the member states. Since an extensive literature
already exists on these fadeout provisions,'6 ' this article will
focus only on Venezuela's laws implementing the Code and the
recent amendments thereto.
1. The Divestment Provisions
All foreign enterprises' 6 2 making new investments in Vene155. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 8; Ven. Decree 2442, supra note 149, arts. 41, 42.
156. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 16; Ven. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 62.
157. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 21; Ven. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 64, sole
para.
158. Ven. Decree 2442, supra note 149, arts. 3-12.
159. Id. art. 26. For appeal from an adverse decision by SIEX, see id. arts. 74-77.
160. A. HIRSCHMAN, HOW TO DIVEST IN LATIN AMERICA AND WHY (1969).
161. Abbott, Bargaining Power and Strategy in the Foreign Investment Process:
A Current Andean Code Analysis, 3 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 319 (1975); Danino, The
Andean Code After Five Years, 8 LAW. AM. 635 (1976); Fouts, The Andean Foreign
Investment Code, 10 TEX. INT'L L.J. 537 (1975); Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for Normative Order as to Direct Foreign
Investment, 66 AM. J. INT'LL. 763 (1972); Schill, The Mexican and Andean Investment
Codes: An Overview and Comparison, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 437 (1974); Schliesser
(ed.), Recent Developments in Latin-American ForeignInvestment Laws, 6 INT'L LAW.
64 (1972); Valdez, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: An Analysis, 7 J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 1 (1972); Comment, Chile's Rejection of the Andean Common Market Regulation of Foreign Investment, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 138 (1977); Note, Andean Pact
Constitutionality: A Final Word from Colombia, 7 LAW. AM. 614 (1975); Note, The
MultinationalEnterprise in the Context of Latin American Economic Integration:The
Andean Agreement Model, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 245 (1973); Note, Political Components and PracticalEffects of the Andean Foreign Investment Code, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1597 (1975).
162. Foreign investment is defined in article 1 of the AFIC, supra note 144, and
articles 2(a) and (b) of Decree 2442, supra note 149.
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zuela after December 31, 1974, must agree to transform themselves into "mixed" or "national" companies within a time
period not to exceed fifteen years." 3 The expansion of an existing investment is treated as "new" for this purpose."'
A mixed enterprise is one in which foreign investors hold
less than 50% of the stock." 5 A firm in which foreigners own less
than 20% of the shares is a "national" company. 6 ' A citizen of
any ANCOM member state may be treated as a national when
computing these percentages.167 For example, a Peruvian shareholder in a Venezuelan company would be considered
"Venezuelan." However, where required by the law of his home
nation, a subregional investor must receive the consent of his
own government to make such an investment.'
Under these transformation agreements, at least 15% of
the shares must be held by Venezuelans (or other subregional
investors) at the time production begins. National investors
must own 30% of the stock by the time that one-third of the
stipulated time period has passed; upon expiration of twothirds of this time period, 45% of the stock must be in the
hands of local persons. At the end of not more than fifteen
years, at least 51% of the total shares must be owned by Venezuelans or nationals from other ANCOM states.6 9 Where
shares are sold publicly on the stock market, foreign investors
may sell their shares to other foreign investors, but such transfers must be registered with SIEX.170
Subject to the exceptions described below, foreign owned
companies existing in Venezuela prior to January 1, 1974, do
not have to satisfy these divestment requirements. However, if
such preexisting companies wish to receive the benefits of the
163. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 30; Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 51.
164. AFIC supra note 144, art. 1; Decree 2442, supra note 149, arts. 2(a), (b).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 1; Decree 2442, supra note 149, arts. 2(c), 27.
168. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 1; Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 28.
169. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 30; Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 51; see Ley
Sobre Transformaciones de Empresas Extranjeras (May 21, 1975), Gac. Of. 30774
(Aug. 21, 1975) as printed in G. PICO MANTILLA, supra note 25, at 349, translated and
reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1489 (1975).
170. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 25.
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reduced internal tariffs upon shipping their products to other
ANCOM nations, they too must agree to transform themselves
into national or mixed companies by 1989.''
The Andean Foreign Investment Code provides for some
major exceptions to these divestment requirements. Article 34
of the Code exempts foreign enterprises which export more
than 80% of their production outside the ANCOM region; such
firms, however, would not qualify for the reduced internal tariffs when they sell to other ANCOM nations. This Article also
exempts investments in the tourism sector from the fadeout
provisions. Article 36 of the Code stipulates that a company
shall be considered as "mixed," if the state owns a portion of
its shares, even if that percentage be less than 51%, so long as
the state has a "determining capacity" in the decisions of the
enterprise. Finally, the recent ANCOM Decision 124 provides
that investments by public international lending institutions
(e.g., the World Bank) or by foreign government development
assistance programs shall be treated as "neutral" capital and
excluded in computing the percentages required to qualify as
a "mixed" or "national" company.'72
It is not clear whether the provisions of Articles 34 and 36
of the Andean Foreign Investment Code and ANCOM Decision
124 are effective law in Venezuela. Neither Venezuelan Decree
2,031 nor Decree 2,442 mentions such exceptions. It may be
that the Venezuelan decisionmakers concluded their economy
was strong enough to attract foreign investments without these
special exemptions. On the other hand, one might argue that
these exceptions are incorporated by reference into this nation's domestic law since the congressional decree approving
Venezuela's accession to ANCOM specifically included Decision 24, the Andean Foreign Investment Code. Moreover, article 1 of Venezuela's Decree No. 2,442 states that Decision 24
and the recent amendment thereto, Decision 103, shall govern
foreign investments.
The Andean Foreign Investment Code also provides that
the fadeout provisions do not have to be applied to the basic
171. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 28; Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 49.
172. Art. 2(c); See AFIC, supra note 144, at 155 (temporary provisions).
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products sector for a period of ten years.' The term "basic
products ' refers primarily to oil and gas, minerals, and pipelines. Since Venezuela has already nationalized her petroleum
and iron ore industries,'74 that provision of the Code probably
has little significance for this nation.
Certain sectors of the economy are reserved for "national"
companies only. Included in this category are all public services, "5 a term defined in Venezuelan legislation to include telephones, mail, telecommunications, drinking water, electricity,
sewage works, sanitary services, street cleaning, and garbage
collection, as well as security services.'78
New investments in insurance and commercial banking
are limited to national companies. Existing banks in Venezuela
must convert to national companies or lose the right to accept
local deposits'77 or to increase their capital. 7 ' No branches of
foreign banks may be established in Venezuela after 1975.' 71
Insurance companies may not operate in this nation if more
than 20% of their shares are held by foreigners; 80 existing insurance companies were given two years in which to convert into
8
national companies.' '
New investments are also restricted to national companies
for the following industries: domestic transportation services,
advertising, television, and newspapers and magazines in
173. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 40.
174. Ley Organica Que Reserva al Estado la Industria and el Comercio de los
Hidrocarboros (August 29, 1975), [1975] Gaceta Legal.No. 405, at 5 (Ven.); Decree
580, Por El Cual Se Reserva al Estado La Industria De La Explotacion De Mineral
De Hierro (November 26, 1974), [1974] Gaceta Legal No. 384, at 5 (Ven.).
175. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 41; Ven. Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. 1(a).
176. Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. 1(a).
177. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 42; Ley General de Bancos y Otros Instituciones
de Credito, Decree 869 of Apr. 22, 1975, arts. 95, 98, [1975] Gaceta Legal No. 394, at
3 (Ven.); Ven. Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. 4.
178. Ley General de Bancos y Otros Instituciones de Credito, Decree 869 of Apr.
22, 1975, art. 97, [1975] Gaceta Legal No. 394, at 3 (Ven.).
179. Id. art. 96.
180. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 42, and Ley de Empresas de Seguros y Reaseguros,
Decree 870 of Apr. 22, 1975, art. 25(b), [19751 Gaceta Legal No. 400, at 3 (Ven.).
181. Id. art. 192(a). Companies affected by this law were Pan American Life
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Spanish. 82 Existing foreign enterprises operating in these fields
were to have been transformed into national enterprises by
3
December 30, 1977.'
The Andean Foreign Investment Code, however, does permit a member state to waive the requirements that certain
economic sectors be reserved for national companies,' 8 ' but,
unless the firms operating in these fields qualify as either
"mixed" or "national," they will be denied the privilege of
selling to other ANCOM nations at the reduced internal duty
rates. 8 5 Venezuelan law authorizes SIEX to approve mergers or
sales which will result in a mixed company, even in those sectors which are reserved for national companies.' This exception allows SIEX to aid in reducing the financial loss which
would otherwise be incurred by foreign enterprises forced to sell
the bulk of their shares to local investors within a very short
time period, e.g., by the end of 1977 for advertising firms.
Venezuela also reserves professional consulting for
"national" firms;8 7 this restriction is not required by the Andean Foreign Investment Code. Mixed companies in Venezuela, nevertheless, may engage in professional consulting if
SIEX finds their work is "contributing technology" for the de88
velopment of the country.
Finally, the Andean Code reserves domestic marketing
services for national companies, 9 but allows its member states
to make exceptions to this rule in special circumstances. 90 Venezuelan law stipulated that firms engaged in marketing goods
shall convert into national firms by December 30, 1977.91 To
accomplish this, such companies could either sell existing
Insurance Co., American International Underwriter's Corp., AFIA World Ins., and
Confederated Life of Canada. IL&T, Venezuela § 3.03, at 6-7 (July 1977).
182. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 43; Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. l(b).
183. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 43; Decree 2031, supra note 148, arts. 2, 3.
184. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 44.
185. Id.
186. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 52.
187. Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. 1(d).
188. Id.
189. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 43.
190. Id. art. 44.
191. Decree 62, supra note 146, art. 2; Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. 2.
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shares or increase their capital. Many foreign firms encountered difficulty finding buyers for their shares. Other foreign
companies found purchasers, but among the traditional industrial groups. The government refused to approve those sales
because it wanted stock ownership to be more widely distributed among smaller investors. "' Thus, the new law provides
that SIEX may extend the 1977 deadline for an additional year
where justified by special circumstances. "3
The new Venezuelan statute on marketing refers only to
"goods.""' Consequently, firms marketing services, such as
leasing IBM machines or renting AVIS autos, are not obligated
to convert to national companies."'
There are several other important exceptions to the transformation requirements for marketing concerns. First, companies which market goods they themselves have manufactured
within Venezuela are exempted from this obligation." ' A company will qualify for this classification if the locally manufactured articles account for 51% of its total activities and if the
value added to the product within Venezuela amounts to at
least 30%. These percentages must be proportionately reflected
in the firm's gross sales and its total income. Furthermore,
other items marketed by these excepted companies must bear
a relation to the articles made locally." 7 Marketing companies
which before the end of 1977 have agreed with the government
to begin such local production by February 8, 1980, will also be
8
exempt from the transformation requirement."1
Another exception is made for existing concerns that market goods produced under subcontracts with local firms. The
only requisite is that the excepted company provide, either
directly or through an affiliate, real and effective technology to
the local subcontractor. Such arrangements must be approved
192. New Venezuelan Decree Shows Changes in Attitude Toward Foreign
Investors, 1977 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 75, 79.
193. Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. 2.
194. Id. art. 1(c).
195. Venezuelan Decree On Marketing Operation Is Being Clarified, 1977 Bus.
LATIN AMERICA 126, 127.
196. Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. 1(c).
197. Id. art. 1, par. 3.
198. Id. art. 1, par. 2.
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by SIEX. 99 It has been reported that, upon expiration of the
relevant technology agreement, SIEX will not compel the exempted firm to convert into a national company. °°
A final exception is provided for firms importing capital
equipment and consumer durables (as well as their accessory
and complementary parts), providing that such goods are not
produced in Venezuela and are not subject to import restrictions. To qualify for this exemption, the company must furnish
inside the nation the services needed to use and to maintain
these goods. Such firms are also obligated to train Venezuelan
nationals to perform this work."0 '
It is not clear whether the above described excepted firms
in the marketing field are required to convert into mixed companies. Decree 2,031 is silent on this question; however, the
general provisions of Decree 2,442 may be interpreted to require
their eventual transformation into mixed enterprises, at least
for new investments and for existing companies that wish to
sell to other ANCOM countries at the reduced internal duty
202
rates.
One final prohibition on foreign investors should be noted.
Venezuela and the four remaining nations may not authorize
direct foreign investment to produce goods which have been
reserved for manufacture by Ecuador or Bolivia (see Part II-A3 supra).' 3
Several administrative provisions had to be built into the
laws, if the divestment requirements were to be effectively enforced. First, the Andean Foreign Investment Code stipulates
that all bearer shares must be converted into shares registered
in the name of the owner.241 This mandate was implemented in
Venezuela in 1975,205 and no bearer shares may be issued in the
future.206 Next, the Venezuelan legislation compels all enter199. Id. art. 1, par. 4.
200. Venezuelan Decree On Marketing OperationsIs Being Clarified, 1977 Bus.
LATIN AMERICA 126.
201. Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. 1, para. 1.
202. Decree 2442, supra note 149, arts. 49, 51, 52.
203. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 46.
204. Id. art. 45.
205. SIEX, Aviso Oficial of Feb. 3, 1975, Acciones Nominativas, reprinted in G.
PIco MANTmLO, supra note 25, at 335.
206. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 79.
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prises with any foreign shareholders to obtain from SIEX certificates' 7 which indicate the category in which the company
falls-national, mixed, or foreign. 08 Finally, both the Andean
Foreign Investment Code'0 and the Venezuelan law '10 provide
for a system of certificates of origin to be issued to firms which
have agreed to transform themselves into national or mixed
companies and which are therefore entitled to sell to other
ANCOM nations at the reduced internal duty rates.
2. Controls over Earnings
Originally, the Andean Foreign Investment Code prohibited foreign investors from remitting abroad yearly profits in
excess of an amount equal to 14% of the investment.2 1' Exceptions to this rule could be authorized only by the ANCOM
Commission.2 12 Likewise, member states could not authorize
foreign investors to reinvest annually profits in excess of the
equivalent of 5% of the company's capital. 213 Questions arose
as to what was to be done with any profits over these ceilings.
On accession to ANCOM, Venezuela did secure the right to
permit foreign investors to apply these limbo profits to Portfolio Development Bonds,21 which includes public debt certificates, mortage bonds, financial bonds, certificates of deposit,
private company bonds, and bonds or securities of the Andean
215
Development Corporation.
Foreign investors were quick to complain that these ceilings on profits were too restrictive, especially in the case of
Venezuela. In 1973, just prior to Venezuela's accession to the
common market, that nation had been considered the most
profitable investment site in Latin America, with an average
return of 25.8%. At that time U.S. direct investment in Vene207. Id. arts. 44, 45.
208. "Foreign" is defined as an enterprise with 50% or more foreign ownership.
AFIC, supra note 144, art. 1.
209. Id. arts. 29, 32.
210. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 53.
211. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 37.
212. Id.
213. Id. art. 13.
214. Accession Agreement, supra note 25, Annex B, art. 34; AFIC, supra note 144,
art. 13.
215. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 36.
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zuela was $2.6 billion;'" two years later it had dropped to $2.1
billion. Likewise, the rate of return on investments had fallen
to 17.1%. 117In 1976, only $51 million new foreign investment in
Venezuela was approved."'
The Venezuelan government was not unsympathetic to
these complaints from the foreign private sector. Even when
negotiating her entry into ANCOM, Venezuela had favored
increasing the ceiling on remittances to 20%.111 Finally, in 1976,
the Andean Foreign Investment Code and the Venezuelan law
were revised to liberalize the provisions on earnings of foreign
investors.
The ceiling on remittances abroad was increased from 14%
to 20% of the investment. 20 Moreover, the President of Venezuela may authorize remittances in excess of that amount. 2 '
Venezuela's currency is freely convertible.222 Therefore, to
make these prohibitions effective, her law also had to forbid
distributions to foreign shareholders above the 20% ceiling.
However, distributions above that amount may be made to a
majority foreign-owned company, if it is incorporated in Venezuela and if the distributed funds will not be sent abroad.22 3 In
addition, SIEX may permit distributions above the 20% for
approved investments or reinvestments in the nation.224 Finally, distributions above 20% are allowed if the President has
225
authorized remittances abroad in excess of that ceiling.
For profits in excess of the amount permissible for distribution to a foreign shareholder, SIEX may authorize such
funds to be declared as a dividend for the benefit of said shareholder and to be used in one of the following ways. First, the
216. LA Investment and ROI Prospects Turn Favorable for US Firms, 1974 Bus.
LATIN AMERICA 370, 371.

217. US Direct Investment in LA And Rates of Return Doing Better Than
Elsewhere, 1976 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 321, 322.
218. IL&T, Venezuela § 1.06, at 4 (July 1977) (unofficial figures).
219. Venezuela Seeks Major Concession in Ancom Bid, 1972 Bus. LATIN AMERICA
101.
220. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 37; Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 33.
221. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 33.
222. IL&T, Venezuela § 1.04, at 3 (July 1977).
223. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 32.
224. Id. art. 34(1).
225. Id. art. 34(2).
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company may utilize these excess profits in the normal operations of the firm. Such funds are to be treated as a loan from
the foreign shareholder to that company and will earn interest
at the rate set by the Central Bank. Alternatively, such excess
profits may be placed in a trust fund for the benefit of the
foreign shareholder and receive the earnings therefrom. As a
third option, the monies may be invested in the Portfolio Development Bonds." 6 The earnings on amounts invested in any
of these three alternatives may be remitted abroad, and the
principle amount may be remitted upon liquidation of the company or sale of the shares, bonds, or rights.? 7
The ceiling on the amount of profit which the foreign
investor has an automatic right to reinvest was increased from
5% to 7%. While permission is not necessary for amounts under
that ceiling, such reinvestments must be registered with
SIEX. 2 8 Such profits are classified as "reinvestments" and
may be added to the capital base upon which the 20% remittance and 7% reinvestment limits are computed in the future.2 9
Reinvestments above that 7% figure are treated as new investments and must receive prior approval by SIEX before they
can be added to that base.230 Foreign enterprises which have
signed agreements with the government to convert into national or mixed companies can reinvest profits above the 7%
ceiling without special permission of SIEX.? 1
3. Loans from Foreign Sources
Both the Andean Foreign Investment Code2 32 and the Venezuelan legislation2 33 provide that, for foreign source loans between related companies, the effective rate of interest may not
exceed three points above the market rate for first class securities in the country of origin of the funds. This prohibition applies to loans between a foreign parent and its subsidiary, as
226. Id. art. 35.
227. Id. arts. 35, 41.
228. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 13; Decree 2442, supra note 149, arts. 29, 30.
229. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 13; see Valdez, supra note 161, at 12; IL&T,
Venezuela 10 (March 1976).
230. Id.
231. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 31.
232. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 16.
233. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 58.
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well as between subsidiaries and/or affiliates of a foreign company."' The "effective" rate of interest includes commissions
and surcharges of all sorts." 5 For foreign source loans between
unrelated companies, SIEX must establish the maximum
effective annual interest rate after consultation with the Central Bank.2 36 In addition, Venezuelan law requires that all such

foreign loan contracts contain a clause permitting prepayment
37

free of penalties.

The Andean Foreign Investment Code calls on its member
states to deny long term credit from the domestic market to
foreign enterprises.2 38 The individual nations may establish
their own policies on short and medium term domestic credit;
medium term credit is defined as less than three years.239 The
Venezuelan statute has no specific provision on this point, but
SIEX, upon the advice of the Central Bank, must establish the
conditions governing the access of foreign firms to the domestic credit market.2 40 Finally, Article 15 of the Andean Code

provides that member governments shall refrain from guaranteeing foreign private loans, unless the state is a participant in
the project involved.
4. Restrictions on Technology Transfer Contracts
Venezuelan legislation specifically incorporates as domestic law Articles 20 and 25 of the Andean Foreign Investment
Code. 24 ' Article 20 provides that no contract for the transfer of

foreign technology or patents shall be approved if it contains
any of the following clauses: those allowing the supplier to fix
the sale or resale price of the goods produced thereunder; those
prohibiting the use of competing technology; those giving a
purchase option to the technology supplier; those obligating
the licensee to transfer back to the supplier inventions or improvements arising out of such technology; those restricting the
volume or structure of production; or those requiring the purchaser to pay royalties on patents which are not used. Save in
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id. art. 57.
Id. art. 57; see AFIC, supra note 144, art. 16.
Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 59.
Supra note 144, art. 17.
Id.
Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 61.
Id. art. 66.
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exceptional circumstances, these contracts may not include
clauses limiting or prohibiting exports of the goods manufactured thereunder. Likewise proscribed are clauses that require
the licensee to employ permanently personnel selected by the
supplier and clauses that limit the licensee to procuring capital
goods, raw materials, intermediate products, or other technology from a particular source. This procurement prohibition
may be waived in exceptional cases, so long as the cost of the
item does not exceed the world market price.
Article 25 stipulates that licensing agreements for foreign
trademarks may not incorporate clauses which limit or forbid
exports of the goods produced under the trademark, which fix
the sale or resale price of that product, which obligate the
licensee to pay for an unused trademark, or which require the
user to employ permanently personnel selected by the licensor.
Also these contracts may not compel the licensee to use raw
materials, intermediate goods, or equipment supplied by the
licensor or its affiliate companies; in exceptional cases, the
recipient nation may permit such a clause, if the cost of the
items does not exceed the world market price.
Besides those restrictions, Venezuela has added her own
list of other clauses which may not be included in any trademark, patent, or licensing agreement: those which prohibit the
manufacture or sale of the goods involved after expiration of
the contract; those calling for royalty payments even where the
technology has been "sold" to the user; those which forbid the
use of knowledge or improvements arising out of the technology
after the agreement has expired; those requiring implementation of specific quality controls; those forbidding the use of
similar trademarks after termination of the contract; those
stipulating that the user will pay the licensor's local taxes on
the royalties; those providing for royalty payments for technical assistance which has not been transferred; and those calling
for the licensee to give the supplier an irrevocable power to sell
2 2
the goods manufactured under the license.
All technology agreements must also obligate the supplier
2 3
to train Venezuelan personnel in the use of the technology.
242. Decree 746 of Feb. 11, 1975, art. 1, reprinted in G. PICo MANTILLO, supra note
25, at 331.
243. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 67.
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In addition, SIEX, in deciding whether to approve a technology
transfer agreement, may take into account its effect on employment, on development, on income generation, on the environment, and on the balance of payments. 44 Finally, the Venezuelan Congress has delegated to the President authority to designate other clauses which must be included in or excluded from
2 45
foreign technology contracts.
Royalty payments between a majority foreign owned subsidiary and its parent or affiliates are prohibited, and such
payments may not be deducted from taxable income.2 " Minor
"occasional services" are excepted from this prohibition, provided that SIEX approves the amount of the payment. In addition, foreign enterprises which have agreed to convert into na2 47
tional or mixed enterprises are exempt from this proscription.
Finally, technology contributions may not be counted as part
24
of the capital of a company. "
Formerly, under Venezuelan law, no new technology contract could exceed five years.2 " Under the 1977 change, however, SIEX may approve contract periods up to fifteen years in
exceptional circumstances.25 0
5. Miscellaneous Laws Affecting Foreign Investment
SIEX must present to the President for his consideration,
any foreign investment in excess of Bs. 20 million (about U.S.
$5 million).25 ' Although SIEX is empowered to establish the
criteria for foreign investments, the statute does list certain
factors and states the project may be approved if two of such
features are present. These itemized factors are: projects
which, within a reasonable time, will incorporate within their
products a local value added component of at least 51%; pro244. ANCOM Decision 84 of May 27, 1974, art. 7, reprintedin G. Plco MANUrLO,
supra note 25, at 367. For an excellent discussion of the application of these laws on
technology transfer, see Pate, Present and Future Venezuelan Technology Policies:
Implementation and Implications for Technology Suppliers and Foreign Investors, 9
LAW. AM. 1 (1977).
245. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 73.
246. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 21; Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 68.
247. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 69.
248. Id. art. 68.
249. Decree 63, supra note 147, art. 56(e).
250. Decree 2442, supra noe 149, art. 65(e).
251. Id. art. 9(9).
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jects exporting goods which contain at least a 30% local value
added component; investments which will generate a significant amount of employment; those located in the lesser developed areas of the nation; projects which will use vital technology; enterprises which agree to convert into national or mixed
companies more rapidly than required by law; and those projects whose organizers promise to reinvest the profits generated
within Venezuela in Portfolio Development Bonds.252
Article 51 of the Andean Foreign Investment Code states
that no investment contract or technology transfer agreement
may contain a clause submitting possible conflicts to a foreign
court. This article also prohibits clauses permitting the subrogation of a foreign government to the rights of the investor.
This latter proscription resulted in the suspension of the insurance and guaranty programs of the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation in the ANCOM nations." 3 Neither Venezuelan Decree 2,031 nor Decree 2,442 contains any provisions
similar to this Article 51 of the Andean Code. As indicated
above, however, Venezuela may consider itself bound by such
provisions since the Code has been specifically approved by her
2
Congress. 11
III. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The foregoing analysis reveals that, through the Accession
Treaty and subsequently enacted legislation, Venezuela has
managed to mesh her legal structure neatly into a preexisting
common market. There are still a few cloudy areas, such as,
whether the Andean Code's prohibition against foreign court
selection clauses has been incorporated into Venezuela's domestic law. In general, however, it is clear that this nation has
brought her municipal law into close conformity with the international prescriptions established by ANCOM.
The legal framework laid down by ANCOM and Venezuela
appears to have produced a balanced combination of mandatory requirements and essential flexibility. It will be recalled
that the LAFTA Treaty left the actual tariff cutting to future
agreements between its members. For instance, every item to
go on the Common Schedules had to be discussed individually
252. Id. art. 22.
253. 22 U.S.C. § 2197(b)(Supp. V 1975); OPIC Country Lists.
254. See note 25 supra; Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 1.
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and agreed upon by the nations in subsequent negotiations.
The same was true for each article on which a duty concession
was to be offered under a National Schedule negotiation. Consequently, whenever a particular product was suggested for a
possible concession, the manufacturers of that item could
exert strong pressure on their governments to retain the existing protective tariffs. Ultimately, the LAFTA countries found
themselves stymied by their inability to offer articles for concessions, and the system ground to a halt.
In contrast, the ANCOM structure removes a good deal of
discretion from its member nations by mandating that certain
actions must occur by fixed dates. Internal duties on nonscheduled goods are to be reduced automatically by prescribed percentages each year. Nonfavored nations have to abolish duties
on sectorial products from favored countries at once. Every
member had to bring its duties up to the minimum common
external tariff level by a set date. By framing these provisions
in obligatory terms, ANCOM has, to a large extent, freed its
member governments from the political pressures to which
they could otherwise be subjected by every industrialist who
feared outside competition.
On the other hand, if the rules established by a new common market are overly rigid, the member states will be
tempted to ignore them and the integration effort will fail. The
Central American Common Market Treaty provided for immediate free internal trade.15 Yet when political and commercial
pressures became too great, her members began imposing duties on each other's goods.25 Honduras finally withdrew, and
this integration unit is currently in limbo.
Some observers thought the withdrawal of Chile sounded
the death knell for ANCOM. Chile's action, however, should
perhaps be attributed more to political differences than to any
inherent defect in the ANCOM structure. Moreover, the response of ANCOM to this event may indicate a flexibility
255. Multilateral Treaty of Free Trade and Central American Integration (June
10, 1958), art. 1, printed in INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
STUDIES, 2 INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND IN THE CARIB-

365 (1975).
256. Honduras Checks CACM Recovery By Slapping Duties on Region's Goods,
1971 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 8; Costa Rica Import Restrictions Provoke New Crisis in
Central America, 1971 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 193.
BEAN
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which will allow this common market to survive, not only this
setback, but also future crises. Chile's departure did provide an
opportunity to bring Venezuela into the Metalworking Sectorial Program through the reallocation of products previously
assigned to Chile. Many of the ANCOM features to which
Chile had objected and with which Bolivia and Ecuador were
having problems were modified in 1976. The deadlines for duty
reductions were extended by as much as five years. The possibility of attracting foreign investment was increased by relaxing the remittances and reinvestments provisions. Nations,
such as Venezuela, appear to have developed an increased sensitivity to the special needs of Bolivia and Ecuador, as evidenced by Venezuela's agreement to yield the high density
polyethylene market to Bolivia.
Even the strictest provisions in the ANCOM accords incorporate a degree of flexibility. Venezuela was allowed to exclude
236 items from the automatic tariff cutting provisions. Likewise, she was permitted to apply discriminatory duties to certain products from individual member nations in order to protect key sensitive industries. On the grounds of hardship, she
was authorized to suspend the minimum common external tariff on sixty items. In structuring the Petrochemical Sectorial
Program, the designers made a special concession to satisfy
Venezuela's interest in developing a petrochemical export industry. The possibilities for relief built into ANCOM's legal
structure, combined with the flexible response of its leadership,
may mean this organization is sufficiently adaptable to survive.
The Andean region has decided for now to retain its current divestment rules. Only time and experience will demonstrate whether this expanded market can attract sufficient foreign capital and technology under these norms. If the results
are favorable, the Andean Foreign Investment Code will have
provided the world community a model whereby foreign influence on an economy can be reduced, without resort to massive
expropriations.
The Sectorial Program of ANCOM offers an innovative
approach to the need for balanced regional development. It
attempts through the discriminatory tariff structures to give
the favored nations a temporary edge over their competitors-an advantage which may be crucial for Bolivia and Ecua-
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dor. On the other hand, it avoids the outright creation of monopolies and envisions eventual free competition between national producers.
Unlike the European Economic Community (EEC),
ANCOM does not have a supranational tribunal to resolve disputes affecting private persons on common market matters.2 57
The Court of Justice of the EEC has played a vital role in
enforcing the internal free trade obligations, in developing the
antitrust rules, and in determining whether national or community law prevails.2 5 In ANCOM no judicial organ is available to decide whether a member state has violated an
ANCOM law, to rule on exactly how much a certain foreign
company can reinvest, or to ascertain which duty rate should
apply to a particular item in a specific case. If Venezuela
should now pass a statute inconsistent with the Cartagena
Agreement or with an ANCOM Decision, which law would prevail-the Venezuelan national law or the ANCOM rule? Who
will decide this question?
Should decisions of the Colombian Supreme Court on a
common market question conflict with those from Venezuela,
there is no higher tribunal to establish a uniform position on
the issue. Although civil law courts do not follow the theory of
stare decisis, in fact, the existence of the supranational tribunal in the EEC has been highly effective in achieving a consistent pattern of regulation in that market.
Nonetheless, it may be preferable for ANCOM to leave the
creation of a supranational tribunal to the future and to concentrate for now on molding her basic structure to fit the economic realities as they develop. Merely to implement the numerous and complex ANCOM rules at the nation-state level
poses an enormous task for its members.
Government agencies will need to establish and police
certificates-of-origin systems so that only those goods which
have satisfied the local content rules will receive the advanta257. A procedure is established for settling disputes between member states. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 23, and LAFTA Protocol for the Settlement of
Disputes (Sept. 2, 1967), 7 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 747 (1968).
258. See, e.g., Costa v. Ente nazionale Energia elettrica impress giA della Edison
Volta, 10 Recueil 1141 (July 15, 1964), [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH)
8023 (1965).
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geous internal duty treatment. Onsite inspection of factories by
relatively honest officials will be essential to any meaningful
certificate-of-origin system.
The annual tariff revisions will have to be published and
distributed in a timely fashion to customs offices in the most
remote border towns. Low level customs officers, perhaps with
little formal education, will be expected to make sophisticated
determinations whether the duty on a particular item is the
ANCOM internal rate, the ANCOM common external tariff, a
LAFTA concession rate, a Sectorial Program "favored nation"
rate, or a Sectorial Program nonfavored nation rate. Even deciding under which NABANDINA classification on article falls
can produce disputes.
Practising lawyers within ANCOM will need to become
familiar with the detailed working of this complex tariff structure, the divestment rules, and the sectorial programs, if they
are to properly advise clients who are planning investments,
reinvesting earnings, or exporting goods. Both judges and attorneys will have to perceive when an incorrect duty has been
levied. The attorneys and the courts must ensure that importers, exporters, and other businessmen can depend on litigation
for appropriate enforcement of their rights under the ANCOM
rules.
If ANCOM is to become a viable integration unit, its governing bodies and its member states should embark on a major
educational effort. Easily understood manuals and lectures
should be prepared and delivered to customs officers at all
levels. The bar associations and the law schools should organize
one-day institutes to provide attorneys with the practical
knowledge they need to apply the ANCOM rules. Scholars
knowledgeable about intricacies of ANCOM could greatly assist in this implementation process by writing short articles
explaining the concrete working of this system to practitioners
and judges. The legal profession, in drafting the ANCOM and
the Venezuelan legislation, has proved itself innovative and
imaginative; now that same profession is called upon to make
these laws effective by training the customs officials, the judiciary, and the practising bar.

The Use of Conditions in Foreign Relations
Legislation
THOMAS

I.

A.

BALMER*

INTRODUCTION

The very heart of our identity as a nation is our firm commitment
to human rights. We stand for human rights because we believe
that the purpose of government is to protect the well-being of its
citizens. The world must know that in support of human rights
the United States will stand firm. We expect no quick or easy
results, but there has been significant movement toward greater
freedom and humanity in several parts of the world. Thousands
of political prisoners have been freed. The leaders of the
world-even our ideological adversaries-now see that their attitude toward fundamental human rights affects their standing in
the international community and their relations with the United
States.I

In his first State of the Union Address, President Carter
thus reaffirmed the human rights position that had played an
important part in his presidential campaign. Significantly,
Carter did not mention the role of Congress or of legislation in
the formulation of American foreign policy. Instead, he spoke
as if United States policy was the expression of a single, unified
view of the world held by the Executive, Congress, and the
general public. In practice, of course, the views of both Congress and the public frequently conflict with those of the President, even to the extent of frustrating the Executive's foreign
policy efforts.
In the area of human rights, and in foreign policy generally, the Carter administration has been attempting to fashion
* Member, Massachusetts Bar. A.B., 1974, Oberlin College; J.D., 1977, University of Chicago.
1. State of the Union Address by President Jimmy Carter, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20,
1978, § 1, at 12, col. 1. President Carter stressed human rights, but his address left
the status of that policy somewhat in doubt: It was not one of the three "goals" of U.S.
foreign policy (security, peace, economic growth and stability), id. at col. 5-6, but it
was included as one of the "purposes" of foreign policy, which were "to insure economic
justice, to advance human rights, to resolve conflicts without violence and to proclaim
our constant faith in the liberty and dignity of human beings everywhere." Id. at col.
6. Despite President Carter's concern for human rights, after one year in office he is
beginning to face criticism from both liberals and conservatives in Congress who think
he has not acted strongly enough in using U.S. influence to advance human rights. See,
e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1978, § 1, at 14, col. 2.
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a workable relationship with a Congress newly active in foreign
affairs. The contours of that relationship are just now beginning to emerge.
Although Congress' assertion of its role in foreign relations
can be contrasted with earlier lassitude, the question of the
respective foreign policy roles of Congress and the Executive is
as old as the nation itself, and is in a state of continual flux.
When George Washington proclaimed American neutrality in
the war between France and Great Britain in 1793, for example,
French sympathizers claimed that this action was beyond the
President's constitutional powers. The Constitution, they
maintained, gave him as the Chief Executive power to conduct
or execute foreign policy. Power to make substantive foreign
policy, on the other hand, was thought to reside in Congress.
That incident gave rise to the first great debate, the PacificusHelvidius articles by Hamilton and Madison, over the respective foreign policy roles of Congress and the President under
the newly ratified Constitution.' Since that time the two
branches have often struggled for control of United States foreign policy, each asserting that the Constitution, extraconstitutional powers, or necessity gave it authority to act in a
particular instance. While the Constitution itself carefully divides foreign policy powers between Congress and the Executive3
(and, to a lesser extent, the judiciary), the Executive has for a
multitude of reasons come to dominate American foreign policy.,
2. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957, at 178-82 (4th
ed. 1957). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-67 (1978); Sofaer,
The Presidency, War, and Foreign Affairs: Practice Under the Framers, 40 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. (No. 2) 12 (1976).
3. Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense
Policy: A NonjudicialModel, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 463, 486-88 (1976). Corwin notes that
while the framers closely adhered to the constitutional prescriptions of Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone in most respects, they deviated radically and intentionally from
those theories in their distribution of foreign affairs powers. E. CORWIN, supra note 2,
at 416-18.
4. E. CORWIN, supra note 2, at 185. See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE CONSTITUTION 37-65 (1972); Johnson & McCormick, Foreign Policy by Executive
Fiat, 28 FOREIGN POL'Y 117 (1977); Patterson, The Rise of PresidentialPower Before
World War II, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. (No. 2) 39 (1976). Despite this dramatic
increase in presidential power, in many areas the President's ability to control policy
is severely limited. For example, appropriations from prior years and the costs of
ongoing programs mean that approximately three-quarters of the federal budget consists of "uncontrollable outlays," and for political reasons much of the remaining one-
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In recent years, however, Congress has begun to reassert
its constitutional role in the conduct of foreign policy with new
legislation relating to war powers5 and oversight of executive
agreements.' Additionally, in the less exotic area of foreign and
military aid Congress has attempted to control what it has
perceived as unchecked executive discretion and error. In these
endeavors Congress appears to have been motivated both by a
desire to correct "erroneous" substantive policies of past Presidents and to redress a procedural imbalance, a deviation from
the constitutional plan. For example, the War Powers Resolution was a response to the substantive policy of the war in
Indochina, but its form is general and procedural; it is framework legislation which implements constitutionally prescribed
powers So, too, in the field of foreign aid, Congress has become increasingly sensitive to criticisms that the United States
too frequently supports the "wrong" side in foreign military
conflicts and that U.S. development assistance stabilizes repressive or dictatorial regimes abroad.8 Consequently, Congress
has moved to cut off aid to particular countries that, for example, consistently violate human rights9 and has also attempted
to make general statutory changes to improve the procedure by
which human rights issues are made a part of the foreign aid
decisionmaking process.' 0 While the new foreign aid legislation
is not fundamental framework legislation in the sense that the
War Powers Resolution is, it serves the dual purposes of injecting new substantive policies into aid decisionmaking and of
increasing congressional participation in that process.
One of the more interesting means by which Congress has
attempted to alter executive practice in foreign aid is the imposition of conditions on aid. By such conditions Congress proquarter is uncontrollable as a practical matter. Dam, The American Fiscal
Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 280 (1977).
5. Act of Nov. 7, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555.
6. 1 U.S.C. § 112b (Supp. III 1973).
7. Casper, supra note 3, at 481-82.
8. Hearings on S. 1816and H.R. 9005 Before the Subcomm. on ForeignAssistance
of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rel., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 424 (1975) (statement of
Sen. Humphrey); Gelb, Arms Sales, 25 FOREIGN POL'Y 3, 14 (1976-1977).
9. E.g., Uruguay. See Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-441, § 505, 90 Stat. 1473 (1976).
10. E.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 502B, added by International Security
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L No. 94-329, § 301, 90 Stat.
748-50 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1976)).
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vides that a country which engages in certain activities may be
denied foreign or military aid. While Congress had imposed
conditions of one sort or another on foreign aid for many years,
only recently have conditions become a detailed and important
part of every major foreign aid bill.
How effective are these congressional efforts? To date congressional attempts to control foreign relations through legislation have produced mixed results in terms of articulating a
coherent foreign policy and advancing American foreign policy
goals. Most notably, the constant stream of amendments to
foreign aid legislation, many in the form of conditions on aid,
indicates continuing congressional dissatisfaction with the operation of military and development aid programs. This article
will focus on several such conditions on aid that have been
enacted in recent years. The constitutional background of this
practice and the structure of current foreign aid programs will
be discussed; then the mechanics of some of these conditions
clauses will be examined in detail. In particular, this essay will
examine the operation of such a clause in the Turkish arms
embargo of 1974-75 and some of the more recent attempts by
Congress to relate foreign aid to human rights by the use of
conditions clauses.
The analysis of these statutory conditions on aid reveals
persistent problems, but also points to several considerations
which could guide Congress to more effective use of legislative
conditions. The greatest difficulty with such conditions is their
pervasiveness. So many different kinds of conditions are imposed upon so many*different types of aid that it is doubtful
that either Congress or the Executive knows exactly what is or
is not prohibited. This proliferation of conditions may serve to
diminish the respect for and adherence to those prohibitions
which are most important to U.S. foreign policy.
Assuming that it is impossible, or, if not impossible, undesirable for Congress to control the daily conduct of foreign policy, it should be sufficient, in most cases, for Congress to:
1. Ensure that a particular consideration (e.g.,
human rights or prevention of nuclear proliferation)
is made a part of foreign aid decisionmaking;
2. Require the Executive to collect necessary
information and transmit it to Congress; and
3. Provide itself with some means of reviewing
and modifying Executive action.
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These guidelines are necessarily somewhat vague. But, as
the examples in this article show, rigid formulas are frequently
counterproductive, while "flexibility" without at least general
goals leads only to undirected pragmatism. It is between these
twin hazards that the path towards constitutional and effective
foreign policy decisionmaking lies.

II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

While a full analysis of the constitutionality of conditions
in foreign relations legislation is beyond the scope of this article, much of the debate over such conditions takes place within
the framework of the Constitution, and several major themes
recur.
A. The Language of the Constitution
Unlike legislative-executive controversies in some other
areas of foreign relations, the constitutional underpinnings of
foreign aid are quite clear:
The Congress shall have Power to ...
provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . [and] to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations."
No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law ....
11

And perhaps most importantly, Congress has the power to
make all laws "necessary and proper" to carry out the powers
vested by the Constitution in the federal government. 3
The President's foreign aid powers are more ambiguous.
His powers to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors (with
the consent of the Senate) 4 may certainly influence foreign aid
decisions. However, his more general powers to execute the
laws, 5 appoint officers of the United States," veto legislation, 7
and his inherently "executive" powers 8 are probably more
important in his impact upon foreign aid. Looking simply at
the language of the Constitution, then, the President's power
over foreign aid is seen to be incomplete and indirect.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 9,
§ 8,
art.
§ 3.
§ 2,
art.
art.

cl. 7.
cl.18.
II, § 2, c. 2.
cl. 2.
I, § 7, cl. 2.
II, § 1, c. 1.
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The spending power and the necessary and proper clause
give Congress control over grants of money and assistance to
other countries, and Congress could constitutionally end all
foreign and military aid programs whenever it desires. It has
the power to authorize or not to authorize foreign aid, to appropriate or not to appropriate funds at will. If Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign aid funds, the Executive is probably obligated to spend them. 9 As Professor Henkin has written:
However unhappy the consequences of division of authority in
this context, one must conclude that Congress could insist on its
spending power as on other express powers, and in foreign, as in
domestic matters, can spend (or not spend) according to its views
2
of the general welfare of the United States. 1

Foreign assistance may be contrasted with congressional
efforts to control, by means of its spending power, foreign policy powers vested elsewhere than in Congress. In 1940, for example, there was an effort in the House to sever relations with
the Soviet Union by striking from the appropriations bill the
salary of the U.S. ambassador to that country. The measure
was defeated 105-108.21 Since the Constitution explicitly vests
the power to appoint ambassadors in the President and the
Senate, 22 and not in the Congress, an attempt by Congress to
control this aspect of foreign policy by means of its legitimate
spending power might be unconstitutional. If Congress is constitutionally unable to regulate some aspect of foreign policy
directly, arguably it cannot regulate it indirectly by refusing to
23
appropriate necessary funds.
B. Constitutionaland UnconstitutionalConditions
Beyond the clear power of Congress to control foreign and
19. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975).

20. L.

HENKIN,

supra note 4, at 110. The congressional spending power is indepen-

dent of the enumerated powers, and spending decisions although theoretically limited
by the general welfare requirement are essentially unreviewable on that basis. See
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936).
21. Nobleman, Financial Aspects of Congressional Participation in Foreign
Relations, 289 ANNALS 145, 156-57 (1953). For other examples of congressional attempts
to control foreign policy through the appropriations process, see L. HENKIN, supra note
4, at 353 n.52 and sources cited therein. See also Schlesinger, Congress and the Making
of American Foreign Policy, 51 FOREIGN AFF. 78 (1972).
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
23. This is particularly true in cases where the power sought by Congress is explicitly vested in another branch of government. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
164 (1926) (addressing the presidential removal power).
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military aid appropriations, Congress' powers become more
uncertain. It can be argued that the greater power, to cut off
funds completely, necessarily includes the lesser power to appropriate funds with certain conditions attached. This reasoning, however, has been challenged in the area of domestic
spending, where the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions"
may operate to prohibit Congress from using its power to spend
for the general welfare to legislate unconstitutionally over matters left to the states.24 A similar argument can be made in
foreign affairs legislation: Congress cannot regulate indirectly
by conditions on appropriations that which it could not regulate directly. 5 As with the question of the constitutional use of
the power not to appropriate, the issue becomes: What can
Congress regulate directly? Where the Constitution vests a particular power in another branch of government, Congress cannot usurp that power by attaching conditions to appropriations
legislation. Thus Congress could not condition appropriation of
a salary for the ambassador to the Court of St. James on the
appointment of a particular person to that position. The President and the Senate have the power to appoint ambassadors,
and Congress cannot encroach upon that power indirectly. To
use Professor Henkin's term, this expenditure is "obligatory"
26
and conditions may not be imposed.
Foreign aid spending, on the other hand, is voluntary, and
decisions to appropriate or not, to attach conditions or not, do
not generally conflict with powers given to the President. Foreign aid spending results from a determination by Congress
that such spending is in the interests of the country; no constitutionally based power of the President would give him the
authority to conduct a foreign aid program without enabling
legislation and financing by Congress.
24. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936). See Note, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 73 HA]v. L. REV. 1595 (1960); Comment, The Federal Conditional Spending Power: A Search for Limits, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 293 (1975). See also Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926) (discussing
unconstitutional conditions in state legislation).
25. L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 113-16.
26. Id. at 115. The appointments clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2, "seeks to
preserve an executive check upon legislative authority in the interest of avoiding an
undue concentration of power in Congress." L. TwBE, supra note 2, at 184-85. See
generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Attempting to limit this conclusion, one writer asserts
that, while Congress may refuse appropriations for foreign aid,
it cannot interfere with the President's conduct of foreign aid
programs.27 Professor Wallace claims that "the Constitution, as
it has developed, has conferred upon the executive branch exclusive powers over a 'core area' of decisions in this field of
foreign affairs, 28 a core that includes the making of policy and
"all diplomatic and Commander-in-Chief foreign affairs decisions except for the following particular classes: . . . the withholding of appropriations altogether. ' 29 Under this extreme
view of presidential power, virtually all restrictions in present
30
foreign aid legislation would be found unconstitutional.
This conception of presidential power is based almost entirely on the "gloss of life" interpretation of the Constitution 3'
and has little relation to the text itself. The mere fact that a
practice has been followed for some years does not make it
constitutional; much less does it make it constitutionally required. While a President would surely think it convenient to
the conduct of foreign policy to have a large fund available to
disburse to other countries at his discretion, there is no constitutional reason why Congress cannot, if it chooses, attach valid
conditions to the use of such money. "Valid" conditions would
seem to include the naming of countries to which foreign aid
may be given, the people in those countries who are to benefit,
and the activities of countries which should result in termination of aid. Since the power to grant foreign aid rests solely with
Congress, virtually any conditions would be constitutional unless they trenched upon some power explicitly given to the
Executive by the Constitution. An example of such an unconstitutional condition might be a foreign aid bill conditioned on
the appointment of a particular person as administrator of the
program. This might be found to interfere with the power of the
27. Wallace, The President's Exclusive Foreign Affairs Powers over ForeignAid,
Parts I & II, 1970 DUKE L.J. 293, 453. See also Note, The Appropriation Power as a
Tool of Congressional Foreign Policy Making, 50 B.U.L. REv. 34, 45-50 (Special Issue
1970).
28. Wallace, supra note 27, at 294-95.
29. Id. at 320-21 (emphasis in original).
30. Id. at 472-80.
31. The phrase is Justice Frankfurter's. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (concurring opinion). See Casper, supra note 3, at 477-80.
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President and the Senate to appoint officers of the United
States.32
It is true, as the gloss of life interpretation would emphasize, that foreign aid is now an integral part of United States
foreign policy as a whole, and that foreign aid policy has generally been formulated, within broad limits, by the Executive.
Such an observation, however, does not rise to. the level of a
constitutional objection to legislative conditions in foreign aid
programs. As Professor Henkin puts it:
Congress has insisted and Presidents have reluctantly accepted
that in foreign affairs, as in domestic affairs, spending is expressly entrusted to Congress and its judgments as to the general
welfare of the United States, and it can designate the recipients
of its largesse and impose other conditions upon it. 31

Few court decisions have dealt with the constitutionality
of conditions imposed in foreign affairs legislation. As we have
seen, some conditions might be unconstitutional while others
would not be. One lower court dealing with wartime economic
regulation broadly stated that:
Congress in making appropriations has the power and authority
not only to designate the purposes of the appropriation, but also
the executive department
the terms and conditions under which
3
may expend such appropriations. 1

But the only important decision actually dealing with a condi35 There,
tion on foreign aid is Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr.
the Second Circuit rejected a claim that the Hickenlooper
Amendment, requiring termination of aid to countries which
expropriated American-owned property without compensation,
was an unconstitutional legislative interference with executive
power." The court noted that the Constitution commits foreign
32. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. But Professor Henkin doubts that the President
could completely ignore the improper condition unless he could "assume that Congress
would have made the contribution unconditionally if it had known the condition would
fail." L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 115.
33. L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 114. See E. CORWIN, supra note 2, at 129: "Of
course, I am not suggesting that Congress may not stipulate any terms it chooses as
the conditions of making an appropriation and thereby limit the scope of the inherently
executive prerogative of planning and directing expenditure."
34. Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 60 F. Supp. 985, 988 (S.D. Cal. 1945), aff'd,
154 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1946).
35. 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
36. 383 F.2d at 182-83. Accord, D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 317 A.2d 38
(Del. Ch. 1973). In Aerotrade v. Agency for International Development, 387 F. Supp.
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relations powers both to the Executive and to the Legislature
and found the condition valid under the commerce and necessary and proper clauses.
C. Concurrent Resolutions
Another constitutional issue in the control of foreign relations is the use of the concurrent resolution as a legislative veto
of executive action. 7 The administration and much of the daily
policymaking within programs such as foreign aid is necessarily
delegated to the Executive. In its attempts to regain some of
this power, Congress has increasingly enacted legislation which
allows it in effect to veto a President's action by a concurrent
resolution of both houses. 31 Such resolutions present constitional difficulties in that they purport to make law (or have the
effect of law) without being signed by the President or fulfilling
the alternative requirement of passing each House by a twothirds majority."
Although it is unlikely that the constitutionality of the
concurrent resolution will be definitively resolved, the constitutional arguments are intimately involved in Congress' struggle
to assert foreign affairs power, and they provide a framework
for bargaining between the Executive and the Legislature. Congress' first attempt in 1976 to enact S. 2662, the International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, was vetoed
by President Ford," largely because of its seven provisions providing for congressional veto of presidential action by concurrent resolution. Congress retreated somewhat and deleted five
974 (D.D.C. 1974), a corporation involved in a financial dispute with the government
of Haiti sought a writ of mandamus to compel AID to terminate development assistance because Haiti had expropriated the corporation's property without compensation. The court held that the plaintiff lacked standing and that there was no subject
matter jurisdiction. A claim that the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 contained an
invalid delegation to the Executive of Congress' power to wage war was rejected as a
political question in Sarnoff v. Connally, 457 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
929 (1972).
37. See generally S. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 112-23 (1975) and the authorities cited therein; Note, Constitutionality
of the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J. LEGIS. 593 (1976).
38. See, e.g., War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5(c), 87 Stat. 556-57
(1973); Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 617, 75 Stat. 444 (codified
at 22 U.S.C. 2367 (1970)).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3.
40. S. 2662, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See President Ford's veto message, 12
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 828 (1976).
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of these provisions in the substitute bill, H.R. 13680, which was
later passed and signed by the President.4 ' While neither the
President nor Congress "won" in the dispute over the constitutionality of the legislative veto, the issue was an important part
of the legislative debate and did emerge as a bargaining chip
in reaching a compromise.

III.

THE FOREIGN AID BACKGROUND

42

A.

Historical Summary
Large grants of military and economic aid to other countries are a relatively recent aspect of American foreign policy.
The Marshall Plan was the first large-scale program of grants
of economic aid to other countries, and its remarkable success
led to other efforts to support U.S. interests abroad with economic and military grants and loans.4 3 Foreign aid, which had
at first been looked upon as a temporary necessity, became a
permanent feature of U.S. foreign policy during the 1950s. In
this period,
foreign aid was justified primarily as a national security measure,
needed to strengthen allies and to build up low-income countries
so that they would be less vulnerable to communist invasion or
4
takeover.

Many of the same purposes continued to guide foreign aid policies during the 1960s, although the program itself received
smaller appropriations, making it less important "both abso'4 5
lutely and in relation to other sources of assistance.
Foreign aid today is in a state of flux. It suffers from public
animosity, with recent polls showing that 56% of the American
people favor cuts in aid." As a percentage of our Gross National
Product, "development assistance has fallen from 2.79% at the
41. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.). See also the
Senate debate on joint and concurrent resolutions, 122 CONG. REc. S9022-29 (daily ed.
June 11, 1976).
42. Unless the context indicates otherwise, the term "foreign aid" means bilateral
economic and military grants, loans, guaranties, and credits.
43. K. WALTZ, FOREIGN POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 182-85, 210-17 (1967).
44. R. ASHER, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE INTHE SEVENTIES 4 (1970). For a concise
summary of the traditional purposes of foreign assistance see id. at 19-38.
45. Id. at 4. See id. at 78.
46. Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance, supra note 8,
at 74 (testimony of Joseph Nye, Jr.), citing a Dec. 1974 poll by the Chicago Council
on Foreign Relations.
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height of the Marshall Plan to 0.23% in 1974-75." 4 With more
funds being disbursed through multilateral organizations, traditional bilateral programs have accounted for an increasingly
smaller share of U.S. assistance to Third World countries,48 and
in fiscal year 1978 U.S. multilateral foreign assistance funds
may for the first time exceed bilateral funds.49 Among the reasons for this shift towards distribution of funds through international agencies was the feeling that such agencies were
"apolitical" and "neutral" and, therefore, better conduits for
foreign aid money. Congress has recently discovered, however,
that such institutions are less susceptible to its control and has
moved to add conditions to its appropriations to multinational
agencies. 0
Despite these difficulties, Congress in the last few years
has attempted to set "new directions" for foreign assistance,
emphasizing aid that actually gets to the neediest people, 5' the
implementation of "intermediate technology, 5' 2 and providing
for the phase-out of military assistance grants. 3 Furthermore,
despite reduced funding, appropriations for foreign aid remain
significant, particularly in the eyes of the countries that receive
such aid.54
47. Id. at 506 (testimony of Roy Prosterman). This low level of foreign aid funding
continued into 1978. Despite a campaign promise to increase aid to one-half of one
percent of the Gross National Product (G.N:P.), domestic economic pressures have
forced President Carter to postpone any increase above the present one-quarter of one
percent. The Administration still hopes to raise this figure to one-third of one percent
by 1982. The United States is now twelfth on the list of nations in the percentage of
G.N.P. given as foreign aid. N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1978, § 1, at 11, col. 1.
48. For a detailed comparison of multilateral and bilateral expenditures, see Center for Int'l Policy, Foreign Aid: Evading the Control of Congress, reprinted in 123
CONG. REC. S3630-40 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1977).
49. See 35 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 620 (1977).
50. For an excellent discussion of this and other recent developments relating to
human rights and foreign aid, see Drew, A Reporter at Large (Human Rights), THE
NEW YORKER, July 18, 1977, at 36, 44-52. See also text accompanying notes 157-63
infra.
51. 22 U.S.C. § 2151(b) (Supp. IV 1974), as amended by the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-161, § 304, 89 Stat. 857-58.
52. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94161, § 306(2), 89 Stat. 858-59 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151(d) (Supp. V 1975)).
53. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-329, § 105, 90 Stat. 782 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2321j (1976)).
54. Military assistance outlays, including grants, training, and credit for arms
sales, totalled $1.1 billion in FY 1976; security supporting assistance outlays were $601
million for FY 1976 and are estimated at $1.5 billion for FY 1977. Bilateral develop-
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Congress and Foreign Aid
With the exception of the rapid congressional response to
Truman's European Recovery Program in 1948, the relationship between Congress and the foreign aid program has been
uneasy at best. Congress is often criticized as provincial and
isolationist, continually obstructing executive efforts to construct an internationalist, bipartisan foreign policy.55 Recent
studies have given greater emphasis to the constructive role
that Congress has often played in foreign aid policy,5" but the
fact remains that foreign aid is a favorite target for congressional budget cutting. One writer found that of seventeen foreign affairs agencies studied over a twelve year period, the
Agency for Internationial Development (AID)-the main channel for nonsecurity foreign assistance-consistently received
the largest budget cuts. The AID appropriation averaged nineteen percent below the administration-requested figure.57
In addition to maintaining foreign aid at a fairly low level
of funding, Congress has used the annual aid bills to express
its approval or disapproval of the administration's conduct of
foreign policy and to direct foreign policy in ways it thinks
desirable. This is understandable, given that
B.

the aid program is the one item on the legislative agenda where
questions of money, administration, and the content of policy
come together in a way that permits Congress to get at them. 58

Foreign aid is one of the few areas of foreign affairs where
Congress can legislate as it wishes without raising constitutional questions.
ment assistance, mostly through the Agency for International Development (AID),
hovers at approximately $1.2 billion per year, and other aid grants including Food for
Peace (the "P.L. 480" program) account for another $1 billion annually. U.S. GOVERNMENT, BuDGEr FOR FISCAL YEAR 1977, at 75, U.S. GOVERNMENT, BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR
1978, at 89. It should be noted, however, that "[tihe United States as recently as 1965
furnished about 60 percent of all the aid donated by the world's nations. This now has
fallen to the 25 percent range; most aid recipients currently depend on the United
States for less than 15 percent of their total foreign aid." 35 CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
620 (1977).
55. See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 27; Brown, A Cooling-Off Periodfor U.S.-Soviet
Relations, 28 FOREIGN POL'y 3, 16-17 (1977).
56. See, e.g., A. FRYE, A RESPONSIBLE CONGRESS: THE PGLrnCS OF NATIONAL
SECURITY 172-73 (1975); K. WALTZ, supra note 43, at 196-224.
57. Davis, The Price of Power: The AppropriationsProcess for 17 Foreign Affairs
Agencies, 18 PUB. POL'Y 355 (1970).
58. K. WALTZ, supra note 43, at 197.
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Congress has communicated these policy preferences
through general precatory language, in conditions attached to
the receipt of foreign aid, and by actions terminating aid to
specific countries. In the early years of foreign aid, general
expressions of policy predominated. The Mutual Security Act
of 1951 required as a condition of eligibility for military, economic, or technical aid that a recipient country, among other
things, "join in promoting international understanding and
goodwill and maintaining world peace."5 The Act also declared
the policy of Congress that aid be used to eliminate barriers to
free enterprise, discourage cartels and monopolies, and encourage free labor unions and collective bargaining. 0 A 1955
amendment added that prior recipients of aid should be encouraged to help in aid programs because "certain other
friendly nations of the world remain in need of assistance in
order that they may defend themselves against aggression and
contribute to the security of the free world."'" This statement
of policy was amended in 1956 to dramatize Congress' concern
that world peace and U.S. security
are endangered as long as international communism and the nations it controls continue by threat of military action, use of
economic pressure, internal subversion, or other means to attempt to bring under their domination peoples now free and independent and continue to deny the rights of freedom and selfgovernment to peoples and nations once free but now subject to
such domination ....62

Even in the 1950s such general language was not the only
direction given by Congress to foreign aid policy. An amendment in 1956 required that aid to Yugoslavia be cut off after
ninety days unless the President determined, inter alia, that
Yugoslavia remained independent of Soviet control and was
not engaged in any program for communist world conquest. 3
The President did make such a determination, but, as Kenneth
Waltz comments, "The Congressionally prescribed procedure
59. Act of Oct. 10, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-165, § 511(a)(1), 65 Stat. 381, this section
repealed by Pub. L. No. 83-665, 68 Stat. 861 (1954).
60. Id. § 516, 65 Stat. 382.
61. Mutual Security Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-138, § 549(a)(3), 69 Stat. 289.
62. Mutual Security Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-726, § 2, 70 Stat. 555.
63. Id. § 5, 70 Stat. 556, this section repealed by Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 460
(1961).
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placed Yugoslavia in a position of dependence upon an uncertain benefactor in a fashion she found insulting." 4
Five years later the foreign aid program was completely
overhauled by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.5 This Act
included examples of all three of the means by which Congress
has controlled foreign aid. There was a lengthy statement of
general policy," an absolute prohibition of aid "to the present
government of Cuba," 7 and a conditional provision, prohibiting assistance to any country "unless the President determines
that such country is not dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement.""8 The 1961 Act, still the
major foreign aid statute, has been repeatedly amended, often
for the purpose of imposing new conditions on the granting of
U.S. aid or of injecting new policy considerations into the making of aid decisions.69 In a single section of the Act as codified,70
an informal count found six separate factors which are to operate absolutely to prohibit aid to a country, ten factors which
are to prohibit aid in the absence of a contrary presidential
determination, and four other factors which are to be
"considered" in making aid decisions. Congress has also acted
in recent years to impose expenditure limits on aid that will go
to a particular country. 7
C. The Controversy over Conditions on Foreign Aid
The executive branch has usually resented congressional
restrictions on foreign aid, whatever form they have taken.
President Nixon in particular criticized the imposition of
"counterproductive conditions on specific programs," and said
that he would "strongly resist efforts by the Congress to impose
unreasonable demands upon the necessary prerogatives of the
64. K. WALTZ, supra note 43, at 199.
65. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified at
22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq.).
66. Id. § 102, 75 Stat. 424-25.
67. Id. § 620(a), 75 Stat. 444.
68. Id. § 620(b), 75 Stat. 445.
69. For a review of these amendments, particularly those related to humanitarian
concerns, see Farer, United States ForeignPolicy and the Protectionof Human Rights:
Observations and Proposals, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 623, 641-46 (1974).
70. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 (Supp. 1977).
71. For example, economic aid to Chile for fiscal year 1976 was limited to $90
million. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94161, § 320, 89 Stat. 868.
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executive. 7 2 Some commentators support the assertion that
such conditions unconstitutionally hinder the President's conduct of foreign policy.7 3 More disinterested observers have also
criticized the heavy-handed use of legislative restrictions on
foreign aid. As Robert Asher writes:
[R]estrictive amendments and provisions considered offensive
by self-respecting nations have made this country's bilateral development assistance program progressively more difficult-almost impossible-to administer."

Indeed, a major effort is now underway to overhaul the entire
foreign aid program.75
Presidents worry not only about the ways in which foreign
aid conditions may limit their diplomatic flexibility, but also
about the effectiveness of using U.S. "leverage" in this manner.
A frequently cited example of a congressional restriction that
backfired is the Jackson-Vanik amendment which denied
"most favored nation" status to the Soviet Union until all restrictions on emigration of Soviet Jews were lifted.76 The result
was a decrease both in the number of annual emigrants from
35,000 to 10,000 and in the volume of Soviet-U.S. trade.77 The
Nixon and Ford administrations generalized the "lesson" of
that experience into a theory that U.S. influence over other
countries is greatest when military and economic ties remain
close. As Secretary of State Kissinger testified:
Certainly we cannot-and we do not-ignore domestic practices
of countries receiving security assistance which deny those
human rights that civilized states commonly agree are inalienable ....
We make our views-and those of Congress-known to
the governments concerned. We are convinced, however, that
withdrawal of security assistance is an extreme measure that
harms other objectives while holding little promise for effecting
72. National Legislative Goals, The President's Message to Congress, 9 WEEKLY
Docs. 1074, 1099 (1973). See also President Carter's opposition to
conditions on U.S. contributions to multilateral aid agencies, note 160 infra.
73. Wallace, supra note 27; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
74. R. ASHER, supra note 44, at 4.
75. 35 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 620 (1977).
76. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 402, 88 Stat. 2056-60 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 2432 (Supp. IV 1974)).
77. Kissinger, American Ideals and American Foreign Policy, STATE DEP'T
NEWSLETrER, Nov. 1976, at 12; Yergin, Politicsand Soviet-American Trade: The Three
Questions, 55 FOREIGN An'. 517 (1977).
COMP. OF PREs.
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desirable changes. Indeed, experience has shown that our influence with other nations depreciates as we cut the bonds that hold
us together."

Following this prescription during the Nixon and Ford years,
although the State Department privately expressed to certain
countries disapproval of human rights violations and apparently considered that factor in making aid decisions, they never
altered any aid decisions because of such violations."
Recent policy statements notwithstanding, there are indications that at least some legislative conditions are sometimes
effective. The Hickenlooper Amendment, requiring termination of aid to any country that expropriated American-owned
property without compensation, "did encourage Brazil to compensate American power companies for property that had been
taken" 0 and induced Honduras to abandon a plan to redistribute uncultivated property owned by the United Fruit Company.9 ' Of course, it is impossible to tell what actions by other
countries may have died in the planning stage because of the
deterrent effect of the Amendment. Leslie Gelb, in surveying
U.S. arms sales, reaches a conclusion exactly contrary to Kissinger's "don't cut the bonds" approach. He states that, although arms sales provide only limited leverage with which to
influence buyers' domestic policies,
the United States seems to have gotten better leverage from denials or threats to deny sales than by completing sales. Threats to
deny sales appear to have convinced South Korea not to buy a
reprocessing plant, to have persuaded Turkey not to invade Cy78. Hearings on FY 1977 InternationalSecurity Assistance Programs Before the
Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rel., 94th Cong.,

2d Sess. 8 (1976).
79. Id. at 108-09 (testimony of Philip Habib, Assistant Secretary of State);
Hearings on the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of
1976 Before the House Comm. on Int'l Rel., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-17 (testimony of

Carlyle Maw, Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance), 140-43 (testimony of
Lt. General Howard Fish, Director, Defense Security Assistance) (1976).
80. K. WALTZ, supra note 43, at 199.
81. Lipson, CorporatePreferencesand Public Policies:ForeignAid Sanctionsand

Investment Protection, 28 WORLD POL. 396 (1976). The rigidities of the Hickenlooper
Amendment may have been counterproductive in Peru, where the cutoff of aid to a
slightly left-leaning government may have contributed to a coup which brought a
leftist military dictator to power. See A. FRYE & P. SZANTON, REMAKING FOREIGN POLICY:
THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONNECTION 34-36 (1976). (The Hickenlooper Amendment discussed here should not be confused with the "second" Hickenlooper Amendment, now
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970), which modified the "act of state" doctrine.).
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prus in 1964 and 1968, and perhaps made Israel more amenable
to negotiations with Egypt. 2

Another difficulty with legislative restrictions on foreign
aid has been the need to combine policy direction by Congress
with flexibility. International conditions change; many different considerations are involved in a given aid decision. To
avoid the twin hazards of ineffective policy statements and
rigid prohibitions, Congress has often turned to presidential
"determinations" to implement its foreign aid policies. A typical provision is section 33 of the Arms Export Control Act
(formerly the Foreign Military Sales Act)8 3 which limits the
total amount of military assistance, credits, and loans to African countries to $40 million per year. This section also provides
that "the President may waive the limitations of this section
when he determines it to be important to the security of the
United States, and promptly so reports to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate."'" The section was amended to its present
form in December 1974 and was waived by President Ford in
both 1975 and 1976.15 Since these waivers included absolutely
no discussion of the reasons for making the determinations,
they offered a convenient way for the administration to evade
the congressional policy of limiting arms sales to Africa. While
the fact that such waivers are made does not necessarily mean
that the statutory policy is being ignored, it does indicate that
waivable restrictions may not be an effective means for Congress to exercise direction over foreign policy.8"
Several points emerge from this survey of recent foreign
aid restrictions. Congress is seeking to increase its control over
foreign aid, and one means of control is the imposition of conditions on recipients of aid. The executive branch has resisted
such conditions on the grounds that they interfere with needed
flexibility in foreign policy and may, in fact, backfire. While
82. Gelb, supra note 8,at 20.
83. 22 U.S.C. § 2773 (Supp. IV 1974).
84. 22 U.S.C. § 2773(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
85. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24887 (1975); 41 Fed. Reg. 25879 (1976). For a more egregious
example of executive evasion of a legislative condition by waiver, see note 110 infra.
86. In addition to numerous specific waiver provisions, the President has the
authority to make annual grants of up to $50 million per country (with an overall limit
of $250 million) which are not subject to the statutory conditions discussed here. 22
U.S.C. § 2364a (Supp. IV 1974).
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there is evidence that some conditions may have been effective
at one time or another, most may be evaded by presidential
"determinations" over which Congress has exercised little review.
With this background we examine in detail several recent
cases of legislative conditions.
IV.

THE TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO

The Chronology of CongressionalAction
The Foreign Assistance Act has long included a provision
stating that military assistance is "furnished solely for internal
security, for legitimate self-defense, [and] to permit the recipient country to partieipate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United
Nations.""7 Similarly, grants of defense articles and sales by
the United States government will not be made unless the
recipient country agrees that it will not use or permit the use
of such articles for purposes other than those for which they
were furnished."8 A country which is in "substantial" violation
of these provisions "shall be immediately ineligible for further
assistance." 9 There is, however, a statutory means by which
these restrictions can be avoided: The President has authority
to make annual grants, free from the statutory restrictions, of
up to $50 million per country, if he determines that such grants
are important to United States security. 0
On July 20, 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus, ostensibly for
the purpose of protecting Turkish Cypriots in the instability
following a July 15 coup. 9' This invasion involved the use of
United States defense articles and services for purposes other
than those for which they were supplied. Security assistance to
Turkey had been based on a 1947 agreement in which the govA.

87. 22 U.S.C. § 2313 (1970).
88. 22 U.S.C. § 2314(d)(1) (1970) (grants); 22 U.S.C. § 2753(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1974)
(government sales). General power to regulate and license commercial, as opposed to
government, arms sales has been delegated by Congress to the President. 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 2778 (Supp. 1977). This delegation was held to be constitutional in United States v.
Gurrola-Garcia, 547 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1976). Congress, of course, frequently acts to
prohibit commercial sales to particular countries, as it did in the Turkish embargo.
89. 22 U.S.C. § 2314(d) (1970); 22 U.S.C. § 2753(c) (Supp. IV 1974), as amended
by the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-329, § 304(b)(1), 90 Stat. 754.
90. 22 U.S.C. § 2364(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
91. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1974, at 1, col. 8.
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ernment had agreed not to use such assistance for purposes
other than those for which it was given. 2 The problem arose of
what, if anything, to do to enforce the statutory mandate.
An initial difficulty with the statutory restriction was the
mechanism for enforcement. In the eyes of Congress the invasion made Turkey "immediately ineligible" for further military
grants, credits, or government sales. However, termination of
such assistance required affirmative action from an executive
branch that never admitted that Turkey had violated the restrictions in the first place. 3 Thus, contrary to the intent of the
Foreign Assistance Act, the President neither halted military
aid to Turkey, nor did he make a determination that despite
Turkish violations continued assistance was important to the
security of the United States. 4
Frustrated by presidential inaction and supported by public opinion in some sectors, 5 Congress moved to cut off aid to
Turkey. The first major action was a sense of the Senate resolution which passed on September 19, 1974, by a vote of 64-27.1'
Senator Eagleton, the main Senate proponent of the cutoff,
discussed the statutory conditions and, in language reminiscent of the then recently concluded impeachment inquiry,
stated:"[Tlhe amendment I propose today is intended to
demonstrate that the rule of law in this Nation must prevail
over the policies of men." 7
In the following weeks both Houses of Congress debated
and voted numerous times on various provisions which would
have cut off aid to Turkey until the President certified that
Turkey was in compliance with U.S. foreign aid laws and that
92. Agreement on Aid to Turkey, July 12, 1947, United States-Turkey, art. IV, 61
Stat. 2953, T.I.A.S. No. 1629. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(i) (1970) requires denial of assistance
to any country which engages in or prepares for aggressive military action against a
country which receives aid from the United States. In 1974 Cyprus was receiving both
P.L. 480 food assistance and regular foreign aid. 120 CONG. REc. 31915 (1974) (remarks
of Sen. Eagleton).
93. 30 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 548 (1974).
94. Some Congressmen suggested that the President could not in good faith make
such a determination. 120 CONG. REc. 31914 (remarks of Sen. Eagleton), 31916 (remarks of Sen. Stevenson) (1974).
95. See, e.g., editorial, N.Y. Times, Sep. 14, 1974, at 28, col. 1. There was also a
well-organized lobbying effort by Greek-Americans.
96. See the debate in the Senate, 120 CONG. REc. 31913-23 (1974).
97. Id. at 31913.
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substantial progress had been made toward a settlement of the
Cyprus conflict. These provisions, which took the form of
amendments to continuing appropriations resolutions, met
extreme opposition from the administration-President Ford

twice vetoed the measures. 9 The President objected to the aid
cutoff because he said that it undercut his "ability to act" and
did not provide the "flexibility needed to carry forward the
foreign policy of the United States."' 00 He warned that the
absolute cutoff might lead to Turkish reprisals including possible withdrawal from NATO or interference with U.S. intelligence operations there. It was also claimed that the cutoff would
make a peaceful solution to the Cyprus question less likely.
A compromise was reached on October 17 with a measure
which prohibited further aid to Turkey, but allowed the President to delay the prohibition until December 10, 1974.101 The

regular 'foreign aid bill, passed December 18, allowed a further
delay of the cutoff until February 5, 1975.102 On February 5,
President Ford reluctantly suspended arms shipments and
other military assistance 3 because he could not make the required findings that Turkey was in compliance with the statutory conditions and that there had been substantial progress
towards a Cyprus settlement.
Arms shipments to Turkey remained at a standstill for the

next eight months. During that time attempts were made to
move towards a resolution of the Cyprus problem, and the
administration continually urged Congress to lift the embargo.
There was a close Senate vote, 40-41, on May 19 on a bill which
would have completely lifted the embargo. In supporting the
bill, Senator Sparkman expressed what appears to have been
the feeling of many Congressmen regarding the embargo: "I
cannot help but feel that we did not realize the lengths to which
98. For a detailed summary of the House and Senate actions, see 30 CONG. Q.
533-53 (1974).
99. H.J. Res. 1131, H.J. Res. 1163, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). For President
Ford's veto messages, see 10 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 1282, 1316-17 (1974).
100. Id. at 1283.
101. Act of Oct. 17, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-448, § 6, 88 Stat. 1363 (1974).
102. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 22, 88 Stat. 1801
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (Supp. IV 1974)).
103. See 11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PaFas. Docs. 155 (1975).
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we went, under Foreign Assistance Act provisions, in cutting
off military equipment deliveries to Turkey."' 14
Before the House in turn considered the Senate bill, Turkey had announced a thirty day timetable for the shutdown of
some twenty-seven U.S. military and intelligence operations
there.'"5 In an effort to assure House passage, a compromise bill
had been agreed upon in committee which prohibited direct
military grants, allowed government-to-government credit
sales only to fulfill NATO responsibilities, and allowed commercial cash sales of arms.'"' The bill would also have allowed
delivery of $185 million of arms purchased from the government before the February 5 embargo. Despite these changes
from the Senate's complete lifting of the ban, and despite intensive lobbying by the administration, 17 the House on July 24,
1975, rejected the bill, 206-223. As in the original embargo vote
in the Senate in 1974, debate focused on the problem of condoning violation of U.S. law versus the need for a flexible,
pragmatic foreign policy.
One day after the House action, Turkey closed down joint
Turkish-American bases and post exchanges on American military installations and declared the 1969 bilateral defense agreement dead. 0 8 These developments were viewed with extreme
dismay by the administration. They tended to support fears
that the arms embargo would not solve the Cyprus problem
and would weaken NATO and undermine intelligencegathering efforts.0 9
Following its August recess, the House, with a contrite
heart, passed a bill similar to the one it had rejected in July."
104. 121 CONG. REc. S8624 (daily ed. May 19, 1975).
105. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1975, at 6, col. 4.
106. S. 846, as amended, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See H.R. REP. No. 365, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
107. See 33 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1607 (1975).
108. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
109. See, e.g., 11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 845 (1975).
110. Act of Oct. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-104, 89 Stat. 508 (codified in various
sections of 22 U.S.C.). See 121 CONG. REc. H9522 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1975). The partial
lifting of the embargo is another example of the difficulties inherent in allowing presidential "determinations" that waive congressional restrictions. The bill permitted
U.S. Government arms sales to Turkey if the President determined that they were
necessary in order for Turkey to fulfill its NATO commitments. President Ford made
several such determinations allowing Turkey to obtain up to $125 million of arms in
both fiscal years 1976 and 1977. N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1977, § 1, at 7, col. 1. Some have
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After an embargo of eight months, there had been no substantial movement towards a Cyprus settlement, U.S. intelligence
operations in Turkey had been severely curtailed, and TurkishGreek relations remained hostile. By the end of 1975, Turkey
had purchased sixty military helicopters from the Soviet Union
and the two countries had signed a long-range cooperation
agreement."'
B.

Evaluation
Many commentators and politicians have criticized the
Turkish arms embargo. It has been viewed as an embarrassing
example of congressional over-involvement in the conduct of
foreign affairs and as a substantive policy that continues to
have a serious adverse effect on U.S. security. I will not discuss
the ultimate wisdom of the arms embargo in detail, but will
focus instead on several of the factors that led to its passage.
In addition to the myriad pressures of constituents, the
Executive, and the dictates of diplomacy, three aspects of the
statutory framework within which Congress acted contributed
substantially to the passage of the arms embargo. First, as
noted above, the cutoff of arms to a country that used them for
aggressive purposes did not occur automatically or by congressional action; it required an affirmative act by a reluctant President. Second, neither the statute nor any other mechanism
had kept Congress abreast of relevant diplomatic developments or possible consequences of various courses of action;
Congress did not have the information it should have had to
make the decision regarding arms sales to Turkey. Third, and
most importantly, the statutory condition was absolute: If a
recipient country used U.S.-supplied arms aggressively, shipments were to be cutoff. Period. These aspects of the statutory
framework will now be examined in more detail.
1. The Burden of Going Forward
By putting the burden of instituting cuts in military grants
and sales on the President, the Foreign Assistance Act required
a reluctant Executive to act affirmatively or to appear to counviewed these determinations as excessive and as a clear executive evasion of the statutory restriction. See, e.g., G. BALL, DIPLOMACY FOR A CROWDED WORLD 309 (1976).
111. HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on ForeignAssistance, supranote 78, at 250;
N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1975, at 3, col. 1.
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tenance violation of the statute. This, coupled with an absence
of active and imaginative diplomacy by the President, contributed to a situation where Congress felt that it had to act by the
passage of a legislative embargo. The President could
have-some would argue should have-cut off aid and arms to
Turkey on his own; the statute gave him that authority. Alternatively Turkey could have been threatened privately with a
cutoff; the administration could have expressed its opinion
that Turkey had violated U.S. law; a partial embargo could
have been imposed. Such affirmative presidential action would
have preserved flexibility. If these efforts failed, the President
would have been put in the uncomfortable position of having
to cut off aid to carry out the threat-and the law-or to use
some other means to get around the statutory restriction." 2
Still, this position could hardly have been more awkward for
the country than what actually happened, and it would have
allowed more time for quiet diplomacy.
Although the facts are difficult to come by, the State Department apparently did not threaten Turkey with a cutoff of
military aid in its attempts to settle the Cyprus dispute." 3 The

consistent administration position was that it would seek a
Cyprus cease-fire and a Turkish withdrawal, but that military
aid to Turkey was a completely unrelated issue, involving U.S.
and NATO security interests."' While neither the old President
nor the new had much time to devote to Cyprus in July and
August of 1974, the lack of presidential action probably reinforced congressional uncertainty as to the Executive's intention
to enforce the law. When Kissinger was asked at a news conference on August 19, 1974, about his interpretation of the statutory cutoff language, he stated that he would have to get a legal
opinion on the matter," 5 despite the relative clarity of the statute. It was probably not any ambiguity in the statute that
bothered the administration, but the unpleasant fact that the
statute required the President to take the initiative.
112. Such as his power to make unconditional limited grants under 22 U.S.C. §
2364(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
113. See, e.g., Kissinger's July 22, 1974, press conference, 71 DEP'T STATE BULL.
257, 258, 261 (1974).
114. See, e.g., Kissinger's Dec. 7, 1974, press conference, 71 DEP'T STATE BULL.
909, 916 (1974).
115. 71 DEP'T STATE BULL. 353, 357 (1974).
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That some of the blame for the embargo must rest with the
Executive has also been expressed by Alton Frye:
Very early, before there were votes on the Turkish cut off, senior
members of the House were advising the administration not to
let the matter be pressed to a vote. They urged the President to
use his emergency authority to sustain some flow of arms, to
allow some time for diplomacy to show progress on Cyprus, and
to let the House delay action . . . . Had he used the emergency
authority, I think the contretemps could have been avoided or at
least muted."'

The consequences of presidential inaction are particularly
striking when compared with President Johnson's effective
threats of arms cutoffs in 1964 and 1968. President Johnson's
use of the statutory condition in the context of traditional diplomacy helped prevent a Turkish invasion of Cyprus on both
7
those occasions."
A statute which contained the nonagressive use condition,
but which required Congress to act to cut off arms to an offending country might have avoided some of these problems. The
administration, operating through traditional diplomatic
channels, would still have considerable leverage to pressure a
country not to use the arms aggressively, but it would not be
forced to label a country as an aggressor and to cut off its grants
and arms. sales. The final embargo, after all, was the result of
congressional action; if the statute had made clear that that
was to be the procedure all along, the conflict over the respective roles of the President and the Congress might have been
avoided.
A more clearly drawn statute which put the burden of
initiating a cutoff on Congress rather than on the President
would not necessarily have prevented the diplomatic failures
that led to the embargo. By putting the burden on the Executive, however, the statute helped create a situation in which
executive inaction appeared to be a conscious policy choice and
a violation of the law, and Congress felt compel-led to react
legislatively.
116. Hearings on Congress and Foreign Policy Before the Special Subcomm. on
Investigationsof the House Comm. on Int'l Rel. 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 31 (1976).
117. Gelb, supra note 8, at 20. See also F. VALI, THE TURKISH STRAITS AND NATO
93-95 (1972); President Johnson's 1964 letter to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet In6nG,
reprinted in id. at 309-13.
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2. Lack of Information
The second deficiency in the statute, Congress' lack of
information, caused many Congressmen later to feel that they
had acted without enough understanding of the complex relationships between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus."' These complaints may be to some extent rationalizations for a policy
choice that went awry; but it is nonetheless true that at the
time the embargo was voted Congress did not have all the
information needed to make the decision. To take one example,
when the House International Relations Committee recommended that the embargo be lifted, it noted that under the
Treaty of Guarantee of 1960"1 Turkey had responsibility to
maintain the independence, territorial integrity, and security
of Cyprus.' 20 If this fact had come out during debate over the
initial aid cutoff, it might have made Turkey's action seem
somewhat less aggressive and less violative of U.S. restrictions
on military aid.
Other informational lacunae were more the fault of the
Executive than of the statute or of Congress' lack of diligence.
For example, even when the embargo was partially lifted in
1975, Congress had not been informed of the exact nature of the
intelligence gathering installations that Turkey had closed
down. The House International Relations Committee was told
that "several installations cannot be duplicated" and that
"others can be duplicated at considerable expense,"'' but the
Committee was not given any facts with which to make its own
conclusions regarding the importance of the installations to
22
U.S. security.
118. Hearings, supra note 116, at 94 (remarks of Rep. Lagomarsino).
119. Treaty of Guarantee, Aug. 16, 1960, between United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, 382 U.N.T.S. 3.
120. H.R. REP. No. 500, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 965, 973. However, the Committee still concluded that Turkey had
violated the statutory restrictions.
121. Id. at 2.
122. As Representative Rosenthal stated:
I would have thought ordinary procedure would have been that Mr. Sisco
or others such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff or CIA, should have come here
and told us what the effect of the loss of the Turkish bases has been?
Rather, we get conclusions without any testimony or supporting documentary material at all.
Hearings on S. 2230 before the House Comm. on Int'l Rel. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1975).
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3. Absolute Nature of the Condition
Perhaps the heart of the problem with the statutory framework was that the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act were absolute in requiring termination of assistance or sales if the recipient country used the defense articles
for prohibited purposes. The statute provided for no alternative
or compromise: The country was to be "immediately ineligible" for further assistance. The combination of the statute cast
in stark black and white terms with the executive inaction
noted above set the stage for a confrontation between Congress
and the President. Furthermore, coming at a time when many
Congressmen already wondered whether presidential policies
could be kept within the bounds of law, the Turkish question
seemed to be a test of legal restraints on the conduct of extralegal diplomacy. It was perceived as a contest between principle and pragmatism:
[Tjo pass this bill [lifting the embargo] would give a sign to
the world that a principle in our aid legislation for over a quartercentury is without significance. Passing this bill will show the
countries which last year bought $10 billion in United States
arms that realistically no restrictions apply to their use.'1

The absolute language of the nonaggressive use condition
thus put Congress in a position where its policy choices were
severely limited.
Consequently, in light of the circumstances and the congressional desire to enforce its statutory condition both against
the President and against Turkey, Congress had little choice
but to act legislatively or allow the restrictions to be flouted.
If one concedes that conditions should be attached to U.S. aid,
then those conditions must-on occasion at least-be enforced.
Inaction would have frustrated goals which were perceived to
be of particular importance, such as the principle of using U.S.supplied weapons for defensive purposes only and the idea that
foreign policy must be conducted according to law. However,
legislative action frustrated other important goals: It did not
lead to a Cyprus solution; it led instead to the closing of U.S.
bases in Turkey.
123. H.R. REP. No. 500, supra note 120, at 31-32 (Opposing views of Reps. Fascell,
Rosenthal, Yatron, Harrington, Collins, and Bonker).
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Disregarding one's evaluation of the embargo itself, it is
evident that at least to some degree Congress suffered from its
own self-imposed rules. The statutory language making violating countries "immediately ineligible" for further assistance
introduced rigidity into a situation which demanded flexibility.24 Compounding the error, the condition put the burden of
finding a violation and cutting off aid on an unwilling Executive, thereby forcing Congress to impose the prescribed penalty. As so often happens when the tool is legislation, the effect
is that of a sledge hammer rather than of a scalpel.
The characteristic rigidity of legislation, however, is present whenever there is a statutory cutoff of aid or arms sales to
a particular country. Nonetheless, despite this inherent handicap Congress frequently makes such legislative determinations
without adverse consequences. Consequently, it was not the
means, legislation, by which Congress acted that was at fault.
Criticism is more appropriately levelled at the statutory framework that helped lead to the embargo. By attaching an absolute condition to aid, by failing to require that information be
transmitted to Congress, and by putting the burden of implementing the cutoff on the President, these statutes forced Congress to act through a predetermined inflexible remedy when
other alternatives might have been more effective.

V.

HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS

A.

The Evolution of Statutory Conditions
Concern over what many have viewed as a worldwide deterioration of respect for human rights has prompted Congress to
try to relate United States foreign assistance to the preservation of such rights. 2 5 American foreign policy, for better or
worse, has frequently exhibited a strong moral emphasis. During the Cold War, foreign aid measures were directed towards
combatting communism and maintaining "independence" and
"self-government." Failures of old policies, large gaps between
124. It should be noted, however, that Congress did compromise on the cutoff date
and did in fact give the President over three months to work for a settlement through
diplomatic channels.
125. See, e.g., Fraser, Freedom and Foreign Policy, 26 FOREIGN POL'Y 140 (1977).
On Congress and human rights generally, see Salzberg & Young, The Parliamentary
Role in Implementing International Human Rights: A U.S. Example, 12 TEx. INT'L
L.J. 251 (1977); Weissbrodt, Human Rights Legislation and U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 231 (1977).
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theory and practice, a new definition of what is in our "national
interest," and humanitarian concerns have led to "new directions" in American foreign aid programs, including statutory
recognition of human rights. 26
The first legislation regarding human rights in foreign aid
was a sense of Congress provision added to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1973 stating that "the President should deny any
economic or military assistance to the government of any foreign country which practices the internment or imprisonment
of that country's citizens for political purposes.' ' 27 While this
provision applied to all assistance, later congressional efforts to
incorporate human rights considerations distinguished between military aid and aid given for nonmilitary purposes, and
went beyond simple expressions of policy.
The International Development and Food Assistance Act
of 1975 contained a detailed human rights provision, added as
section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act, 2 which applies to
development assistance, but not to disaster assistance or food
aid programs. Under the section, no assistance may be provided to the government of a country which "engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights . . . unless such assistance will directly benefit
the needy people in such country." The proviso ensures that
while human rights are to be linked to American assistance, aid
that actually reaches needy people should not be "conditioned
on their having political freedom."'2 9
The mechanism by which the provision operates is considerably more sophisticated than the statute that led to the
Turkish arms embargo. A conference committee rejected an
earlier provision which would have put the burden of declaring
126. While moral values are an essential part of American foreign policy, some
writers have warned that the United States must do more than merely substitute
human rights platitudes for anticommunist platitudes. As the United States moves
away from its old role as the world's military policeman, it must avoid setting itself
up as the world's "moral policeman." See Szulc, The Limits of Linkage, NEW REPUBLIC,
Mar. 5, 1977, at 19.
127. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 32, 87 Stat. 733. For a
discussion of Congress and human rights before 1973, see Weissbrodt, supra note 125,
at 232-40.
128. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94161, § 310, 89 Stat. 860 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (Supp. V 1975)).
129. S. REP. No. 406, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1975).
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human rights violations on the President:
In the view of the committee the House language was deficient
in that unless and until the President made a determination in
effect condemning an aid recipient government, the provisions of
the section were not operative. The committee has noted that the
executive branch is reluctant to make such determinations.'IQ

In the measure as adopted, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the House International Relations Committee may
require "assurances" from the AID administrator that assistance directly benefits needy people in a particular country and
"a detailed explanation of how that is being accomplished."' 3 '
Annual reports on the steps taken to carry out the provision are
required from the President. 3 1 If Congress then disagrees with
the executive report, it may initiate action to cut off aid by
concurrent resolution-an alternative that has always been
available under section 617 of the Foreign Assistance Act.'3 By
this relatively mild provision, Congress has sought to have
human rights factors taken into consideration in foreign aid
allocations, but without requiring the President to brand a
country as a violator or to cut off aid whenever a violation is
found. And, to prevent the Executive from ignoring the statutory direction, Congress has given itself oversight powers and
access to information gathered by the Administration.
Congress has taken a harder line in attaching human
rights conditions to military and security supporting assistance. In 1974 a human rights provision was added as section
502B of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military
Sales Act.' 4 The section stated that it was the sense of Congress that "the President shall substantially reduce or terminate security assistance" to countries which consistently violate human rights. "Security assistance" included military assistance, security supporting assistance, and government and
commercial sales under the Foreign Military Sales Act. The
only really operative part of the 502B amendment required
130. Id. at 35.
131. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94161, § 310, 89 Stat. 860 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(b) (Supp. V 1975)).

132. Id. (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d) (Supp. V 1975)).
133. 22 U.S.C. § 2367 (1970).
134. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 46, 88 Stat. 1815
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (Supp. IV 1974)).
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that: "Whenever proposing or furnishing security assistance to
any government falling within the provisions of paragraph (a)
[i.e., violating human rights], the President shall advise the
Congress of the extraordinary circumstances necessitating the
assistance."
The language of 502B contained two obvious implications
which limited its effectiveness. First, and most importantly, it
put the burden on the Executive to make a determination that
a particular country was a gross violator of human rights. Second, it allowed, in effect, evasion of the human rights condition
on the basis of "extraordinary circumstances" without further
defining that term.
Practice under 502B confirmed its deficiencies. One major
stumbling block was resistance in the State Department towards identifying any country as a violator of human rights.
The following exchange between Representative Fraser of the
House International Relations Committee and Carlyle Maw,
Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance is illustrative:
Mr. Fraser. Mr. Secretary, could you give me a single instance
in which this weighing of human rights or shared values or the
lack of them has altered a decision on security assistance or modified the decision? Can you give me a single instance?
Mr. Maw. I have to answer you, Mr. Fraser, by saying that is
one of the factors that has gone in and is weighed in all cases. You
cannot quantify one factor as against another.
Mr. Fraser. Can you point to any country where you can tell us
that weighing in the question of shared values or the lack of it or
the human rightsMr. Maw. I would like not to point the finger at particular
countries but I think you appreciate that we might feel much
more strongly about helping countries if their human rights were
more compatible with our own ideas.
Mr. Fraser. Well, you don't have very much money to work
with.
Mr. Maw. That is correct.
Mr. Fraser. There are some countries that you might do more
for if they had some shared values with us?
Mr. Maw. I prefer not to get into the position of having to point
a finger at any particular countries . . . .

A similar style is evident in the Administration's "Report
135. Hearingson the InternationalSecurity Assistance and Arms Export Control
Act, supra note 79, at 15.
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to the Congress on the Human Rights Situation in Countries
Receiving United States Security Assistance."' 30 The Report
does not mention a single foreign country or a single specific
violation of human rights. Senator Humphrey said of the Report, "It was about as bland, may I say, as swallowing a bucket
of sawdust."'' 7
Congressional unhappiness with the operation of 502B led
to an effort at substantial revision in 1975-76. After President
Ford vetoed S. 2662, which included a lengthy new version of
502B, 3 8 a somewhat different version was included in the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of
1976, signed by the President on July 1.111 The new 502B makes
the "increased observance of internationally recognized human
rights" a "principal goal" of United States foreign policy and
declares that no security assistance will be provided to gross
violators of human rights except under specific circumstances
stated in the section. A yearly report to Congress on the human
rights practices of each recipient country is required. Upon the
request of either House or its relevant committee, the Secretary
of State is to transmit, within 30 days, "all the available information" regarding a country's human rights practices, the
steps the United States has taken to discourage human rights
violations and to dissociate itself from such violations, and
"extraordinary circumstances" which "necessitate a continuation of security assistance for such country," a description of
such circumstances, and whether "on all the facts it is in the
national interest of the United States to provide such assistance."'' 0 If a requested statement is not delivered within 30
days, "no security assistance shall be delivered . . . except as
may thereafter be specifically authorized by law."'' After a
136. Report to the Congress on the Human Rights Situation in Countries Receiving U.S. Security Assistance, reprintedin 122 CONG. REC. S1895-96 (daily ed. Feb. 18,
1976).
137. 122 CONG. REC. S1895 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
Senator Cranston commented: "This law has been totally ignored." 122 CONG. REc.
S9060 (daily ed. Jun. 11, 1976).
138. S. REP. No. 605, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63-65 (1976).
139. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-329, § 301, 90 Stat. 748-50 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (Supp. IV 1974)).
For an exhaustive discussion of section 502B, see Weissbrodt, supra note 125, at 24150.
140. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(1) (1976).
141. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(3) (1976).

1978

FOREIGN RELATIONS LEGISLATION

requested statement is transmitted, Congress may terminate or

42
restrict security assistance by joint resolution.

The improvements of this section over earlier efforts are
obvious. The provision requires executive reports and information gathering, but moves toward termination of assistance
may be triggered independently by Congress. Unlike the old
502B an executive determination of a violation is not required.
Pressure to label a country as a violator of human rights is thus
removed from the State Department. While a congressional
request would elicit an opinion from the administration as to
whether continued assistance was in the national interest, Congress would also receive facts concerning the human rights violations and the circumstances which "require" continued assistance.4 3 With the facts in hand Congress presumably will be
able to arrive at its own determination of whether security
assistance should be terminated or not. The provision for congressional termination by joint resolution was a change from
the concurrent resolution provision of the vetoed S. 2662, and
was made in the spirit of compromise. As noted above Congress
has long had the power to terminate any foreign assistance by
concurrent resolution, " but, according to Senator Cranston,
that power has never been used.'45
B. The Present Provisions in Practice
A revealing look at section 116 of the Foreign Assistance
Act in practice is provided in recent hearings on the relationship between foreign aid and human rights in Chile." 6 While
Congress had deliberately not placed the burden of determining whether a country had violated human rights on the Executive, that strategy made it difficult to discover exactly what the
State Department's view of human rights in Chile was. An AID
official stated that no determination had been made of whether
Chile violated human rights within the meaning of the statute,
but it was AID's position, in any event, that the assistance was
directly benefitting needy people and was therefore allowable
142. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(4) (1976).
143. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(1)(C)(i)-(ii) (1976).
144. 22 U.S.C. § 2367 (1970).
145. 122 CONG. REC. S9060 (daily ed. June 11, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
146. Chile: The Status of Human Rights and its Relationship to U.S. Economic
Assistance Programs: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Int'l Organizations of the
House Comm. on Int'l Rel. 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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regardless of human rights violations." 7 In fact, the official
asserted, virtually all aid is presently structured so that it benefits needy people.' 8 AID, therefore, was not required to make
any determinations about human rights violations in recipient
countries. If the Executive feels that the aid comes within the
"needy people" proviso, the burden is on Congress to investigate further.
Practice under the new human rights conditions on military aid has been more encouraging.' 9 The State Department
has complied with the new 502B, at least to the extent of compiling reports on human rights violations in countries that received U.S. military aid. Under pressure from several Congressmen, the reports on Argentina, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran,
Peru, and the Phillippines were partially declassified in December 1976.150 The reports found varying degrees of violations
of human rights but the State Department concluded that
American military support for each country should continue.' 5 '
Based on these reports, the Carter administration, with some
impetus from Congress, announced cutbacks of assistance to
Argentina, Ethiopia, and Uruguay.' 52 However, President
Carter apparently chose to follow the State Department's recommendations regarding countries such as the Philippines,
where U.S. bases might be closed if aid were cut.'55
Of potential significance in future aid decisions, the first
complete State Department report on human rights was sent
to Congress in March 1977 containing information on 82 countries which received security supporting assistance.' While
147. Id. at 20-21.
148. Id. at 24. See also id. at 92-93.
149. Salzberg & Young, supra note 125. But see Note, U.S. Military Exports and
the Arms Export Contol Act of 1976: The F-16 Sale to Iran, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
407 (1977).
150. Human Rights and U.S. Policy: Argen., Haiti,Indonesia,Iran, Peru, and the
Phil., Reports Submitted to the House Comm. on Int'l Rel. By the Dep't of State, H.R.
Doc. No. 462, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See 123 CONG. REc. H452-53 (daily ed. Jan.
19, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Drinen).
151. N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
152. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
153. See 76 DEP'T STATE BULL. 326 (1977).
154. 1977 Human Rights Reports, prepared by the Dep't of State for the Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance, Senate Comm. on Foreign Rel., 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977). See Weissbrodt, supra note 125, at 263 n.111.
The 1978 report was released in February, and gave information on 105 countries
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not satisfying all critics, the report did bring together data from
the State Department and from various nongovernmental organizations and will provide a basis for later human rights
discussions.
Moreover, it appears that human rights conditions in addition to their "negative" aspects-the cutting of aid-have a
positive impact in the decisionmaking of foreign nations as
well. For example, following the release of the State Department reports and the administration's decisions to reduce aid
to several countries, Indonesia released several thousand alleged communists, some of whom had been detained for up to
ten years. This move was seen as linked to possible cuts in U.S.
55
aid.
The efficacy of these new human rights provisions depends
to a large extent on the policies of the executive branch. The
human rights condition on development assistance allows a
great deal of executive flexibility; aid is always allowed if it
reaches needy people. Conditions on military aid and security
supporting assistance are more tightly drawn, but they too
allow room for maneuvering. As in the Turkish embargo, executive action or inaction may be as important as the statutory
language, and it remains to be seen how closely, within the
statutory parameters, the new administration will link aid to
human rights. The Kissinger policy of nonlinkage meant a
complete separation of human rights concerns from aid decisions, but there are any number of ways short of complete
linkage for President Carter to use foreign military and economic aid to further human rights goals.
VI. THE FIRST YEAR OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION
Insight into the present use of statutory conditions by Congress and the Executive may be gained by a short survey of
developments during 1977. The year was marked by a decided
receiving U.S. aid. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1978, § 1, at 1, col. 3. While the report notes
some improvement in human rights situations as a result of U.S. efforts, "the overall
picture described for Congress again was a bleak one, with rights reportedly violated
in all but a few non-Western countries." Id. See Human Rights Practicesin Countries
Receiving U.S. Security Assistance, Prepared by the Dep't of State for the House

Comm. on Int'l Rel., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 1977).
155. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1977, at 27, col. 1. For a listing of favorable acts by
foreign governments in reaction to U.S. human rights initiatives, see Drew, supra note
50, at 59-60. See also, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1978, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
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shift in the rhetoric of American foreign policy. President
Carter's concern for human rights was stressed early in his
administration and was incorporated into a statement of principles which were to guide American foreign assistance. 5 ' That
statement expressed two occasionally conflicting goals of
Carter's foreign policy. On the one hand, the administration
was "reforming" policies which at times "awarded liberal
grants and loans to repressive regimes which violate human
rights."' 17 On the other hand, the President sought $2.7 billion
for international financial institutions in fiscal year 1978, in
part because "[tihey help remove political considerations
from development efforts, and they encourage developing
countries to pursue sound domestic policies."' 5 8 Thus, at the
same time Carter wanted to use U.S. aid to encourage respect
for human rights and to channel a large amount of aid through
international agencies where control of aid decisions would be
substantially diminished.
This potential conflict surfaced in congressional action on
legislation authorizing increased participation in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, and other multinational
funds." 9 The Senate Committee supported President Carter's
position that human rights provisions in the Statute should
require American representatives to express concern by "vote
and voice" about the human rights records of loans and grant
applicants. The Committee, however, felt strongly "that directives not be issued which would place the U.S. in a position of
a mandated 'no' vote, thus obviating U.S. negotiating strength
and influence in an institution."'' 10
This reaction was in part a response to the apparent ineffectiveness of a condition placed on International Development
Association funding in 1974 which required the American rep156. Message from the President of the United States on ForeignAssistance, H.
Doc. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 123 CONG. REC. H2297 (daily
ed. Mar. 21, 1977).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Act of Oct. 3, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-118, § 101, 91 Stat. 1067 (to be codified
at 22 U.S.C. § 262c (Supp. 1977)).
160. S. REP. No. 159, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1977).
For President Carter's views, see his letter to Senator Humphrey, id. at 82-83.
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resentative to vote against loans to countries which had detonated nuclear devices. In practice, that provision had required
the United States to vote against all loans to India. "The effect
of the Long provision had not been to stop India loans, as the
United States does not have veto power, but to negate the
necessity for consultation with the United States about India
loans."' 6' The Senate Committee's broader, nonmandatory
provision on human rights and multinational agencies did not
prevail, however, and the legislation that passed put more restrictions on U.S. aid than the President wanted.
As passed, the statute contains a broad, general statement
that the United States should use its voice and vote to
"advance the cause of human rights, including by seeking to
channel assistance toward countries other than those whose
governments engage in [certain violations of human
rights].' '16 In section 701(f), however, the language was more
imperative:
The United States Executive Directors of the institutions listed
in subsection (a) are authorized and instructed to oppose any
loan, any extension of financial assistance, or any technical assistance to any country described in subsection (a)(1) or (2), unless
such assistance is directed specifically to programs which serve
the basic human needs of the citizens of such country.113

This section is based on prior statutes such as section 116 of
the Foreign Assistance Act, which allows development aid to
countries where human rights are violated, if that aid goes to
the neediest people. Again, there may be some problems of
interpretation. A new airport or government-built hotel may
not serve "basic human needs," while direct grants of food or
distribution of farming tools presumably would; but there is a
large gray area including dams, rural electrification projects,
and other elements of an economic infrastructure which are
essential to any serious improvement in the well-being of the
population. Section 701(f) also illustrates potential problems
that may result from transfering a condition placed on U.S.
grants of development aid to U.S. participation in an international loan agency. The two types of assistance are structured
161. Id. at 17.
162. Act of Oct. 3, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-118, § 701(a), 91 Stat. 1069 (to be codified
at 22 U.S.C. 262d (Supp. 1977)).
163. Id. § 701(f), 91 Stat. 1070.
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and operate differently, finance different development projects, and may require conditions more closely tailored to their
respective functions.
A further change in the conditions on multinational appropriations came in section 507 of the Omnibus Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act. In an apparent attempt to
strengthen section 701(f), Congress declared that it was the
"sense of the Congress" that where other efforts at promoting
human rights had been ineffective, the U.S. representatives
"should oppose loans" or other financial assistance to countries
which systematically violate human rights."4 However, such
opposition was not required if the President determined that
"the cause of international human rights is served more effectively by actions other than voting against such assistance or
where the assistance is directed to programs that serve the
basic needs of the impoverished majority of the country in
question."'' 5 This section is somewhat difficult to fathom in
that it appears to restate in substantial part section 701(f)
which Congress had enacted less than a month earlier. Although couched in strong and detailed language, it is not mandatory and represents only the sense of Congress. More than
anything else, perhaps, it indicates that Congress would like to
exercise closer control over foreign aid, but that such control
might well be impossible or unwise.
In other areas of human rights legislation, 1977 was a year
for extending some provisions and refining others. For example,
the International Development and Food Assistance Act extended section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act to agriculture
commodity credit sales.' 6 The statute also amended the provision of section 116, as applied to such sales, which allowed sales
to countries which violate human rights if the sales benefit
needy people. The amendment attempts to clarify, though
without a great deal of success, the possible ambiguity in the
meaning of "benefit," and "specifies that the Public Law 480
credit sales will not be deemed to benefit needy people unless
164. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-148, § 507, 91 Stat. 1240 (1977) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. 262d-1 (Supp.
1977)).
165. Id.
166. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 9588, § 202, 91 Stat. 545 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1711 (Supp. 1977)).
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either the commodities themselves or the proceeds from their
sale will be used for specific projects or programs which will
benefit the needy."'' 7 The House Report, however, does add a
helpful gloss on the statute, noting that such projects "should
be mainly in the areas of agricultural development, rural development, nutrition, health services, population planning, food
distribution, education and training, housing, public works,
conservation and storage, and credit and marketing facilities. ' ' 8 Another section of the International Development and
Food Assistance Act contained a small, but possibly significant
authorization of not less than $750,000 for studying and carrying out programs to encourage adherence to political and civil
rights. The House saw this as a positive expression of U.S.
concern for human rights as opposed to the sanctions of actual
69
or threatened reductions of aid.'
More than previous years, the first year of the Carter administration was one of attempting to implement existing
human rights conditions, rather than of enacting sweeping new
legislation. The termination of aid to several countries, based
upon reports prepared pursuant to such legislation, was the
most direct effort by the administration.' 7 0 Perhaps more important in the long run is the currency that the term "human
rights" has gained and the new awareness that those rights are
threatened in many parts of the world. This change in American attitude may have been important, for example, in encouraging the recent general strike in Nicaragua protesting alleged
violations of civil and political rights by the dictatorship of
General Somoza. Although the United States did not actively
support the strikers, the fact that the United States remained
neutral and did not immediately come to the aid of the military
ruler was seen as a major departure from past policy and as
tacit approval of the strike.'7 '
Events of 1977 have also shown that foreign policy achievements such as increased international concern for human rights
can come even in the absence of legislation, when Congress and
167. H.R. REP. No. 240, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977).
168. Id. at 49.
169. Id. at 30-31.
170. See text accompanying note 150 supra. See generally Weissbrodt, supra note
125, at 278-79; Drew, supra note 50, at 59-60.
171. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1978, §1, at 3, col. 1.
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the Executive share certain goals. Indeed, during President
Carter's first year Congress repealed two important statutory
directives concerning foreign policy."' Implicit in this was a
recognition that the complexities of foreign policy require at
least some room for Executive discretion and maneuvering. In
a comment that applies to foreign affairs generally, Secretary
of State Vance noted: "In the end, a decision whether and how
to act in the cause of human rights is a matter for informed and
careful judgment. No mechanistic formula produces an auto1 73
matic answer.'
VII.

CONCLUSIONS

The examples of the Turkish arms embargo and recent
human rights legislation allow some cautious generalizations
about the use of conditions in foreign relations legislation. The
Turkish arms embargo shows the rather blunt operation of legislation directed at a particular country in response to a particular action by that country. This statutory embargo was in part
the result of an absolute statutory condition-that the aggressive use of U.S. arms made the country ineligible for further
aid-and of executive inaction. Whether the embargo was
"right" or "wrong," it is beyond question that it did not allow
room for flexible diplomacy that could have (though not necessarily would have) used the leverage of a threatened arms cutoff to the greatest advantage. Yet, in the circumstances, it may
have been a necessary action to enforce a statutory policy that
the Executive showed little interest in pursuing. 7 4 Occasional
172. Pub. L. No. 95-118, § 702, 91 Stat. 1070, repealed the requirement that the
U.S. representative vote against loans from multinational agencies to countries that
had detonated nuclear devices. See text accompanying note 161 supra. Pub. L. No.
95-88, § 123, 91 Stat. 541, repealed various provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act
which prohibited aid to countries which furnished assistance to Cuba. See H.R. REP.
No. 240, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1977).
173. Vance, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 223, 226
(1977).
174. As Representative Fraser, one of the major backers of human rights legislation, has written:
In recent years Congress has struggled with a recalcitrant executive
branch over [the issue of human rights]. When the executive branch
failed to implement the legislative mandate on human rights the only
recourse open to Congress was to act in specific situations. Congress will
welcome a clear declaration of intent by the executive branch to stress
human rights in its foreign policies, and will be ready to accept quiet
diplomacy as the most effective way to give expression to the deep-seated
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congressional action such as the Turkish embargo may be necessary to put both the Executive and foreign countries on notice that conditions on aid will be enforced. If a statutory condition is to be effective, the sanctions for violation must be credible. However, frequent use of absolute conditions on aid may
force Congress into other situations where its flexibility is limited.
To be truly influential, Congress must move beyond the
simple "yes/no" character of an embargo and devise legislation that meets the complexity of foreign policy. The new
human rights conditions seem to be an attempt to do just that.
This succession of statutes has led to one provision, section
502B, which does appear to be effective in requiring the State
Department to compile reports on human rights violations in
countries which receive military assistance and to make recommendations for aid decisions. In late 1976, for example, Congress was instrumental in getting several such reports released,
and the Executive subsequently reduced aid to three countries.
Even if the administration had not acted, Congress would have
had before it the information on human rights violations and
on the security or other reasons for not terminating aid, and
Congress would have been able to act on its own to reduce or
terminate aid.
Recalling the guidelines for legislative conditions suggested at the beginning of this article,'7 5 a strong argument can
be made that Congress has done all it should by way of a
general statutory framework in the area of human rights and
military aid:
1. It has introduced a new consideration into foreign
military aid decisions;
2. It has required the Executive to gather necessary
information and transmit it to Congress;
3. It has equipped itself with a means of reviewing
administration action and modifying by legislation
when necessary.
desire of the American people that their government be devoted to furthering decency in the conduct of human affairs.
Fraser, supra note 125, at 156.
175. See text following note 10 supra.
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Congress can of course engage in various other kinds of
human rights activism, such as publicizing violations through
hearings. But if Congress regularly goes beyond these functions, making absolute conditions a large part of foreign aid
legislation and passing special statutes to deal with a multitude of discrete and transitory foreign relations matters, there
will doubtless be more cases like the Turkish embargo.
When the human rights views of Congress and the Executive are in harmony, of course, defects in the statutory language
will not be as apparent; the Executive will not (presumably)
try to evade the legislative mandate by strained interpretations
of the law. It is possible, however, that in such a situation
congressional attentiveness to human rights will atrophy, and
its oversight role under the new legislation go unfulfilled. If
Congress is to play the more vital role in foreign policy that it
has created for itself, it must continue to be involved in the
process even when the glamour has faded. The present 502B
provides a workable framework for considering human rights
within the context of military aid; it is now up to Congress to
make that mechanism work.
Congressional involvement in foreign assistance will bring
it face to face with the hard questions of foreign policy. Aid is
one area where the Constitution gives Congress almost complete control over policy issues normally reserved to the President. There, it can attach the conditions it wishes and encourage or discourage practices it chooses. In its recent human
rights legislation, Congress has begun to arm itself with needed
information and to infuse human rights considerations into
executive policymaking. In this fashion it has started to exert
its influence in these difficult decisions. Congress can take
credit when U.S. actions advance human rights and international peace and must accept part of the blame when policies
fail.

STUDENT COMMENT
The Triangle Claims Another Victim: A
Watery Grave for the Original Bermuda
Agreement Principles
KATHLEEN
I.

K.

MACDEVITT*

INTRODUCTION

British Airways in 1973 carried the equivalent of five
empty Boeing 747 jumbo jets daily between New York and
London.' In that same year scheduled flights across the North
Atlantic carried several million empty seats.' Overcapacity on
the North Atlantic had reached serious proportions. 3 The provisions governing capacity in the 1946 bilateral agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom concerning
scheduled air transportation no longer operated to limit capacity effectively.
On June 22, 1976, the British denounced the 1946 Bermuda Agreement, contending that it no longer corresponded
satisfactorily to the conditions of the 1970s.5 Under the terms
of that agreement, air service would continue for one year after
either country's repudiation. As June 22, 1977, drew nearer,
U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary Brock Adams
indicated that unless a new agreement were signed, airline
services between the two countries would cease. 6 The threat* B.A., 1966, University of Michigan; J.D. candidate, University of Denver College of Law.
1. TRAvEL AGENT, May 30, 1974, at 6.
2. Note, A New Era in InternationalAviation: CAB Regulation, Rationalization
and Restrictionism on the North Atlantic, 7 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 317, 352 (1974).
3. Excess capacity is not defined solely as unutilized capacity but the "unused
capacity of the aircraft below a certain standard percentage of the aircraft capacity
which must be sold to ensure an economical operation of the route concerned over a
certain period of time (critical load factor)." H. WASSENBERGH, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

Am

TRANSPORTATION LAW IN A NEW ERA

31 (1976).

4. Air Services Agreement with the United Kingdom, Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499,
T.I.A.S. No. 1507 [hereinafter cited as Bermuda 1.
5. Letter from British Ambassador Peter Ramsbotham to the U.S. Department
of State (June 22, 1976).
6. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 30, 1977, at 26.
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ened disruption was averted,
however, and Bermuda II was
7
1977.
23,
July
on
signed
The hallmark of the original Bermuda Agreement was its
lack of formula or any other method for the predetermination
of capacity Capacity was to be "adequate to the traffic demands between the country of origin and the countries of ultimate destination," 9 that is, third and fourth freedom traffic. 0
Air carriers of Great Britain and the United States remained
free under this provision to set trip frequencies unilaterally.
Bermuda I also provided that if either country became dissatisfied with what it regarded as excessive capacity on the part of
the other country's carrier(s), it could request consultations.
The flexibility of Bermuda I was everywhere praised, and it
served as the basis of hundreds of similar bilateral agreements
governing air transportation."
Several factors, however, had combined to render the 1946
Bermuda Agreement an anachronism in the 1970s. Beginning
7. Air Services Agreement with the United Kingdom, July 23, 1977, - U.S.T.
T.I.A.S. No. 8641 [hereinafter cited as Bermuda III.
8. Capacity is defined as the "maximum amount of payload which could be carried, in the same direction along the route for which payload is determined, as limited
. . .by available seating capacity ..
" H. WASSENBERGH, POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE AIR 46-47 n.5 (1962). But
it is a well known fact that operating a transport service at an overall load
factor of more than 65 or 70 per cent of its capacity is not a sound
proposition; in these circumstances quite a number of the individual
services are fully booked and the operator would on many occasions have
to disappoint prospective passengers.
Van der Turk Adriani, The "Bermuda" Capacity Clauses, 22 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 406,
409 (1955). The same holds true today.
9. Bermuda I, Final Act, para. 6.
10. First Freedom: The right to fly across the territory of a foreign country
without landing.
Second Freedom: The right to land for non-traffic purposes.
Third Freedom: The right to set down in a foreign country traffic coming from United States territory.
Fourth Freedom: The right to pick up in a foreign country traffic destined for the United States.
Fifth Freedom: The right to carry traffic from a point of origin in one
foreign country to a point of destination in another foreign country.
Stoffel, American Bilateral Air Transport Agreements on the Threshold of the Jet
Transport Age, 26 J. AIR L. & CoM. 119, 122-23 n.6 (1959).
11. A survey of the more than 1,000 bilateral agreements registered with the
International Civil Aviation Organization indicates that the great majority follow the
principles enunciated in the first Bermuda Agreement. Goedhuis, The Air Charter
Market and the Restrictive Effects of Current Bilateral Agreements: Changes in the
Approach to InternationalAir Agreements, 77 AERONAUTICAL J. (London) 25, 26 (1973).
-
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with 1958 the substitution of jet aircraft for propeller driven
planes dramatically increased the number of available seats on
the North Atlantic. As the number of restrictions limiting
charter flights was gradually lifted in the past two decades,
capacity again burgeoned. A factor, too, was the proliferation
of foreign carriers entering the market. As new countries
emerged from colonial bonds, they viewed the airplane as a
unique ambassador, and international institutional bodies
loaned funds to these nations to develop "state" airlines.
The integrity of the Bermuda capacity principles had also
been weakened by the number of capacity reduction agreements entered into not only among U.S. international carriers
but between the United States and Great Britain. In addition,
internal U.S. administrative regulations" having the force and
effect of law were enacted to deal with what the Civil Aeronautics Board (hereinafter CAB) viewed as the inability of Bermuda I to ensure prompt reaction to decisions by other countries affecting air transportation. In essence, these regulations
empowered the CAB to request any foreign carrier operating
under a permit"3 to this country to file traffic and schedule
data. A third factor subverting the original capacity principles
was the emergence throughout western Europe of airline pooling agreements.
The vague capacity principles of Bermuda I were set forth
word for word in the main body of Bermuda II, but the heart
of the second Agreement is contained in Annexes One and Two
which deal respectively with Route Schedules and Capacity on
the North Atlantic. The capacity annex provides for the service
plans of each country's carriers to be scrutinized in advance of
12. 14 C.F.R. § 213.1-.6 (1977).
13. A foreign air carrier may not engage in scheduled or nonscheduled air transportation to or from the United States without a permit issued by the CAB. Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1372 (1970 & Supp. II 1972). However, in issuing any
such permit the Board is directed to "do so consistently with any obligation assumed
by the United States in any treaty, convention, or agreement that may be in force
between the United States and any foreign country." Id. § 1502.
The permit must also be approved by the President. Id. § 1461. By Executive
Order No. 11920, President Gerald Ford established procedures for executive branch
review of decisions submitted to it by the CAB. 41 Fed. Reg. 23,665 (1976). However,
a CAB Advisory Committee recently recommended, as did the American Bar Association, that the Federal Aviation Act be amended to withdraw from the President this
power of approval. CAB ADVISORY CoMMITrEE, REPORT ON PROcEDuRAL REFORM 24
(1975).
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implementing annual schedules. In addition to this frequency
control mechanism, Bermuda II employs a second method of
capacity limitation: carrier designation. Only one U.S. and one
British carrier will be permitted to serve twelve of the fourteen
U.S. cities having nonstop links with London.
Although both U.S. and British negotiators hailed Bermuda II as a "satisfactory" accord," opposition surfaced when
the details of the new pact became known. The thrust of the
opposition was that Bermuda II, insofar as it restricted capacity, was anticompetitive and therefore contrary to the Federal
Aviation Act's mandate of competition. President James E.
Carter, in a letter addressed to various Cabinet heads some two
months after Bermuda II was signed, expressed belated dissatisfaction over the capacity restrictions. He declared that the
United States "should be bold in granting liberal and expanded access to foreign carriers . . . in exchange for equally
valuable benefits we receive from those countries."' 5 He proclaimed a "new" policy, which suggested a repudiation of the
new Agreement and which embodied the theme of the old.
"Our policy should be to trade opportunities rather than restrictions.""'
Despite the strong accusations leveled at the Agreement
by the President and others, this writer believes that Bermuda
II represents one solution to what the CAB viewed as the most
salient characteristic of the international air transportation
industry of 1975: excessive capacity producing uneconomical
levels of passenger load factors. 7
It is not disputed that the new Agreement is noncomprehensive in its coverage. Although it makes charters the subject
of Article 14 and Annex 4, it merely calls for the two countries
to enter into bilateral charter negotiations. In addition, the
supersonic Concorde is specifically exempted from its capacity
provisions. 8 Nor does Bermuda II address itself to the slowly
14. Morgenthaler, Britain Gets Less than It Sought in New Air Pact, Wall St. J.,
June 23, 1977, at 4, col. 1.
15. Karr, CarterReadies Aggressive U.S. Strategy to End Restrictions in Foreign
Air Pacts, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1977, at 2, col. 3.
16. Id.
17. CAB, REPORT TO CONGRESS FIscAL YEAR 1975, at 2 (1976).
18. Bermuda 1I, annex 2, para. 8. In return, however, the United States may not
be required, under the frequency control mechanism of the Agreement, to operate less
than seven round trip flights per week between Washington and London. Id.
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increasing number of pooling arrangements entered into between western European nations.
However, Bermuda II represents a positive step toward
curbing the excessive capacity that has plagued North Atlantic
air operations and which Bermuda I was unable to contain.

Alan Boyd, head of the U.S. delegation to Bermuda II, defended the Agreement in testimony before a Senate aviation
subcommittee. He foresees the Agreement as increasing "the
efficiency of airline operations by forcing more careful planning." 9
Observers speculate that the U.S. concessions in Bermuda
II will act as dangerous precedents for the forthcoming U.S.
bilateral air transport talks within the next three months with
Japan,2" Italy,2 and Australia and fear a country-by-country
blackmail. This writer contends, however, that the assumption
that Bermuda II will be a blueprint for bilateral discussions
with countries whose postures remain divergent from those
embodied in the U.S.-British pact is wrong. That Bermuda I
served as a pattern for similar agreements with other countries
does not, ipso facto, dictate that Bermuda II serve in the same
manner. Bermuda I, in contrast to Bermuda II, contained
vague and ambiguous phraseology which rendered it adaptable
to virtually any set of political and economic realities existing
between any two nations. Bermuda II, on the other hand, was
adopted with the specific purpose of stemming the overcapacity characterizing the U.S.-Great Britian route sector. Moreover, Bermuda II represents a compromise tempered by differing economic and political viewpoints embodied in relations
between two specific countries.
The history of the original Agreement, the reasons for its
repudiation, and the substance of both Agreements will be ex19. Griffiths, Bermuda Pact Provisions Backed, Av.

WEEK & SPACE TECH.,

Dec.

5, 1977, at 23.
20. Japan and the United States recently decided to defer further negotiations
until spring 1978 in view of Japanese concern that the present congressional dissatisfaction with the U.S. trade deficit vis-a-vis Japan would result in Japan making
undesired concessions in the air transportation agreement in exchange for Congress'
failure to enact punitive trade measures. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 2, 1978, at
31.
21. Initial negotiations in November 1977 produced a stalemate over the issues of
capacity reduction and carrier designation. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 21, 1977,
at 27.
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amined in an effort to demonstrate that Bermuda II establishes
an orderly and efficient response to the haphazard conditions
.confronting international airline traffic between the United
States and the United Kingdom.
II. HISTORY OF THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT
Bermudas I and II were essentially compromises between
the relatively competitive philosophy espoused by the United
States and the protectionist viewpoint of the British. The
Agreements must be read in light of the bargaining postures of
the two countries at both the 1946 and the 1977 bargaining
tables.
A.

The Early Years

The year 1929 found the United States and the United
Kingdom in complete agreement with respect to international
freedom of the air for the last time. At the International Commission for Air Navigation, both countries advocated permitting airlines of any country to land freely anywhere in the
world. 2 This camaraderie would soon evaporate, however, for
the difference in the strength of the internal air transport services of each country, already pronounced in 1929, would continue to increase.
U.S. planes in 1928 traveled approximately 10.5 million
miles over 36,300 miles of air routes, while British planes flew
one-tenth the number of miles over one-quarter the air route
mileage.2 3 Many immutable factors had favored the more rapid
expansion of the U.S. aviation industry. In Great Britian it is
impossible to get more than 100 miles away from the sea,
22. R. C~vEANv & L. NEVILLE, THE COMING AIR AGE 68 (1944). The Dutch and
Swedish delegates also favored the U.S.-U.K. position, but the 27 other countries
attending the Commission vetoed this stance.
23. [19291 ANNUAIRE DE L'AERoNAUTIQUE 31-35. The number of passengers and
the amount of freight carried did not demonstrate the same variance. Whereas U.S.
planes carried 49,713 passengers and 1,848,156 pounds of freight, Great Britain's
planes transported 36,769 passengers in 1928 and 1,621,400 pounds of freight. Id. However, what was significant in the early days was not the number of passengers carried
nor the amount of freight transported, but the actual experience of the airlines, as
measured by the number of miles flown and the route mileage pioneered.
An even more startling statistic revealing the difference between the two countries
is the number of commercial planes used in 1928 on scheduled services. The U.S. fleet
numbered 268; the British, 29. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ANN. REP. OF DIRECTOR OF
AERONAUTIcS 58 (1928). During 1928 U.S. aircraft industries churned out more than
4,300 aircraft, while Great Britain manufactured 204. K. COLROVE, INTERNATIONAL
CONTROL OF AVIATION 14 (1930).
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whereas U.S. planes possessed the singular advantage of being
able to fly 3,000 miles from east to west coasts and 3,000 miles
from the northern to the southern borders without having to
bother with changes in language, currencies, and countries.
Moreover, because the British climate was not conducive to
flying without instruments, the internal airlines were slow to
develop .24
Originally, the British aviation industry operated without
subsidy. The two English companies which commenced service
to the continent in 1919 enjoyed no governmental largesse. But
because the two French concerns which competed on the London to Paris route were the recipients of generous amounts from
their government, it became apparent to British officials that
some form of assistance was necessary. In 1921 the British government adopted a temporary plan subsidizing the two British
companies.2" This assistance became more permanent when in
1924 the government merged four air companies into Imperial
Airways, Ltd. and subsidized the new monopoly to the tune of
137,000 pounds per annum. 6 In 1936 a new competitor on the
scene, British Airways, was also granted annual operating
sums.27
Many writers surprisingly cite the American development
of aviation as occurring without governmental financial assistance. Although the United States did not pay out-and-out
subsidies, indirect subventions were granted in the form of contracts for carrying the mails. Reimbursements were placed at
higher rates than the revenue recovered by the government
from the public in the form of airmail stamps, and the infant
28
airlines flourished.
The American cause was also aided by the fact that the
domestic airlines did not engage in destructive competition for
the overseas routes. The field was left wide open to Pan American Airways which pioneered the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the
South American routes.
24. C, GREY, THE CnIL AiR WAR 145 (1945).
25. K. COLGROVE, supra note 23, at 23.
26. Id. (approximately $342,500).
27. J. ROMEYER, LES GRANDS RE.SEAUX DE L'AIR 82 (1938).
28. Air Mail Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 359, 43 Stat. 805 (1925). In 1929, for example, $11,169,015 was paid out in the form of airmail contracts. [1929] POSTMASTER
GEN. ANN. REP. 126.
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B.

The 1935 Agreement
The United States and the United Kingdom, along with
Canada and Ireland, sat down at the bargaining table in 1935
to discuss transatlantic routes and landing privileges. It was
not until the following year, however, that permits for reciprocal privileges were issued. These permits provided for two
round trip flights per week between London and New York with
landing rights in Canada, Newfoundland, and Ireland." Under
the agreement, a flight could be operated at any fare the airline
chose. In addition, neither the United States nor Great Britain
could begin transatlantic service unilaterally. Such service was
required by the agreement to commence simultaneously. 0
But because the British had no suitable planes to endure
the rigors of an Atlantic crossing, and because it was unwilling
to permit Pan American Airways to get a head start, transatlantic service was not inaugurated in 1936, 1937, or 1938. 31 Unable to contain itself any longer, Pan American secured landing
rights in France in 1939. Faced with the prospect of traffic on
this important New York-Paris route bypassing Great Britain,
the British relented and permitted American carriers to land
in London although they themselves still possessed no aircraft
capable of crossing the Atlantic. 2
Meanwhile, in 1938, the faint outline of the airplane's role
as a political instrument was becoming visible. Despite the fact
that both the United States and the United Kingdom continued to proclaim the principle of freedom of the air, each began
a series of maneuvers to prevent the other from crossing the
continental and territorial borders of the other. Under the guise
of military security, the United States refused the United
29. U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE PRESS RELEASE,

XII, at 521 (Dec. 14, 1935).

30. Burden, The Future of Air Transport:An American View, in
AND CIVIL AVIATION 1944-1945, at 42 (Brabazon of Tara ed. 1945).
31. K. HUTCHSON, FREEDOM OF THE AIR 9 (Public Affairs Pamphlet

AIR TRANSPORT

No. 93, 1944).

32. Hackford, Our International Aviation Policy, 25 Haav. Bus. REV. 483, 484
(1947). Another agreement of April 6, 1939, established joint control by Great Britain
and the United States over Canton and Enderbury Islands in the Pacific. The agreement, which was to remain in effect until 1989, permitted use of the islands by only
civil aircraft and solely for the purpose of scheduled air services. 53 Stat. 2219, E.A.S.
No. 145. In the meantime, the United States in 1937 had authorized Imperial Airways
to inaugurate Bermuda-New York service, and Bermuda had granted landing rights
to the United States. G. GOODMAN, GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD COMMERCIAL AVIATION
80 (1944).
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Kingdom (and all other foreign competitors) landing rights in
Hawaii.33 In turn, the British barred the United States from
Australia and also from Hong Kong.34
At the time transatlantic service was initiated in 1939,
American planes had flown five and one-half times as many
miles as had British aircraft, over two and one-half times the
route mileage; 35 1939 also found both Great Britain and the
United States sporting new domestic legislation in the air
transportation field. Congress had adopted the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938.36 All the powers over air transport held by
individual government agencies were molded into a new independent administrative body, the Civil Aviation Authority.
The Authority was granted extensive powers: all domestic and
international air transportation was placed under its control.
Although actions taken by the Authority with respect to permits for international air services were subject to the approval
of the President, such decisions were insulated from judicial
review. The Act also provided that air mail subsidy rates,
which had previously been set by the Post Office Department,
37
were henceforth to be determined by the newAuthority.
The declaration of policy which accompanied the Act appeared to favor competition over monopoly. It set forth various
considerations which the Authority was required to take into
33. K. HUTCHISON, supra note 31, at 9. Testifying on behalf of the Interdepartmental Committee on Civil Aviation before the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, Clinton M. Hester stated that "[t]he major reason for refusal was
the government's willingness to expose its Hawaiian defenses to view from foreign-flag
airlines over which they would have little control." To Create a Civil Aeronautics
Authority: Hearings on H.R. 9738 Before the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 148 (1938).
34. 27 FORTUNE, Apr. 1943, at 72-74. The Hong Kong restriction was soon lifted,
however, when the Portuguese permitted Pan American Airways to fly into nearby
Macao. Id.
35. 1938 Statistics of RegularAir Service of PrincipalCountries, in AIR TRANSPORT
AND CIVIL AVIATION 1944-1945, at 274 (Brabazon of Tara ed. 1945). American aircraft
flew 81 million miles, eight times that of 1928. The route mileage had doubled, too, to
71,200. Id. In addition, American manufacturing companies in 1937-1938 accounted for
over 45% of all aircraft exports. In contrast, the export sales of Great Britain, France,
Italy, and Germany combined were over $68,000,000 less than that exported by the
United States. E. FREUDENTHAL, THE AVIATION BUSINESS 267 (1940).
36. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 977 (current version
at Federal Aviation of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970)).
37. Such amounts were not limited by statute, and Pan American Airways received between $21,500 and $23,600 from the Authority for each round trip flight in
1939. Hackford, supra note 32, at 485.
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account when passing upon the applications of both American
and foreign carriers to engage in transportation to and from the
United States:
(a) The encouragement and development of an airtransportation system properly adapted to the present and future
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive
competitive practices . . .
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to
the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
States. ..... 1

In the same year over in Great Britain, an Order in Council39 issued pursuant to the Air Navigation Act of 19364o established the Air Transport Licensing Authority. This threemember Authority was empowered to grant or deny licenses for
internal air transport.
C.

The War Years

Early into World War II, President Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Churchill verbally contracted that the United States
would supply the necessary transport planes while Great Britain furnished the military aircraft." To the American aircraft
industry, this represented a great challenge which was eagerly
taken up. Because the United States concentrated on manufacturing regular transport aircraft, no new civil aircraft were designed in Britain during the war.42
Two other differences contributed to the strong position of
the U.S. airlines emerging from the shadows of the war and the
relatively weak stance of their British counterparts. The American carriers were under contract to the government, whereas
the British airlines were seized. And in contrast to American
38. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, § 2, 52 Stat. 980 (current
version at Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970)).
39. No. 613 STAT. R. & 0. 53 (1938).
40. Air Navigation Act, 1936, 26 Geo. 5 & 1, Edw. 8, c. 44.
41. H. SMITH, AIRWAYS ABRoAD 70 (1950). This is an excellent and entertaining
account of the early international air relations between the United Kingdom and the
United States. Smith had access to the private diaries of Adolph A. Berle, Assistant
Secretary of State at the time of Bermuda I.
42. Hutchison, Imperialism of the Sky, 156 NATION 552 (1943).
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operations, where the airlines continued to be operated by
those who had done so before the war, British airlines were
dominated by the government.4
D. Postwar Maneuvering
Postwar debates in Great Britain, unlike those in the
United States, centered not so much around chosen instrument
versus multicarrier service as they did around the best manner
in which to build up a weakened competitive posture. Great
Britain was apprehensive of American competition: whereas
Americans flew 72% of the world's commerce in 1943, Britain's
share was only 12%."1 In spite of this, the small but determined
group known as the Little Englanders, who advocated shutting
off the Empire to all foreign competitors, met with stiff opposition. 5 The government spokesmen were cautious, however, to
refrain from advocating wholesale competition, as the Americans seemed to be doing. Lord Beaverbrook, who had been
appointed by Churchill to head the Civil Air Transport Committee to revive the British air transport industry after the war,
addressed himself to the remarks of U.S. Congresswoman Clair
Booth Luce: "We want to fly everywhere. Period."" "Complete
freedom of the air in the present state of the world," said he,
"might result in commercial anarchy."47
In outlining British civil aviation policy before the House
of Lords, Beaverbrook presented the government position of
setting national quotas and of an "equilibrium between transport capacity and the traffic offering on any international
route." The British Government believed that with its share
of international air traffic assured and with the Americans unable to pick up all the traffic, British aviation could hold its
own. This posture, unacceptable to the Americans, was outlined in the first British policy statement or "White Paper. 49
The White Paper indicated the willingness of Great Britain to accept the first four freedoms of the air in a multilateral
agreement. The fifth freedom, however, was to be accorded
43. H. SMITH, supra note 41, at 74.
44. Id. at 109.
45. Id. at 113.
46. 89 CONG. REC. 759-64 (1943) (remarks of Rep. Luce).
47. 130 PAlL. DES., H.L. (5th ser.) 462 (1944).
48. 131 PARL. DES., H.L. (5th ser.) 694 (1944).
49. Am MINISTRY, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT, CMD. No. 6561 (1944).
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only through bilateral negotiations. Britain believed that this
restriction would protect the weaker countries from the overpowering U.S. competition. Britain also urged the creation of
an international aviation authority which would enforce the
application of the fifth freedom restriction.
E. The Chicago Conference
Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle, prodded by the
prospect that Great Britain was soon to issue invitations to an
international aviation conference, called a meeting to be held
in Chicago in November 1944.0 Although many looked to the
International Civil Aviation Conference (hereinafter Chicago
Conference) to solve the world's postwar aviation problems,
they were to be disappointed. The Conference, however, was an
important part of the history of aviation, for it opened up the
world's air routes.
The British were prepared to rely on the White Paper,
whereas the American delegation, headed by Berle, operated
independently of the so-called Biddle Report. This document,
which was the only published doctrine on America's postwar
civil aviation plans, agreed that the rapid development of air
commerce would necessitate a supranational governmental
body and urged the creation of an experimental authority of
this sort."1 Although the report declared that America would
decline to take advantage of its superior resources to dominate
world air commerce, it opposed the many types of restrictions
favored by the British.
The nations at Chicago quickly aligned themselves into
countries advocating freedom of the air and those favoring
order of the air. Great Britain installed itself as the leader of
the latter viewpoint, and the United States became the leading
proponent of the former. Great Britain's predetermination of
capacity principle, as expressed in the White Paper, involved
an initial allocation of capacity with an escalator clause. At the
outset, each country would be permitted capacity sufficient to
meet one-half of the forecasted traffic between points of departure and destination at a 60% load factor. If a carrier operated
on the average at more than a 65% load factor, it would be
50. H. SMITH, supra note 41, at 158.
51. INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT Poucy, H.R. Doc. No. 142, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1945).
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permitted a capacity increase. 2 If, however, its load factor
should fall to less than 50% after the additional capacity had
been added, then the increase would be withdrawn.
The draft multilateral convention presented at the Chicago Conference by the United States provided for the mutual
granting of all five freedoms. As to the international body with
authority to oversee fifth freedom operations, the United States
remained hostile. It did agree, however, to the institution of an
international authority which would control standardization of
airports and operating procedures. 3 The fifty-one other participants at the Conference failed to adopt the U.S. scheme and
the Conference, deadlocked, ended without resolution of the
major issues. 4
The Conference was not a complete failure, however. The
International Air Services Transit Agreement, which gathered
a number of signatories, provided for the mutual granting of
the first and second freedoms of the air, the so-called
"technical" or "operational" freedoms.5 5 Also adopted was the
International Convention on Civil Aviation which provided for
the establishment of the International Civil Aviation Organization (hereinafter ICAO) .1
F. Pre-BermudaI
Shortly after the Chicago Conference, a skirmish arose
between Great Britain and the United States which pointed to
the necessity of some sort of agreement to end the frequent
squabbling and to present a united front among the postwar
democracies.
Pan American Airways announced plans to inaugurate its
postwar schedules with a generous fare reduction on the New
York-London run.57 In addition to the two flights per week permitted under the 1935 agreement at any fare the airline chose,
Pan American had been operating three additional flights at a
52. B.

CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT

422 (1962).

53. W. WAGNER, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION As AFFECTED
SOVEREIGNTY

BY STATE

97 (1970).

54. F. THAYER, AIR TRANSPORT POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY: A POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY ANALYSIS 76 (1965).
55. H. WASSENBERGH, POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL CIvI. AVIATION POLICY AND THE
17 (1962).
56. H. SMITH, supra note 41, at 185.
57. L. ZACHAROFF, THE WORLD'S WINGS 261 (1946).
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tariff agreed to by the British. 8 The United Kingdom promptly
informed the U.S. State Department that unless Pan American
ran the flights at the mutually acceptable tariff, it would no
longer be allowed to operate the additional flights; instead, it
would be limited to the flight frequency of the 1935 agreement.59 Pan American then relented, and the original tariff was
reinstated.
After the fracas, in which most nations supported the
British position, George Baker, a former Civil Aeronautics Authority member and the head of the U.S. delegation, came to
the first Bermuda negotiations prepared to make certain concessions with respect to rates. Great Britain, on the other hand,
in the market for a sizeable U.S. loan and frightened by the
revolt of Pan American, came to Bermuda ready to sacrifice its
cherished demand for capacity predetermination."
Ill. BERMUDA I
The participants at the bargaining table in 1946 did not
possess equal strength in terms of civil air power. In return
merely for the United States agreement to the setting of fares
through the International Airline Transport Association
(IATA), Great Britain had to abandon the capacity predetermination principles which it had sought.
Under Bermuda I"' the air carriers of each country were to
be accorded "a fair and equal opportunity" to operate on any
route between the two nations. The primary objective of the
Agreement was the "provision of capacity adequate to the
traffic demands between the country of which such air carrier
is a national and the country of ultimate destination of the
traffic. 6' 2 The only limitation on the number of allowable
flights was set forth in an often overlooked provision that "the
interest of the air carriers of the other Government shall be
taken into consideration so as not to affect unduly the services
'6 3
which the latter provides on all or part of the same routes."
58. Id.
59. Id. at 262.
60. H. SMITH, supra note 41, at 256-57.
61. For a thorough analysis of Bermuda I and its capacity principles, see Diamond, The Bermuda Agreement Revisited: A Look at the Past, Present and Future of
BilateralAir Transport Agreements, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 419-95 (1975).
62. Bermuda I, Final Act, para. 6.
63. Id. para. 5.
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The restrictions on fifth freedom traffic were slightly more
stringent, but equally as imprecise as the third and fourth freedom limitations. Fifth freedom capacity was to be related
(a) to traffic requirements between the country of origin and the
countries of destination;
(b) to the requirements of through airline operation; and
(c) to the traffic requirements of the area through which the
airline passes after taking account of local and regional services."

Alongside the vaguely worded capacity restrictions rested
an equally imprecise form of enforcement. Paragraph nine set
forth the intention of the parties to engage in regular consultations in order to implement the capacity principles." In the
event that neither country could agree on acceptable capacity
levels, an arbitration procedure could be invoked."6 In addition,
either party could terminate the Agreement with a one year
notice. 7
"Adequate" capacity was nowhere defined or measured in
the Agreement. Nor could standards be found to indicate what
level of capacity would be deemed inadequate, or, at the other
extreme, excessive. Capacity was thus left to the discretion of
the individual airline to institute subject only to a review by
the other country's government. 8
The ambiguous phraseology of Bermuda I rendered it subject to varying interpretations. The fifth freedom limiting language was used by nations favoring restrictive policies to interpret the Bermuda principles as "protectionist." Nations favoring freedom of the air, on the other hand, utilized the very same
language to construe the principles as "liberal."
A government supporting the "liberal" interpretation
could seize upon the requirement that fifth freedom capacity
be related to "the requirements of through airline operation."
It could claim that without fifth freedom traffic on the final
segments of a New York-London-Rome-Bombay-New Delhi
64. Id. para. 6.
65. Id. para. 9. This method of consultation has come to be known as ex post facto
review.

66. Bermuda I, art. 9.
67. Id. art. 13.
68. One writer described Bermuda I as a "sort of 'gentlemen's agreement' not to
do anything that is too unreasonable, or at least not to expect to go on doing it for any
great length of time." W. O'CONNOR, ECONObnc REGULATION OF THE WoRLD's AiRmINEs:
A PouncAL ANALYsis 46 (1971).
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route, its airline could not afford to fly from New York to India
on a profitable basis. Along the same lines, this government
could contend that since its airline passed through the various
fifth freedom cities only once a day, it was therefore "taking
account of local and regional services."
The opposing government could select the "traffic requirements between the country of origin and the countries of destination" language. It could argue that under the primary
objective of the Agreement, or the provision of "adequate" capacity, the other country's carrier was operating at a greater
capacity level than the third and fourth freedoms would warrant.
The "fair and equal" opportunity language was not intended by the parties to be equated with a 50-50 share of operations, rather with the opportunity to attempt to gain a certain
share." But in the years immediately preceding Bermuda II,
Great Britain and the United States appeared to be interpreting the phrase to mean equality of market shares. England
clamored for a 50-50 split of the transatlantic market instead
of the 40% share it had previously held, despite the fact that
Americans accounted for 60% of the passengers traveling across
the North Atlantic.70 Even after Bermuda I was signed, Great
Britain hinted that a 50-50 division was its ultimate goal. Patrick Shovelton, Deputy Secretary of the United Kingdom's
Department of Trade and its chief negotiator at Bermuda II,
stated that "the fact remains that we do not have an equal
opportunity to compete on all routes."'"
The United States, too, in capacity negotiations in 1974
and in 1975 attempted to invoke the Bermuda principle of "fair
and equal opportunity." It sought to ensure equal benefits to
Pan American Airways with KLM, SAS, and Sabena Airlines
in their respective operations to the Netherlands, Scandanavia,
and Belgium.7 2
If equality of shares had been intended by the contracting
69. Van der Turk Adriani, The "Bermuda" CapacityClauses, 22 J. AIR. L. & COM.
406, 409 (1955).
70. Kaplar, US., Great Britain Fight New Air War over the Atlantic, NAT'L J.,
Jan. 1, 1977, at 23.
71. Av. DAILY, Oct. 11, 1977, at 213.
72. H.WAsSENBERGH, supra note 3, at 12.
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parties to Bermuda I, they would have had to have required one
country's carriers, more specifically those of the United States,
to lower the capacity levels to those of the other country's carriers. Such a formula would have directly contravened the nonpredetermination principles of Bermuda I. Moreover, Dr. G.
Goedhuis, a public international aviation authority, observed
that if traffic is to be equated to other forms of production, "it
is difficult to see why, in the field of aviation, there should be
a claim for equal division which is not made for the production
'73
of grain, machinery, frozen meat, etc.
IV. THE DEMISE OF BERMUDA I
A. The Introductionof Jet Aircraft
The factor that contributed most significantly to the
mushrooming growth of capacity was the introduction between
1958 and 1963 of the jet aircraft. In 1959 the average number
of seats per aircraft was 74. By 1961 that figure had climbed to
124. 71
Prior to the substitution of the jet, air carriers had relied
on aircraft such as the Douglas DC-7, which had a seating
capacity of 89 coach passengers. In contrast, the Boeing 707120, which supplanted the DC-7, could carry 160 coach passengers across the Atlantic. 75 In 1969 the first wide-bodied jet was
introduced into North Atlantic service, again causing a jump
in unutilized seats. By March 1977 the average number of seats
on American international flag carriers had increased to 232.5,
more than trebling the 1959 average.78
Had the airlines curtailed the frequency of their flights to
accommodate the increased number of seats offered on each
flight, capacity would not have increased so dramatically. But
because air carrier managements believed the passenger to be
solely interested in convenience of schedule, the airlines found
little incentive to decrease the number of flights offered.
73. Goedhuis, supra note 11, at 27.
74. Wheatcroft, The Influence of Operationaland Technical Factorson Air Transport Regulation, 74 AERONAUTICAL J. (London) 623, 627 (1970).
75. Sackrey, Overcapacity in the United States International Air Transport
Industry, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 24, 77 (1966).

76. CAB, BUREAU
9 (Mar. 1977).
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B.

CAB Liberalizationof Charter Rules
A substantially greater number of charter flights also contributed to the excess capacity problems. In 1961 international
charter flights across the North Atlantic carried less than
204,000 passengers. Ten years later, this number had increased
to 1.9 million passengers."
Beginning in 1959 the CAB promulgated a series of regulations easing the number of restrictions that had formerly limited charter carriers. The inevitable result was a further increase in total capacity. After the CAB authorized foreign air
carriers to engage in charters to off-route points in 1959, the

number of charter flights more than doubled." Sensing a
broadening of CAB charter policies, the supplemental79 air carriers applied for and received permission to perform transatlantic charter services in 1960.10 In the same series of orders, the
Board also removed restrictions on split charters (charters with
more than one group) and charters to organizations with a
membership numbering over 20,000. In addition, the order permitted travel agents to organize charters. 8'
In 1963 the CAB authorized the granting of charter-only
air services to foreign air carriers, thus opening the transatlantic market to an additional number of new entrants.8 2 This was
followed several years later by the CAB granting inclusive tour
charter authority to the supplementals 3 Alarmed, the scheduled airlines challenged this order.
77. Lichtman, Regularization of the Legal Status of International Air Charter
Services, 38 J. Ant L. & COM. 441, 447 (1972).

78. K. PU.LAI, THE Am NET: THE CASE AGAINST

THE

WORLD AVIATION CARTEL 161-

62 (1969). In 1957, 524 one-way charter flights were operated on the transatlantic route;
by 1960 this number had increased to 1,532. Id.
79. "'Supplemental air carrier' means on air carrier holding a certificate of public
convenience and necessity authorizing it to engage in supplemental air transportation." Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301(33) (1970). '"Supplemental air
transportation' means charter trips, including inclusive tour charter trips, in air transportation, other than the transportation of mail by aircraft, ...
to supplement the
scheduled service ...
" Id. § 1301(34).
80. No. CAB-11908 et at, Order No. E-16023, Nov. 14, 1960.
81. K. PILLUA,
supra note 78, at 164.
82. Caledonian Airways (Prestwick) Ltd., Foreign Air Carrier Permit, 38 C.A.B.
501 (1973). There are at present 92 foreign charter-only carriers operating between the
United States and their homelands. CAB, REPORT TO CONGRESS FIscAL YEAR 1975, at
12 (1976).
83. Reopened Trans Atlantic Charter Investigation, decided March 11, 1966,
served after President's approval on Sept. 30, 1966, Order No. E-24240.
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In Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. CAB the Second Circuit found that the Board's statutory authority to issue certificates of public convenience and necessity for supplemental air
transportation which had been defined in the Supplemental
Air Carrier Act of 1962" as "charter trips in air transportation"
did not include the authority to grant certificates for inclusive
charter tours.8 5 The fact that this decision was upheld by the
U.S. Supreme Court in World Airways, Inc. v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc.u proved of little assistance to the scheduled carriers.
That very same year Congress expanded the definition of supplemental air transportation to include the conduct of inclusive
tour charters. 7
The seventies also saw a significant expansion of the number of charter services. During 1975 the CAB relaxed the requirements for travel group charters (TGCs).8s As a result,
TGC filings for 1975 tripled over the previous year. 9 In 1976 the
CAB approved Advance Booking Charters (ABCs) on a five
year experimental basis. The ABC passenger was not required
to be a member of an affinity group, nor did he have to purchase a ground package with his air transportation. 0
In view of the number of international discount fares being
allotted to scheduled carriers, the CAB recently issued notices
of proposed rulemaking to liberalize charter flights for the supplementals." The proposed regulatory reform bills introduced
by Senators Cannon and Baker also would greatly broaden
supplemental charter transportation requirements. 2
84. Supplemental Air Carrier Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-528, 76 Stat. 143 (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1301(34) (1970)).
85. 380 F.2d 770, 777 (2d Cir. 1967).
86. 391 U.S. 461 (1968), aff'g by an equally divided court Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc. v. CAB, 380 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1967).
87. Pub. L. No. 90-514, 82 Stat. 867 (1968) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1301(34)
(1970)).
88. Travel Group Charter regulations permit any group of 40 or more persons to
be organized for the purpose of chartering all or part of an aircraft provided that they
conform to certain specified conditions. Keyes, The TransatlanticCharterPolicy of the
United States, 39 J.Am L. & CoM. 215, 239 (1973).
89. CAB, supra note 17, at 12.
90. TRAFmc WoRa , Sept. 13, 1976, at 150. The Advance Booking Charter requires
the prospective traveler to purchase a round trip tricket from an independent charter
operator or a travel agent a specified number of days in advance of the flight departure
date. Id. The advance booking period for European charters is 45 days. This period
will be shortened to 30 days after October 1, 1978. Id. at 151.
91. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 24, 1977, at 28.
92. Id. June 20, 1977, at 33.
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C.

Capacity Restriction Agreements
The various capacity reduction agreements entered into in
the past ten years have also acted to undermine the vitality and
authority of Bermuda I's capacity principles. In 1974 the CAB
approved capacity restriction agreements between the United
Kingdom and various American cities 3 on the grounds that
such limitations could "help to provide the public with optimum service in the face of the constraints imposed by the
international fuel situation.""
An attempted agreement in 1976 failed to materialize. The
British had notified Trans World and National Airlines that
they would be unable to provide the amount of North Atlantic
frequencies during the winter season that the airlines had desired to operate. The CAB viewed this notification as a violation of Bermuda I requiring "appropriate retaliatory response '' 5 and issued two orders in quick succession. The first
commanded British Airways to file its existing and planned
flight schedules. The second commanded the airline to reduce
its daily nonstop DC-10 round trips from Los Angeles to London to five per week. President Ford, believing recission to be
in the best interests of foreign policy, disapproved the Board's
orders. The British in turn accepted the originally proposed
winter schedules.
The two U.S. flag carriers also adopted a capacity pact.
Pan American Airways and Trans World Airlines agreed to
discontinue head-to-head competition on most of their North
Atlantic routes due to the massive operating losses that they
had been experiencing during 1974. They implemented an
93. CAB Order No. 74-10-6, Oct. 2, 1974.
94. With respect to capacity reduction agreements within the domestic U.S. market, the CAB Report on Regulatory Reform noted that, whereas the agreements implemented during the fuel crisis were justified in line with Federal Energy Administration's objectives of fuel consumption reduction, approval of capacity limiting agreements in nonemergency situations "would represent a radical departure from the
Board's previous pro-competitive policies and from generally accepted antitrust principles." CAB, REGULATORY REFoRM: RE'oaT oF THE CAB SPECcL STAFF 95 (1975). (This
Report was never formally endorsed by the entire Board.)
The Board made it clear, however, that international capacity agreements represented a different story. "The views expressed by the Board, . . . relating to domestic
capacity agreements, cannot be applied in international capacity agreements without
taking into account the often decisively different circumstances which prevail in the
international arena." CAB Order No. 75-7-98 (1975).
95. TRAnc WoRLD, Nov. 1, 1976, at 92.
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agreement whereby Pan American would, inter alia, suspend
service between the United States and France, Austria, Portugal, Spain,9" and Casablanca. In return, Trans World agreed to
refrain from transatlantic service between the United States
and Germany and to suspend through plane service between
Washington, D.C. and London. The CAB approved the agreement in January 1975 for a two year term. 7
In June 1976 the District of Columbia Circuit in Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB"5 vacated the CAB's order of approval.
The court found that the two year operational period was excessive in the absence of an evidentiary hearing wherein opposing carriers could present objections. 9 The court also rejected
the two year term because the Board had failed to secure the
approval of the President. 00° On remand, the CAB issued an
order authorizing the route exchange to continue until March
1978.'"1
Claiming that further frequency reductions were needed
on several international routes, Trans World Airlines in early
1978 sought CAB permission to engage again in intercarrier
talks on capacity limitation. The CAB denied the request, however, asserting that any unilateral capacity diminutions attempted without corresponding reductions by foreign carriers
would place the United States in an inferior competitive posture.' 2 The Board pointed out that the 1973 fuel crisis had
triggered the earlier discussions and that factor was lacking in
the present circumstances. 3
D. CAB Economic Regulations, Part 213
In an effort to improve the economic position of the American flag carriers whose share of international traffic had been
96. PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS, INC., ANN. REP. 17 (1976). The Miami-San JuanLisbon-Madrid-Rome route was excepted, however.
97. CAB Order No. 75-1-1133 (Jan. 30, 1975), reconsiderationdenied, Order No.
75-2-108 (Feb. 27, 1975).
98. 539 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
99. Id. at 752.
100. Id.
101. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.-Trans World Airlines, Inc. Route Agreement,
[1977] 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 22,228. However, both airlines informed the CAB that
they would not apply for an extension of the 1975 agreement when it expires in 1978.
Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 5, 1977, at 30.
102. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 16, 1978, at 34.
103. Id.
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steadily worsening and because of the proliferation of international airline pooling agreements," 4 the CAB enacted part 213
of its Economic Regulations in June 1970. °5 Part 213 empowers
the CAB to' request, with or without a hearing, any foreign
carrier operating under a permit to file traffic and schedule
data disclosing the extent of that carrier's operations to and
from the United States. 0 8 If the services provided by the foreign
carrier are subject to a bilateral air transport agreement, an
additional finding must be made before the Board can request
such data. It must find that the permit holder,
over the objections of the United States government, [has]: (1)
Taken action which impairs, limits, terminates, or denies operating rights, or (2) otherwise denied or failed to prevent the denial
of, in whole or in part, the fair and equal opportunity to exercise
the operating rights, provided for in such air transport agreement .... 107

The CAB is then authorized to notify the foreign permit
holder that its operations are not in accord with applicable law
or "adversely affect the public interest."'" 8 The CAB may then
order the foreign carrier to refrain from implementing a proposed schedule or to discontinue an existing schedule within
thirty days.0 9 Before issuing such orders, however, the CAB is
required to secure the approval of the President."0
The CAB explained its rationale for adopting part 213 in
Foreign Air CarrierPermit Terms Investigation."' The Board
believed that the ex post facto review mechanism of the
Bermuda-type agreements to which the United States was a
party encouraged other countries to take restrictive action
against U.S. carriers without the United States being able to
impose prompt, reciprocal restrictions.
So long as the United States is forced to follow procedures under
which retaliatory action is long delayed, foreign governments will
104. Note, CAB Regulationof ForeignAir Carriersunder Part 213: A Turn toward
Restrictionalism in American Aviation Policy, 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 239, 244

(1971).
105.
however.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

14 C.F.R. § 213.1-.6 (1977). Canadian air carriers are exempt from Part 213,
Id. § 213.1.
Id. §§ 213.2, 213.3(b).
Id. § 213.3(c).
Id. § 213.3(d).
Id.
Id.
54 C.A.B. 175, 177-78 (1970).
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not regard the threat of U.S. retaliation as a serious deterrent.
Only by adopting part 213 can this Government increase the
likelihood that other governments will abandon unilateral restrictionism. 112

One questions, however, whether part 213 was the appropriate response to what the Board viewed as coercion by other
countries. It is submitted that alternative procedures would
have been less abrasive, such as amending the existing bilateral agreements."'
E. Pooling Arrangements

Pooling agreements among western European nations have
been in existence since Bermuda I was signed."' By the summer of 1951, fifteen separate pooling agreements were engaged
in by nine different airlines." 5 By 1954, fifty-six different route
sectors were the subject of pooling arrangements."'
In 1959 Air-Union, a pooling arrangement of commercial
and technical operations covering Air France, Lufthansa, Sabena, and Alitalia Airlines, came into being. The airlines
agreed on traffic quotas of 34%, 30%, 10%, and 26% respectively." 7 But because of disputes relating to traffic apportionment and national control, the agreement collapsed in the sixties."'
112. Id. at 178.
113. Other measures adopted to curb discriminatory practices engaged in by other
countries against U.S. flag carriers include the International Air Transportation Fair
Competitive Practices Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1159a, b (Supp. V 1975). This Act
requires the Secretary of Transportation to survey the charges made to U.S. air carriers
by foreign governments for the use of airports and airways and requires the CAB and
the Secretary of State to take such steps as necessary to eliminate practices or reduce
charges that the Secretary of Transportation finds discriminatory or unreasonable.
The CAB also adopted an amendment effective September 10, 1977, that will
require foreign carriers proposing to transit the United States to file notice of their
intention to transit 15 days prior to the flight. The amendment authorizes the Board
to halt such flights pending a review of any questions existing with respect to their
operations under the International Air Services Transit Agreement. Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 8, 1977, at 31.
114. For an article dealing with the early postwar attempts of European airlines
to enter into pooling agreements, see Wager, InternationalAirline Collaboration in
Traffic Pools, Rate-Fixing and Joint Management Agreements (pts. 1, 2), 18 J. Am L.
& COM. 192, 299 (1951).

254 (1956).
Id. at 255.
R. DAVIES, A HISTORY OF THE WORLD'S AIRUNES 515 (1964).
Pourcelet, The InternationalElement in Air Transportation,33 J. AIR L. &
79 (1967).

115. S. WHEATCROFT, THE ECONOMICS OF EuaOPEwN AIR TRANSPORT

116.
117.
118.
COM. 75,
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In 1973 the Committee on Economic Affairs of the Council
of Europe proposed capacity control over scheduled North Atlantic services in a Resolution to the Council." 9 The European
Parliament had also recommended to the European Economic
Community's Council of Ministers that a common system of
capacity control over chartered services be developed. 2 0
The arguments for pooling are essentially threefold.' By
assessing the demand on subject routes and adjusting schedules so as to meet this demand, higher load factors will result.
Increasing the load factor is the most profitable way to ensure
a sound economic posture because revenue per mile is increased without a corresponding cost rise. A second argument
in favor of pooling is that it results in a significant reduction
of operating costs. By eliminating duplicative traffic and by
utilizing aircraft personnel more efficiently, it is predicted that
an airline can reduce 30-35% of its total operating costs.' 22 The
third reason cited in favor of pooling is that such arrangements
benefit the public. Left to their own devices, airlines would
schedule flights only during periods of peak traffic requirements. If resources were to be pooled, however, the airlines
would provide a better spread of services throughout the day.
William Jordan predicts that airline pooling arrangements
would increase the duration of aircraft replacement cycles and
23
would cause the abandonment of service and quality rivalry.
It has also been suggested that cooperation among nations with
respect to airline traffic encourages the breaking down of other
political barriers as well.
Jordan points to the fact that load factors on intraEuropean routes increased from 61.6% to 63.3% in one year as
a result of pooling agreements allowing direct control of seating
capacity. 2 1 Jordan also recognizes the casualties of such agreeWASSENBERGH, supra note 3, at 137.
120. Id.
121. Straszheim notes the different types of pooling agreements in existence: market sharing agreements, equipment pools, space leasing arrangements, spare parts
pools, maintenance pools, collective training agreements, and joint purchasing agreements. M. STRASZHEIM, THE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY 60-63 (1969).
122. S. WHEATCROFr, supra note 115, at 259.
123. Jordan, Airline CapacityAgreements Correctinga Regulatory Imperfection,
39 J. AIR L. & COM. 179, 208 (1973).
124. Id. at 208 n.98. Contra is a study compiled by the Air Research Bureau of
six routes covered by pooling arrangements where the passenger load factors were lower

119. H.
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ments: discharged employees no longer working, suppliers of
resources no longer needed by the airlines, and aircraft manufacturers being put out of business.'2 5
V. U.S. AIR TRANSPORTATION POLICY
Despite the excessive capacity occasioned by the factors
listed in the previous section and the weakening of the capacity
principles of Bermuda I in the face of CAB promulgations,
capacity reduction agreements, and pooling arrangements, the
United States continued to support the 1946 Agreement.' The
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was declared in much the same
manner as its 1938 predecessor to foster air transportation and
to preserve competition among air carriers.'2 In 1963 President
John F. Kennedy's Statement on International Air Transportation Policy affirmed U.S. approval of the Bermuda capacity
principles and reiterated opposition to any inflexible determination of capacity. Kennedy believed that the principles accommodated "the general good, the legitimate economic inter128
ests of all nations engaged in international air transport.'
At the time of Kennedy's statement, however, almost half,
or 47%, of the 20.3 billion passenger-seat-miles flown by international carriers went unutilized. 'M But the opportunity to
modify Bermuda I in order to curb capacity went unheeded
when the Agreement was amended in 1966. Although the U.S.
Department of State claimed that the amendment
"represented the most far-reaching review . . . that the two
Governments have undertaken since that agreement was origion all but five. S. WHEATCROrr, supra note 115, at 261. However, this study was
performed in the early fifties.
125. Jordan, supra notes 123, at 209.
126. Representative of the many critics of the continued adherence to Bermuda I
principles by the United States was Oliver Lissitzyn, author of InternationalAir Transport and National Policy. He believed that the present regime had a "tendency in the
direction of maintenance and operation of excessive capacities which makes the entire
industry less economical." Lissitzyn, Freedom of the Air: Scheduled and NonScheduled Air Services, THE FREEDOM OF Tm Am 96 (E. McWhinney & M. Bradley
eds. 1968).
127. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
128. Statement on International Air Transport Policy, Apr. 24, 1963, reprintedin
D. BLvou, AIR LAw 292 (1964). Such statements do not have the force of law but are
intended as advisory statements to be used by government officials in dealing with
aviation matters.
129. CAB, OFFICE OF CARRIER AccouNTs AND STATISTICS, Ant CARRIER ANALYTICAL
CHARTS 10-12 (Dec. 1963).
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nally signed,"13 0 no mention was made of the capacity disequilibrium.
In 1970, President Richard M. Nixon's Statement of International Air Transportation Policy echoed President Kennedy's support of the Bermuda principles even more forcefully.
The Bermuda capacity provisions have served both the United
States and international air transportation well in providing a
liberal economic environment for the conduct of international air
services. Attempts to restrict United States carrier operations
abroad should be vigorously opposed, and where required, the
United States should take appropriate measures against the carriers of foreign countries restricting United States carrier operations in violation of the terms of bilateral agreements or of the
3
principles of reciprocity.' '

The greatest irony is to be found in the CAB Annual Report to Congress for fiscal year 1975. On one hand, it decries
the "excessive capacity" that "produced uneconomical levels
of passenger load factors.' ' 3 Further on in the Report, however,
one reads that the Bermuda principles
are not an argument against freedom from any control of capacity, but rather they are an argument for first allowing each carrier
to exercise its judgment as to capacity needs in the light of its
determination of market conditions or opportunity.
The cause of international air transportation has been well served
by the economic environment fostered by the Bermuda principles.13

Why, then, did the United States continue to rely on Bermuda I in the face of excess capacity and the resultant lower
profits of U.S. flag carriers? 34 The most plausible theory is a
recognition on the part of the United States that the country
making a unilateral capacity reduction might well incur serious
losses because of aggressive competitors. The experience of the
U.S. domestic airlines points out the ineffectiveness of unilateral capacity reductions in a competitive market. A study of
130. 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 954-55 (June 13, 1966).
131. Statement of International Air Transportation Policy, June 22, 1970,
reprinted in 36 J. AIR L. & CoM. 651, 654 (1970).
132. CAB, supra note 17, at 2.
133. Id. at 16.
134. One writer suggests that the United States viewed the original Bermuda
capacity provisions as possessing a kind of moral force and was therefore reluctant to
disturb them. Jones, The Equation of Aviation Policy, 27 J. AIR L. & CoM. 221, 232
(1960).
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market share changes over a thirteen month period in three
different city-pairs demonstrated that the airlines which had
added additional' capacity gained heightened market shares at
the expense of the airline which had acted on its own to reduce
capacity.'35
Another domestic study shows that on a competitive route
served by two carriers, the airline providing the smaller share
of seats (30%) will "very often" receive a smaller share of the
total number of passengers (little more than 20%). 13 The car-

rier providing 70% of the seats, on the other hand, will get a
"disproportionately larger" portion of the passengers (approximately 80%).'13 A recent study by the National Productivity

Commission further documents the close relationship between
seating capacity and market shares. It determined that the
most powerful force in shaping market shares is "simply
the
1 38
relative number of flights offered by each competitor.'
VI. BERMUDA II

The first indication of a change in U.S. policy came with
the International Air Transportation Policy Statement of President Ford in September 1976.'31 Although calling for "reliance
upon competitive market forces to the greatest extent feasible," the policy statement recognized that capacity agreements
may be necessary in situations where "excess capacity has a
serious adverse impact on the viability of services and where
public interest is served by adequate scheduled service by a
U.S. carrier." 0 The Statement stressed that such agreements
should be of a temporary nature and that agreements between
carriers would be preferable to agreements between governments.'4 '
135. R. VAMBERY, CAPITAL INVESTMENT CONTROL IN THE AIR TRANspoir INDUSTRY

213 (1976).
136. W. FRUHAN,
137. Id.

138. J.

JR., THE FIGHT FOR COMPETrTIVE ADVANTAGE

FRIEDMAN,

A NEw

126-27 (1972).

AIR TRANSPORT POLICY FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIc

33

(1976).
139. 12 WEEKLY Comp. OF Pass. Doc. 1319 (Sept. 8, 1976). Dr. H. Wassenbergh,
however, termed it a .'fighting document' to primarily advance the interests of the
United States' international carriers." Wassenbergh, The Special Air Transport Conference of ICAO April 1977: A New Basis for the Trade in Traffic Rights for International Air Services, 42 J. Am L. & CoM. 501, 502 n.4 (1976).
140. CAB, REPRT TO CONGRESS FISCAL YE 1976, at 79 (1976).
141. Id.
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In the meantime Bermuda II negotiations had commenced. The participants at the 1977 bargaining table were
again unequal in posture. In 1976 U.S. carriers earned $375
million on the North Atlantic run, while state-owned British
Airways collected $274 million.' Fifth freedom rights beyond
London to other European capitals and to the Far East had
garnered $170 million for U.S. carriers during 1976, whereas
British carriers received only $8.5 million 4for
fifth freedom
3
rights beyond the continental United States.
In Bermuda II, however, the pendulum swung not in favor
of regulated competition as it had in 1946, but toward a dual
capacity control mechanism: carrier designation on specific
routes and a frequency control formula.
A. CarrierDesignation
The first method of capacity control is carrier designation.
Although the number of U.S. cities" that will have nonstop
5
links to London has been increased from nine to fourteen,"
only one U.S. and one British carrier will be allowed to serve
6
twelve of the fourteen."

In three instances an additional carrier may be designated
to serve a one-carrier gateway: 1) if one country decides not to
142. TIME, July 4, 1977, at 64.
143. Id.
144. The Miami-London route is subject to an agreement negotiated in October
1976 dealing with summer season capacity. It is essentially a compromise wherein
National Airlines receives the right to continue its summer frequencies (six flights per
week between Miami and London) in return for limitations both with respect to the
number of seats it can offer as well as to the fares it will be permitted to charge. In
addition, National did not receive any fifth freedom rights beyond London. ECONOMIST
(London), June 4, 1977, at 98.
145. Wilkin, New U.S.-British Air Pact Will Affect Travel Habits, N.Y. Times,
June 23, 1977, § A, at 7, col. 1. Atlanta, Dallas/Ft. Worth, Houston, and Anchorage
were added. Houston, however, may not be served nonstop by a U.S. carrier until three
years after Bermuda II has been in force. Bermuda II, annex 1, § 1, US Route 1 n.1.
The same restriction applies to British carriers serving Atlanta and Dallas/Ft. Worth.
Bermuda II, annex 1, § 3, UK Route 1 n.1.
146. Two U.S. and two British carriers will be permitted to serve both New York
and a second U.S. gateway to be designated by the CAB. Bermuda II, art. 3, para. 2(a).
(b). Boston was temporarily authorized as the second two-carrier gateway in October
1977. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 7, 1977, at 32. However, the CAB requested
comments by January 13, 1978, as to whether Boston should retain its dual designation
or be replaced by Los Angeles. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 9, 1978, at 37. The second
British carrier on the New York-London run will be Fred Laker's Skytrain, much to
the displeasure of British Caledonian Airways. J. Com. (New York), June 24, 1977, at
1, col. 2.
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compete on the route or engages in token service; 2) if the
number of one-way revenue passengers carried by the designated airline of each country exceeds 600,000 in each of two
consecutive years; or 3) in the alternative, 450,000 passengers
in each of two consecutive years by one country's airline.'47
After the agreement has been in effect for three years, the
United States will be permitted to choose an additional U.S.
gateway city. One carrier from each country will be allowed
to
45
render nonstop service to that gateway from London.
The formerly liberal U.S. fifth freedom rights beyond London were severely limited except with respect to one carrier's
"round-the-world" service and various points in Germany.'
After three years, United States carriers must stop serving Belgium and Austria beyond London. After five years, ongoing
flights to the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden must cease. 50
In addition, the United States immediately gave up fifth freedom rights to twenty-two cities that are not presently being
served. 51
The British, in contrast, were granted fifth freedom rights
beyond Boston, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia, and Washington/Baltimore to Mexico City, a lucrative market. 5 2 The
British were also authorized to serve all stops in Canada as
intermediate points from all British gateways 5 3 to Boston, Chicago, Dallas/Ft. Worth, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia, and
Washington/Baltimore. 4 Additional fifth freedom rights
gained by the British extend beyond Atlanta and Houston to
Venezuela, Columbia, Manaus (Brazil), and Peru.'1 Beyond
service is also permitted to Japan for flights from London via
Anchorage.
147. Bermuda II, art. 3, para. 2(b)(i)-(ii).
148. Bermuda I, annex 1, § 1, US Route 1 n.2.
149. Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, and Berlin. However, only one U.S. carrier
may serve each of these cities, with the exception of Frankfurt, to which two U.S.
carriers may fly. Id. n.3.
150. Id. n.2.
151. Brown, Compromise Marks Bilateral Pact, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., June
27, 1977, at 26.
152. Bermuda I, annex 1, § 3, UK Route 3.
153. London, Manchester, Prestwick/Glasgow. Id. Route 2.
154. Id.
155. Id. Route 4.
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B.

Article 11-Fair Competition
Article 11 sets forth the "fair and equal opportunity" language 5 of the original Agreement and also the identical third,
fourth, and fifth freedom provisions of Bermuda P" It is the
very vagueness of the capacity clauses of Bermuda I, allowing
flexible and often diverse interpretations, which permits them
to rest alongside the more restrictive provisions of Bermuda II.
After setting forth the Bermuda I language, Article 11 proceeds to tie in tariffs for the first time to capacity offerings.
Frequency and capacity must be related to "public demand,"
taking into account the provision of "adequate service to the
public" and the "reasonable development of routes and viable
airline operations."' 58 Capacity is also to be provided at levels
"appropriate to accommodate the traffic at load factors consistent with tariffs" that are based on the criteria enumerated in
Article 12, Tariffs.'5 9 Although Article 12 sets forth several factors to be taken into account in setting fares, it merely provides
60
that tariffs should assume "reasonable load factors.'
Up to this point, the capacity provisions remain undeterminative, permitting each carrier to apply its own conception
of public demand to capacity offerings.
However, the next to last paragraph of the Fair Competition Article recognizes that excess capacity can be "counter to
the interests of the travelling public."'' Accordingly, it establishes Annex 2, Capacity on the North Atlantic, to be utilized
only with respect to the North Atlantic route sectors.
The paragraph embodying the purpose of the Annex reflects the deep division between the two countries on the capacity issue-the relatively unrestricted competition advocated by
the United States and the governmental regulation of capacity
favored by the British.
The purpose of this Annex is to provide a consultative process to
deal with cases of excess provision of capacity, while ensuring
156. "The designated airline or airlines of one Contracting Party shall have a fair
and equal opportunity to compete with the designated airline or airlines of the other
Contracting Party." Bermuda II, art. 11, para. 1.
157. Id. para. 3(a),(b),(c).
158. Id. para. 4.
159. Id.
160. Bermuda II, art. 12, para. 2.
161. Bermuda II, art. 11, para. 5.
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that designated airlines retain adequate scope for managerial
initiative in establishing schedules and that the overall market
share achieved by each designated airline will depend upon passenger choice rather
than the operation of any formula or limita2
tion mechanism."

The comments of American and British officials after the
signing of Bermuda II as to the purpose of this "consultative
process" mirrors the conflicting viewpoints expressed in the
paragraph. Alan Boyd, Special Ambassador and head of the
U.S. delegation to Bermuda II, sees the mechanism as "no
more than a consultative process."'' 3 Other U.S. negotiators
viewed the clause as putting pressure on capacity rather than
dictating market shares. 164 On the other hand, the British Secretary of State, Edmund Dell, sees the process as more of a
capacity limitation device in and of itself. "This is designed to
reduce the waste of fuel and other resources that results from
flying too many empty seats. .
".'."I"In defense of the American position, a similar process of prescreening of flight frequencies is provided for in several U.S. bilateral agreements,' but
representatives of the contracting nations point out that capacity has not been effectively curbed by the prescreening mechanism.'0 7
C.

PrescreeningProcedure and Fallback Mechanism
The second capacity limitation method utilized by Bermuda II is a relatively complicated prescreening procedure and
fallback mechanism. These provisions are at the heart of the
anticompetitive accusations leveled against Bermuda II.
Each air carrier must file proposed schedules 180 days in
advance of the summer and winter traffic seasons.' The schedules must specify the type of aircraft to be used, the destinations of the aircraft, and the frequency of the flights.' Amend162. Bermuda II, annex 2, para. 2.
163. Quoted in Barnard, US, UK Sign New Air Service Pact: Unlikely to Much
Alter Present Imbalance, J. Com. (New York), June 23, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
164. Bus. WEEK, May 9, 1977, at 32.
165. TRAFFIC WORLD, July 4, 1977, at 91.
166. E.g., Italy.
167. Karr, Anglo-U.S. Talks on New Aviation Pact Face Basic Hurdle and June
22 Deadline, Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 1977, at 6, col. 2.
168. The summer season includes the period April 1 through October 31. The
winter traffic season begins November 1 and continues through March 31. Bermuda
II, annex 2, para. 13.
169. Id. para. 3.
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ments to the original filings can be tendered but must be filed
165 days before the commencement of the season.7 0 Adjustments to these subsequent filings must be tendered on a
"timely" basis.
Should one of the governments (the "Receiving Party")
believe that an increase in frequency proposed by any of the
filed schedules does not conform to the fair competition principles set forth in Article 11, it may call for consultations with
the other government (the "Requesting Party") not later than
150 days before the beginning of the next traffic season. "1 In
its notice to the other government, the complaining party must
specify the reasons for its belief and indicate the frequency
level which it believes to be consistent with the agreement. "2
If, however, the level of frequency provided in the proposed
schedules to and from a gateway city is 120 or fewer round trips
during the summer or 88 or fewer round trips
during the winter,
17 3
neither party may complain to the other.

In reviewing the frequency level under dispute, the party
proposing the increased frequency is mandated to take into
account
the public requirement for adequate capacity, the need to avoid
uneconomic excess capacity, the development of routes and services, the need for viable airline operations, and the capacity offered by airlines of third countries between the points in question."'

After such review, the Requesting Party must, not later than
120 days before the traffic season in question, notify the other
government of the level of frequency it believes to be in conformity with Article 11.1'5
If the Receiving Party does not agree with the Requesting
Party's determination, it must notify the other party not later
than 105 days before the coming season. "' In the event of disagreement, consultations must be held not later than 90 days
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.

Id. para. 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

176. Id. para. 5.
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before the beginning of the next season. " ' At the conference,
the Parties must exchange economic data relevant to their frequency contentions and must compare forecasted levels with
the levels of the previous corresponding season.'
If no agreement on the number of frequencies has been
reached 75 days before the next traffic season begins, an automatic "fallback" mechanism would be triggered. This mechanism was contained in the White Paper submitted to the U.S.
government by Great Britain in preliminary talks held in December 1976.1
The carrier desiring the frequency increase will be able to
operate the frequency level it proposes.'8 However, this number must not exceed the sum of the number of round trip frequencies operated on the route segment in question during the
previous corresponding season' 8' plus the mean of the forecast
percentages presented by the carriers during consultation as
applied to the latter number.' In any event, however, the
increase could not be pared to less than twenty flights during
the summer traffic season or fifteen during the winter season. 3
Exempt from the fallback mechanism's operations are
carriers inaugurating service on a route already served by a
carrier of the other party. The exemption would continue in
effect for two years or until the frequencies of the newcomer
matched those of the incumbent, whichever occurred earlier. 8 ,
Carriers on both sides are not limited with respect to the
number of extra sections that each may operate to a flight,
provided that the extra sections are not advertised or held out
as separate flights. 85
The North Atlantic Capacity Annex has a five year lifetime. At the end of this period, the parties must agree to its
extension. If no agreement can be reached, the capacity provi177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 3, 1977, at 26.
Bermuda II, annex 2, para. 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 7.
Id. para. 10.
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sions will remain in effect for an additional two year period and
then lapse."
D. CharterServices
For the first time, charter services were placed in such an
agreement. 7 Article 14, Charter Air Services, alludes to the
realization of both countries that there is a "substantial and
growing demand from that section of the travelling public
which is price rather than time sensitive, for air services at the
lowest possible level of fares" and accordingly establish a separate annex to deal with charter services.' Annex 4, however,
states by omission that Article 3, Designation and Authorization of Airlines, and Article 11, Fair Competition, are not applicable to these services. 18' The Annex does commit the contract0 with a
ing parties to negotiations before the end of the year"9
view toward establishing a bilateral or hopefully even a multilateral agreement with respect to North Atlantic charter services.' In the event that the parties are unable to reach an
agreement by March 31, 1978, further consultations will be
had."

2

The charter provisions in Bermuda II have no real impact,
then, other than to obligate the two countries to sit down at the
bargaining table. Further weakening the charter provisions is
a paragraph stipulating that an agreement entered into on
April 1, 1977, between the two countries will be incorporated
3
by reference into the Annex."

186. Id. para. 12.
187. The United States had previously negotiated with several countries for bilateral charter agreements (e.g., Belgium), but these agreements were, according to the
1970 Statement on International Air Transportation Policy, separate and apart from
the corresponding agreements relating to scheduled services. Lichtman, supra note 77,
at 460. Aviation authorities agree that controlling scheduled capacity would save resources but it cannot be effective if charter capacity, with which it competes, is permitted to proliferate without restraint. J. FRiEDMA, supra note 138, at 139.
188. Bermuda I, art. 14, para. 3.
189. Bermuda II, annex 4, para. 2.
190. An October 31, 1977, meeting was held with the British. The results of the
Oct. 1977 meeting and the additional meetings in Feb. and Mar. 1978 produced an
agreement which, inter alia, rejected the concept of part charters, but reduced the
advance purchase requirement from 45 to 21 days and the minimum group size requirement from 40 to 20. Further meetings are scheduled for the fall of 1978. Av. WEEK &
SPACE TECH.,

Mar. 27, 1978, at 25-26.

191. Bermuda II, annex 4, para. 3.
192. Id.
193. Id. para. 1.
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Ostensibly entered into in an effort to minimize the administrative workload of filing charter requests, the agreement
has the effect of granting both British Airways and British
Caledonian Airways blanket authorization to conduct off-route
charter flights between the United States and Great Britain
beginning May 31, 1978.'11
Nor did the new Agreement discuss the effect of pooling
arrangements. Although the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 requires each air carrier to file with the CAB a copy of every
contract or agreement into which it enters for the pooling of
services,'9 5 the Act does not expressly prohibit pooling. However, the CAB is given the affirmative duty of approving by
order any such agreement.9 6 In addition, it is empowered to
disapprove any arrangement that it finds to be contrary to the
97
public interest or in violation of the Federal Aviation Act.
In contrast to the relatively restrictive policies respecting
U.S. carriers, the United States has strongly encouraged air
carriers of smaller nations to enter into agreements with adjoining nations in order to combine air services to this country. The
latest "U.S.-mandated" regional pooling organization was the
grant of New York authority to Alia Airlines of Jordan in conjunction with Syrian Arab Airlines.9 8'
VII.

CRITICISM OF THE AGREEMENT

Most observers agree that on balance the British airlines
will realize greater benefits from the Agreement.' 9 The American opposition, however, centers not so much upon "how much
the British received as compared to the share of the American
airlines," but on the negotiating body, the form the Agreement
took, and the anticompetitiveness of the Agreement.
194. Memorandum of Understanding on Passenger Charter Air Services between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 13,
1977, at 47.
195. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (1970).
196. Id.
197. Id. § 1382(b).
198. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 26, 1977, at 33. Recently, however, Saudi
Airlines of Saudi Arabia insisted on its own operating rights into New York apart from
the Alia-Syrian Arab consortium. The quid pro quo was the grant of operating authority to a U.S. flag carrier (Trans World Airlines) into Jidda, Saudi Arabia. Id.
199. British officials predicted that the new capacity mechanism would raise load
factors to 60-65% and that British Airways would gain three million pounds for each
percentage point increase. J. Com. (New York), June 24, 1977, at 15.
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A.

Criticism of the Negotiaiing Body
The Secretary of State is empowered to advise and consult
with the Secretary of Transportation, the CAB, and the Secretary of Commerce with respect to negotiating agreements with
foreign governments concerning air routes and services. 00 Criticism has been directed at the State Department, however, for
placing harmonious diplomatic relations before the economic
welfare of the U.S. airlines in its bargaining priorities and for
its lack of intragovernmental cooperation.101
The Carter administration recently submitted the draft of
a plan which would place the State Department in a negotiating position subordinate to that of the Department of Transportation. 0 2 Earlier administration plans had centered upon
the creation of a separate negotiations branch of the executive
203
department.
President Carter is also presently revising the 1976 Statement on International Aviation Policy of President Ford. In it
he is expected to delineate the chain of command in the new
reorganization, but he is meeting State Department opposition
to the loss of its ad hoc, moment-by-moment policymaking

powers .204
B.

Criticism of the Legal Status of the Agreement
20 5
In the United States, bilateral air transport agreements
are concluded without the advice and consent of the Senate
and are thus characterized as executive agreements rather than
as treaties. 20 1 Most countries, however, consider a bilateral
agreement a treaty.2 W.Shortly after Bermuda I was signed, considerable debate occurred in the houses of Congress as to the
legal status of that agreement; the debates reemerged after
Bermuda II.
200. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1462 (1970).
201. Bus. WEEK, Aug. 16, 1976, at 106.
202. Doty, InternationalAviation Policy Shift Urged, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
Feb. 6, 1978, at 36.
203. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 8, 1977, at 31.
204. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 19, 1977, at 33.
205. As of June 30, 1975, a total of 74 U.S. bilateral agreements were in effect.
CAB, supra note 17, at 16.
206. See Lissitzyn, The Legal Status of Executive Agreements on Air
Transportation(pta. 1, 2), 17 J. AIR L. & CoM. 436 (1950), 18 J. Ant L. & CoM. 12 (1951).
207. Id.

1978

BERMUDA H

Objections to having bilateral air agreements considered
as treaties include the inherent delay of congressional deliberation and the intertwining of basically air transportation issues
with politics? 8s One solution would be that introduced by Senator Smathers of Florida in 1957. Decisions that called for foreign policy or for national security considerations would be the
exclusive province of the President; agreements concerning
purely economic issues would remain outside his control.2"9 Difficulties with this solution center around whether economic,
military, and political interests in any given case would be
clearly distinguishable and capable of compartmentalization.
C. Criticism of the Capacity Control Measures
Another challenge to the Bermuda Agreement is that by
restricting the number of carriers as well as capacity, it may
violate U.S. antitrust laws.2 10 The recently concluded hearings

of the Aviation Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Public Works and Transportation point out that the capacity
and airline designation provisions are contrary to the Federal
Aviation Act's mandate of competition."' The Senate Commerce Aviation Subcommittee also called for hearings.
Several court challenges are being organized by Ralph
Nader's Consumer Action Project and by Tampa, Florida,
which was named as a gateway city in the TransatlanticRoute
Proceedings but which was excluded by Bermuda II.21I
VIII.

CONCLUSION

President Carter's displeasure with the Bermuda capacity
limitations, evidenced in letters concerning present bilateral
negotiations with Japan, is curious.2 1 He expressed no disa-

greement with the 1976 International Air Transportation Pol208. Av. WEEK & SPACE

TECH.,

Aug. 8, 1977, at 31.

209. SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, IMPROVEMENT OF PROCEDURES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN AIR COMM., S. REP. No. 119, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1957).
210. Av. DAILY, Oct. 5, 1977, at 189.

211. Letter from Rep. Glenn M. Anderson, Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation,
and Rep. Norman Y. Mineta to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (Oct. 5, 1977),
reprinted in Av. DAILY, Oct. 7, 1977, at 204.
212. Ellingsworth, Bermuda Pact Sparks Opposition, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
Aug. 1, 1977, at 26; Av. DAILY, Oct. 5, 1977, at 189.
213. Letters from President James Carter to the Attorney General, Chairman of
the CAB, and the Secretaries of State and Transportation (Oct. 7, 1977). Stressing the
importance of a healthy international air transport industry, Carter called for the
avoidance of governmental restrictions on capacity.
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icy promulgated by President Ford until one month after Bermuda II had been signed. Nor did he object to Bermuda II until
this time. Administration officials stated, however, that once
the full details of the new agreement became known to the
President, he "was less than pleased." ' Carter is expected to
include "very pro-competitive" guidelines in his new International Air Transport Policy. However, this policy will not be
promulgated as public papers, as were the former International
Air Transportation Policy Statements of Presidents Kennedy,
Nixon, and Ford.
The new Chairman of the CAB, Alfred E. Kahn, a Carter
appointee, also charged "that Bermuda 2 was a vehicle for anticompetitive intrusion into the international aviation marketplace." 15 Although his criticism is echoed by John Barnum,
Deputy Secretary of Transportation from 1973 to 1977, who
called for "giving up Bermuda 2,"11 and others, the opponents
fail to take into account the very pressing need for filling the
overabundance of empty seats.
In 1976 the total number of seats offered on the North
Atlantic was 15,820,020.17 Over 6 million of those seats flew
empty."' In March 1977 the number of available seats on the
North Atlantic was 1,159,709, a 6.5% increase over the same
period,"' and the March 1977 load factor had decreased 3.4%
from March 1976.20 Predictions were also being made that an
800-seat airliner would be in service by the end of the cen2
tury. '
The critics of the new Agreement also fail to realize that
in Bermuda II neither government actually possesses a veto
right over capacity. Even if the carriers are unable to reach an
agreement, flight frequencies may be increased, albeit by a
predetermined formula.
214. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 12, 1977, at 29.
215. Griffiths, Bermuda 2 PrinciplesDropped, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 23,
1978, at 31.
216. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 23, 1978, at 31.
217. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 25, 1977, at 37.
218. Id.
219. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 29, 1977, at 30.
220. Id.
221. Wilkinson, The Role of Advancing Technology in the Future of Air
Transport, 81 AERONAUTICAL J. (London) 185, 186 (1977).
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Bermuda II remains essentially the middle-of-the-road
approach and the compromise between two conflicting philosophies which characterized Bermuda I in 1946. The absence of
a strict formula for determining capacity is balanced by a prescreening mechanism which limits the discretion of the individual carriers.
Moreover, like many general principles, the Bermuda I
capacity provisions could work only when both sides agreed as
to their meaning. But because of the differing philosophical,
political, economic, and geographic criteria applied by each
country, widely diverging interpretations resulted. The fault of
Bermuda I was not in what it said but what it left unsaid.
Bermuda II at least attempts to say what needs to be said.

CASE COMMENT
Comment: Jurisdiction in Transnational
Securities Fraud Cases-Securities &
Exchange Commission v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109
(3d Cir. 1977)
I.

INTRODUCTION

SEC v. Kasser' is a recent decision in the series of transnational securities fraud cases wherein the federal courts have
devised tests to determine when subject matter jurisdiction is
proper under SEC rule 10b-5, 2 promulgated pursuant to section
10(b) 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 The holding of

SEC v. Kasser purports to extend subject matter jurisdiction
in transnational securities fraud cases beyond any prior decisions. It is submitted, however, that the holding may be limited
somewhat by reference to the facts of the case, which facts
could satisfy more conservative tests of subject matter jurisdiction. The Kasser decision also makes an important contribution by articulating policies which identify U.S. interests in
applying rule 10b-5 to transnational securities transactions.
The events in this case leading up to an alleged rule 10b-5
violation began in the mid-1960s when the Canadian provincial
government of Manitoba created the Manitoba Development
Fund in order to interest private enterprise in the creation of a
1. 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility or any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-I (1970).
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forestry complex.5 Kasser and his codefendants allegedly induced the Fund to enter into investment contracts with and
acquire debentures of two defendant corporations, largely
owned and dominated by Kasser.6 Under the investment contracts, the Fund was to make loans to the two defendant corporations in exchange for debentures. The Fund entered into the
contracts and acquired the debentures based on false representations that Kasser and his associates, or corporations they
controlled, had invested and would invest capital in equity
securities of the two defendant corporations over and above the
proceeds obtained from debenture sales to the Fund. However,
the defendants never made the equity investments. Instead,
they recirculated the proceeds of the loans and debenture
transactions, making the required equity investments not with
additional capital but with the very money previously made
available by the Fund. Over several years the Fund invested
about $45,000,000 in debt securities issued by the defendant
corporations. These payments were made because of misrepresentations to and concealment of material facts from the Fund.
The defendants falsely represented that substantial equity
capital had been invested in the two defendant corporations
and spent for development of the forestry complex. Moreover,
the defendants diverted much of the money invested in the two
defendant corporations to their own personal use. As a result,
both corporations went bankrupt.7
The court noted that the following conduct forming part
of the defendants' scheme occurred in this country: (1) various
negotiations; (2) execution of one ofthe investment contracts
in New York; (3) utilization of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce (e.g., telephones and mails) to further the
scheme; (4) incorporation of defendant companies in the
United States, or at least the establishment of corporate offices; (5) use of the New York office of a Swiss bank as a conduit
for the moneys received from the Fund; (6) the maintenance
of books and records in this country; (7) drafting of agreements
executed elsewhere; and (8) transmittal of proceeds from the
transactions to and from the United States.8
5. 391 F. Supp. 1167, 1169 (D.N.J. 1975).
6. 548 F.2d at 111.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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The Third Circuit court held that it is proper to exercise
jurisdiction in an SEC suit for injunctive relief' against violations of the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities
Acts "in transnational securities cases where at least some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within
this country."' 0
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Development of Effect and Conduct Theories
The application of rule 10b-5 to transnational securities
fraud cases is limited to those transactions with which the
United States has a significant connection or interest. Principles of international law form the basis of theories devised by
the courts to assess this connection. These principles of international law" distinguish between jurisdiction to prescribe a
rule of law and jurisdiction to enforce a rule of law. A country
is permitted to prescribe a rule of law (a) for conduct occurring
within its territory, 2 (b) when conduct outside a territory produces a substantial, direct and foreseeable effect within its
territory,' 3 and (c) for conduct of its nationals wherever the
conduct occurs." A country has jurisdiction to enforce in a
9. See notes 35 & 36 infra.
10. 548 F.2d at 114.
11. Principles of interntional law formulated by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FORmON RELAIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES represent the opinion of the American
Law Institute as to the rules that an international tribunal would apply in deciding a
controversy in accordance with international law [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
12. RESTATEMENT § 17 provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its
territory, whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects
of the conduct outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its territory.
13. RESTATEMENT § 18 provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a,rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect
within its territory, if...
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity
to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the
territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice
generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
14. RESTATEMENT § 30 provides:
(1) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
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proceeding brought within its territory any rule of law that it
has jurisdiction to prescribe.' 5 The major theories applied by
the courts in deciding whether to assume subject matter jurisdiction in a transnational securities fraud case have been based
upon a certain effect occurring within the United States or
certain conduct taking place here. No support has been generated for a theory that would authorize the United States to
apply rule 10b-5 in every case where an American national is
charged with fraud regardless of where the conduct or effect
occurs.16
In the transnational securities fraud context,17 effectsbased jurisdiction was first proposed in Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook.5' In that case, an American shareholder of a Canadian corporation, Banff, brought a shareholder derivative action for damages to the corporation resulting from the sale of
Banff treasury stock to defendant corporations. The plaintiff
alleged a violation of rule 10b-5 in the nature of a conspiracy
between the Banff board of directors who were individual defendants and the defendant corporations to defraud Banff by
making Banff sell treasury shares at the market price which the
defendants, who had inside information not yet disclosed to the
public, knew did not represent the true value of the shares.'"
The court formulated the effects test of jurisdiction based on
congressional intent in enacting the Exchange Act. The court
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct of a national of the
state wherever the conduct occurs ....
15. R STATEM ET § 20 provides: "A state has jurisdiction to enforce within its
territory a rule of law validly prescribed by it."
16. Compare ]IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975) and F.O.F.
Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., 400 F. Supp. 1219, 1223 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), where American nationality of the defendant is not alone sufficient to confer
subject matter jurisdiction, with notes 49, 63, and 75 and accompanying text infra,
where control by a U.S. defendant from the United States would support subject
matter jurisdiction.
17. For application of the effects theory in a criminal context, see Strassheim v.
Dailey, 221 U.S. 280 (1911). For application of the effects theory in an antitrust case,
see, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
18. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.) (holding that lower court had jurisdiction, but that
plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action under rule lOb-5), rev'd in part and
remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (reversing dismissal for failure to state
a claim), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), noted in 1 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 168
(1969).
19. 405 F.2d at 204.
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believed "that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have
extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the
effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities. '" Therefore, the court held that it had
subject matter jurisdiction over violations of the Securities Exchange Act although the transactions which are alleged to violate
the Act take place outside the United States, at least when the
transactions involve stock registered and listed on a national securities exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of American investors."'

The conspiracy and sale of stock at less than true value to
defendant corporations in Canada were detrimental to the interests of the American plaintiff because they lowered the price
of his stock of the same issue which was registered and listed
on a national exchange.Y
The conduct theory of subject matter jurisdiction was developed in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v.
Maxwell. 2 In that suit for damages, an American corporation
alleged that defendants conspired to cause plaintiff to buy
stock in the defendant British corporation at prices in excess
of its true value by making misrepresentations in violation of
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5. 24 Misrepresentations were made in New York and London. 25 A contract was

signed in New York whereby plaintiff offered to buy shares of
the defendant corporation and defendant agreed to accept the
offer. 2 However, before the agreement was closed, plaintiff
purchased the shares on the London Stock Exchange through
a London banking firm, because defendants informed plaintiff
27
of rumors of a counter-takeover bid.

The court first examined the conduct occurring within this
country and developed a causation test to determine whether
20. Id. at 206.
21. Id. at 208.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1330.
Id. at 1331-32, 1335.
Id. at 1332.
Id.
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the conduct would be sufficient under international law principles to permit jurisdiction."8 According to its causation test, the
American activity must be an essential link inducing the purchase. Although the precise details causing the loss need not
be reasonably foreseeable, the damages must be within the
area where the defendant had unlawfully created a risk of loss.29
The court found that significant conduct occurred in this country and that the contract was an essential link inducing the
purchases, irrespective of whether the purchases were triggered
by the misrepresentations made in New York or London."
After concluding that the conduct in this country provided
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction under principles of international law, the court considered whether Congress would have
wished the antifraud provision to apply to the transaction.',
The court concluded that in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,
Congress intended to prevent fraud in the sale or purchase of
securities whether or not traded on organized U.S. markets,
and that such protection was not limited to securities of American issuers. 32 The court held that subject matter jurisdiction
existed because there was an impact on an American company
and its shareholders, and because substantial misrepresen33
tations occurred in this country.
Whether the effect and conduct theories enunciated in
Schoenbaum and Leasco should be applied concurrently, or
alternatively, or if they should be balanced is a point raised in
Recaman v. Barish.3 Based on the distinction between the
facts of Schoenbaum and Leasco, it is suggested that these
theories may be applied alternatively. Where the transactions
which violate the Act take place outside the United States, but
a domestic investor suffers a loss from his purchase of foreign
securities which are registered and listed on a national exchange, then subject matter jurisdiction would vest under rule
10b-5 according to the Schoenbaum holding. However, where
an American corporation suffers a loss from its purchase
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 1334-35.
Id. at 1335.
Id. at 1334-35.
Id. at 1335.
Id. at 1336.
Id. at 1337.
408 F. Supp. 1189, 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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abroad of foreign securities that are not registered or listed on
a national exchange, then according to the Leasco holding,
substantial misrepresentations must occur in this country, in
addition to the impact felt by an American corporation and its
shareholders, before jurisdiction will vest under rule 10b-5.
B. Foreign Victims
Where foreign individuals or foreign corporations seek to
invoke the protection of rule 10b-5 in suits on their own behalf,
or in class or derivative actions, or where the SEC sues to
enjoin 31 fraudulent activity perpetrated against foreigners, the
law is in flux regarding the conduct or effect within the United
States that is necessary before jurisdiction will vest.3 The jurisdictional section of the 1934 Act provides little insight into the
issue of when it is proper to exercise subject matter jurisdiction
in such cases. 37 Nor does section 30(b)38 automatically exempt
transnational securities transactions from the application of
rule 10b-5.3 ' No legislative history illuminates this issue. 4 Nor
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (Supp. V 1975).
36. Each type of action may present different considerations in the decision to
assume jurisdiction. In a class action there is the problem of "the dubious binding
effect of a defendants' judgment (or a possibly inadequate plaintiff's judgment) on
absent foreign plaintiffs or the propriety of purporting to bind such plaintiffs by a
settlement." Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975). "Such problems are not presented where the SEC seeks to enjoin
activity as in SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Finance Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla.
1963), and SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973), . . . or
when the action is by named plaintiffs, as in Leasco or in ]IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d
Id. at 986 n.26. Cf. lIT, 519 F.2d at 1017-18: "If there would
1001 (2d Cir. 1975) ....
be subject matter jurisdiction over a suit by the SEC to prevent the concoction of
securities frauds in the United States for export, there would also seem to be jurisdiction over a suit for damages or rescission by a defrauded foreign individual." See also
Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REv.
553, 563-68 (1976) for a discussion of the problems presented in assuming jurisdiction
over suits by individual victims of fraud, suits by or on behalf of corporations, and
derivative suits against corporate management.
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1970) provides:
The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder
shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such
business in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of
this chapter.
39. Section 30(b) did not exempt the transaction in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part and remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), because it was not part of "a business in
securities without the jurisdiction of the United States," but was only an isolated
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do any SEC rules or regulations provide any guidance.
The usual presumption is against extra-territorial application of legislation.,' The courts have found this presumption is
rebutted where the United States has a significant interest or
connection with a transnational securities transaction. In assessing this connection, the cases discussed below 42 have examined first whether the United States has a sufficient basis
under principles of international law to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction, and secondly, if this basis exists, whether Congress would have wished the Securities Acts to apply. Policy
considerations are important in determining congressional intent.4 This approach was taken in the leading cases of Bersch
v. Drexel Firestone,Inc.," and IT v. Vencap, Ltd.,' 4 in formulating tests 46 for subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of
foreign plaintiffs. These tests examined the conduct occurring
foreign transaction. Id. at 207. Nor did section 30(b) exempt the transaction in SEC
v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973), where the court distinguished the words "without the jurisdiction of the United States" from the concept of
without the territorial limits of the United States. Id. at 357-58. Finally, section 30(b)
had no application in Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,
1336 n.6 (2d Cir. 1972).
40. "The legislative history is silent respecting the jurisdictional scope questions
at issue here." SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 n.21 (3d Cir. 1977). See also Venture
Fund v. Willkie Farr & Gallagher, 418 F. Supp. 550, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). For a
summary of the legislative history of the Exchange Act see 2 L. Loss, SECURTMES
REGULATION

784 n.2 (1961).

41. Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1975); See Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd in part and remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
42. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975); IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Recaman v. Barish, 408
F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1975); F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co.,
400 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). These cases take an approach similar to that of
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). See
text accompanying notes 23-33 supra.
43. See, e.g., SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977); notes 90-92 and
accompanying text infra.
44. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
45. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
46. This author's use of the term "test" does not mean to imply that the decision
to assume jurisdiction is reached simply by a process of matching new facts to an old
paradigm of effect or conduct. See, e.g., Venture Fund v. Willkie Farr & Gallagher,
418 F. Supp. 550, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). For the view that an effects test has "little
independent analytic significance," see Note, supra note 36, at 563, where the author
suggests that the securities fraud cases "appear to turn [instead] on a reconciliation
of American and foreign interests in regulating their respective economies and business
affairs."
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within this country. The case law subsequent to Bersch and IT
has generally adhered to their holdings. SEC v. Kasser, however, purports to break new ground by liberalizing the conduct
required in this country before jurisdiction will vest.' 7
In one line of cases, the courts have outlined those effects
within the United States which will support subject matter
jurisdiction and those effects which will not trigger application
of rule 10b-5 when foreigners are defrauded in transnational
securities transactions. In SEC actions to enjoin fraudulent
activity injuring American and foreign investors, the courts
have upheld subject matter jurisdiction based on the adverse
effect on American investors. This effect was demonstrated
where offers to sell were made in the United States in SEC v.
5 or where Americans
Gulf IntercontinentalFinance Corp."
suffered a loss from their purchase of securities in a fraudulent
transaction as in SEC v. United FinancialGroup, Inc.'9 In Des
47. See text accompanying notes 83-89.
48. 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963). In this case, the individual defendants'
scheme to defraud began by creating the defendant Canadian corporation and offering
8 and 81/2%notes to the public through Canadian newspapers which circulated in
Canada and the United States. The Canadian corporation made loans to the defendant
Florida corporations which were created by the individual defendants. Funds from the
Florida corporation bank accounts were withdrawn by the individual defendants for
salaries and travel expenses, causing a material working capital impairment for the
Florida corporations. The Florida corporations had no realized net income or any
earnings available to meet interest requirements on the funds advanced by the Canadian corporation. The Canadian corporation paid interest to its noteholders out of the
principal, causing a substantial principal impairment, without disclosure to note holders of the actual source of the interest payments.
This was the first suit brought by the SEC to enjoin a fraudulent scheme perpetrated against foreign investors. It was decided prior to Schoenbaum and Leasco, and
hence the court did not have the benefit of the guidance provided by their effect and
conduct theories. However, the court upheld subject matter jurisdiction on the basis
that some misleading offers to sell the notes were made in the United States, through
Canadian newspapers sold here, and held that it was not necessary to make a showing
that the offers were accepted by actual sale in this country, or that the alleged misrepresentations were in fact successful in inducing the sale of such securities by reliance
thereon.
In commenting upon the Gulf holding, the court in Recaman v. Barish, 408 F.
Supp. 1189, 1200 (E.D. Pa. 1975) noted: "[O]f equal importance is the fact that...
the 'true issuers' of the notes of Gulf Intercontinental . . .were the individual and
corporate Florida defendants and that Gulf Intercontinental was nothing more than a
conduit for the securities issued by the Florida corporation."
49. 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973). Here, the defendant was an American holding
company owning and from its home base in the United States controlling a large
number of service and investment companies incorporated in foreign countries. Offers
and sales of shares in mutual funds of the various investment companies were made
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Brisay v. Goldfield Corp.,50 a class action for damages where
only one member of the class was American, subject matter
jurisdiction was upheld on the basis of an adverse effect on the
American securities market from the improper use of securities
of an American corporation which were registered and listed on
a national exchange.
The court in Finch v. Marathon Securities Corp.,5' held
that there was no effect within the United States to support
subject matter jurisdiction where a foreign investor had been
to foreigners. The SEC sought a preliminary injunction alleging that defendants had
violated various antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts and rule 10b-5 by
obtaining money from investors by means of untrue statements and omissions to state
material facts. The court upheld subject matter jurisdiction on much the same basis
as it had in SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp. While foreign investors were
defrauded in both cases, in the Gulf case offers to sell were made in the United States,
and in the UFG case, stock was actually sold to at least three Americans who lost
$10,000 from their investment. The court assumed subject matter jurisdiction based
upon this impact on American investors as a result of substantial activity within the
United States. This holding was supported by evidence that (a) there were American
owners of shares of the defendant companies, (b) there were offers and sales of stock
to American citizens, (c) the foreign companies were directed and controlled from the
United States, and (d) the mails and other facilities of interstate commerce were used
in the preparation and distribution of misleading prospectuses, to set up sales meetings
and to consummate investment transactions.
50. 549 P.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977). This class action was brought to recover damages
based upon an allegedly fraudulent stock transaction between a Canadian corporation
and the defendant Goldfield Corporation, an American corporation. Members of the
class were former shareholders of the Canadian corporation, only one of whom was an
American citizen. The alleged fraud involved defendant Goldfield's contract to purchase and take over the assets of the Canadian corporation, including all its stock. The
purchase price of $3,000,000 was to be paid in Goldfield stock which was registered and
listed on the American Stock Exchange. The manner in which the takeover transaction
was effected violated particular substantive provisions of the securities acts and proximately resulted in the collapse of the American market in Goldfield's shares. The court
held that subject matter jurisdiction would vest under the Schoenbaum effects theory
because the improper use of securities of an American corporation which were registered and listed on a national exchange adversely affected not only the plaintiffs but
also the American market in that corporation's securities.
51. 316 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In this private action for damages, the
British plaintiff charged that violations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 were committed by another British individual as agent of defendant EICL, a Bermuda investment
company. The plaintiff signed an agreement in Great Britain to purchase EICL's
interest in another British corporation. The agreement was signed allegedly in reliance
upon misrepresentations made in London. The securities purchased in London were
neither registered nor traded on an American exchange. Applying the Schoenbaum
effects theory, the court held that it was without subject matter jurisdiction because
there was no injury to domestic investors who purchased foreign securities on American
exchanges, nor was there an adverse impact on the domestic securities market from
improper foreign transactions.
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defrauded in his purchase abroad of securities which were not
registered or listed on an American exchange. Where a fraudulent transaction outside of the United States allegedly results
in loss of foreign investor confidence in American underwriters
and securities and in increased problems of U.S. corporations
seeking to raise capital abroad, and has a general adverse effect
on the prices of American securities, these effects will not support subject matter jurisdiction where there is no intention that
the securities should be offered to anyone in the United
States. 52 Also, where any loss to Americans is a result of a fraud
practiced upon the trust in which they have invested, and not
a fraud practiced upon individual Americans in their purchase
of securities, this effect is insufficient for jurisdiction to vest.5"
Assuming no adverse impact on U.S. investors who have
purchased securities on American exchanges, and no adverse
impact on the domestic securities market from improper foreign transactions in American securities, another line of cases
has also upheld subject matter jurisdiction over actions where
foreigners are defrauded when certain conduct occurs within
the United States. In Wandschneider v. IndustrialIncomes of
North America,5, the court held that where misrepresentations
52. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975).
53. UT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Venture Fund v. Wilikie
Farr & Gallagher, 418 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). UT allegedly had 300 U.S. citizens
and residents as fundholders which amounted to only .2% of EUT's fundholders. The
court found that this was not the substantial effect of RESTATMErr § 18. IT, 519 F.2d
at 1016-17. Similarly, Venture Fund had 22,000 shareholders, only two of whom were
American citizens. Venture Fund,418 F. Supp. at 553-54. The indirect injuries to these
American shareholders "as a result of a fraud allegedly perpetrated on Venture Fund
could not of themselves constitute effects within the United States substantial enough
to sustain jurisdiction ....
" Id. at 554 n.6.
54. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 93,422 at 92,054
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). The defendant was a New York corporation engaged in managing
mutual funds and selling their shares. It employed the defendant agent who visited
the plaintiff in West Germany to induce her to invest in Industrial Incomes. The agent
explained the general prospectus written in English and containing several misrepresentations and omissions to state material facts and also communicated some additional oral misrepresentations, including a statement that Industrial Incomes was
regulated by the SEC when in fact the stock of Industrial Incomes had not been
registered with the SEC. The plaintiff relied on these material misrepresentations in
purchasing $50,000 worth of Industrial Incomes stock. Shortly after purchasing the
stocks, plaintiff could not redeem them as had been represented to her, and the stocks
were worthless. The court cited Schoenbaum in holding that there was subject matter
jurisdiction under rule 10b-5 where the misrepresentations were devised within the
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are devised within the United States by U.S. residents, where
the sale is effected within the United States,55 and where U.S.
mails are used for fraudulent misrepresentations," subject
matter jurisdiction will vest over a foreigner's claim for damages. Conversely, when the false and misleading prospectus
and oral statements are communicated abroad and the purchase of shares also takes place abroad, subject matter jurisdiction will not vest over a class action for damages brought by
foreigners, as the court held in Recaman v. Barish.57
The two leading cases in formulating conduct tests to determine the existence of subject matter jurisdiction when foreigners are defrauded are Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,Inc.58 and
United States by U.S. residents, where the sale was effected within the United States,
and where the U.S. mails were used for the fraudulent misrepresentations.
It is suggested that the reliance on Schoenbaum is misplaced. Schoenbaum held
that subject matter jurisdiction would vest where a transaction outside the United
States involved stock registered and listed on a National Securities Exchange and was
detrimental to the interests of American investors. See text accompanying notes 2022 supra. This effect is clearly lacking in Wandschneider. For the suggestion that the
court upheld jurisdiction in part because of defendant's misuse of the SEC name, see
Note, supra note 36, at 570 n.101.
55. Regarding the locus of the sale, compare [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
92,058 and 92,065 where plaintiff signed an application to
purchase shares in West Germany, withdrew funds from a West German bank and sent
them to New York where the share certificates were issued, and the court found that
the sale was effected in New York; with Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189, 1200
(E.D. Pa. 1975) where an application for purchase was filled out in Colombia and the
authorization was made there to withdraw funds from plaintiff's Miami bank account,
and the court found that the purchase took place in Colombia.
56. Compare Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 210 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part
and remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969),
with SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 995 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
57. 408 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The named plaintiffs who were citizens of
Colombia, South America, sought damages for themselves and all who purchased
shares of U.S. Investment Fund (USIF). Plaintiffs alleged that the prospectus and oral
statements pursuant to which offers and sales were made were false and misleading
and violated rule 10b-5 and other antifraud provisions. The court granted defendants'
motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court
first applied the Schoenbaum rule that if securities were registered and listed on a
national exchange, then the alleged fraud would have an impact on the domestic
securities market. However, in the Recaman case this impact did not occur because
the USIF securities were never listed on a U.S. stock exchange or traded over the
counter within the United States. The court also cited SEC v. United FinancialGroup,
Inc. and Bersch where an impact within the United States occurred when sales of
securities were made to U.S. citizens or residents. Since the two named plaintiffs were
neither citizens nor residents of the United States, no impact occurred in that respect.
Nor, presumably, were the other members of the class Americans, since the trust deed,
prospectus and investment program certificate provided that shares were not eligible
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1IT v. Vencap, Ltd.,59 companion cases decided on the same
day by the Second Circuit. In Bersch, the court held that where
acts or culpable failures to act within the United States directly cause a loss to foreigners, subject matter jurisdiction will
vest over their claims. 0 Where the sale to foreign investors
occurred abroad, simply preparing the offerings and part of the
prospectus in the United States was not conduct directly causing the loss." Rather, the Bersch court found that these activities within the United States were merely preparatory or took
the form of culpable nonfeasance, and were relatively small in
comparison to those abroad.2
In HT v. Vencap, Ltd.,13 the court held that where fraudufor ownership by residents of the United States. The court also applied the Leasco test
requiring significant conduct within the United States with respect to the alleged
violation before jurisdiction would vest under the antifraud provisions. The court
found that this test was not satisfied since the false and misleading prospectus and
oral statements were communicated in Colombia and the purchase of shares took place
there also.
58. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). In Bersch, plaintiff
brought an action for damages individually and on behalf of a class of persons who
purchased common stock of Investors Overseas Services, Ltd. (IOS), an international
sales and financial service organization principally engaged in the sale and management of mutual funds. The class consisted of Americans residing in the United States,
Americans residing abroad, and foreigners. Plaintiff alleged that IOS and other defendants violated rule 10b-5 by failing to reveal material facts in their prospectus. The
offerings were prepared, in part, in the United States, and a part of the prospectus was
also prepared here. Shares, which were neither registered nor listed, were sold under a
prospectus outside the United States to foreign nationals. In reaching its conclusion
not to assume subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of the foreign plaintiffs, the
reasoning of the Bersch court was similar to the Leasco approach. Although the U.S.
based activities in Bersch were sufficient for jurisdiction to vest under the principle of
international law expressed by RESTATEMENT § 17, the U.S. conduct did not satisfy the
test which the court fashioned in its interpretation of congressional intent.
59. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
60. 519 F.2d at 993.
61. See id. at 985 n.24, 987.
62. Id. at 987.
63. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975). Plaintiffs, liquidators of UIT, an international
investment trust organized under the laws of Luxembourg, brought an action against
Vencap, a Bahamian venture capital firm; Pistell, its president and chairman of the
board; and Vencap's American lawyers. The agreement for the purchase by UT of three
million dollars in Vencap's preferred securities was drafted in New York by IIT's
lawyers and exchanged in New York with Vencap's lawyers. The sale was closed in the
Bahamas. Pistell subsequently caused Vencap to enter into several questionable transactions involving dispositions of Vencap funds which plaintiffs alleged were inconsistent with the operation of a bona fide venture capital firm and which may also have
been injurious to shareholder interests. The court noted that what are fraudulent acts
sufficient to uphold jurisdiction depends upon the theory of fraud. For example, under
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lent acts were committed in the United States, subject matter
jurisdiction would vest over the claims of the foreign plaintiff
investment trust because Congress did not intend "to allow the
United States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are peddled
only to foreigners." 4 The court noted that mere preparatory
activities, or the failure to prevent fraudulent acts, where the
bulk of the activity was performed in foreign countries would
not be sufficient conduct for jurisdiction to vest. 5
In the class action of F.O.F. ProprietaryFunds, Ltd. v.
Arthur Young & Co.,6" the first case to apply the Bersch and
HT holdings, the court declined to assume subject matter jurisdiction because no activity within the United States directly
caused the plaintiff's loss. The court found that the allegedly
fraudulent conduct directly causing losses to F.O.F. Proprietary consisted of the sale of the debentures and the distribution
of the materially misleading offering circulars to purchasers
a theory that Pistell committed a fraud through transactions which funneled substantial amounts of Vencap funds into his own hands, the court suggested that fraudulent
acts would be committed in this country where a New York office was used as a base
for the fraud, including directing the transactions and maintaining transactional records there. The court then remanded for further findings as to the factual basis for
different theories of rule 10b-5 liability to determine the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction.
64. Id. at 1017.
65. Id. at 1018.
66. 400 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Plaintiff, a Canadian mutual fund, purchased one million dollars in convertible guaranteed debentures from Farrington Overseas Corp. (FOC), a Delaware corporation, allegedly in reliance on a misleading offering circular. In order to comply with the federal securities laws and with federal
regulations, the FOC debenture offering circular provided that the debentures were not
registered and were not being offered to nationals or residents of the United States,
nor to residents of Canada or Canadian corporations. The SEC agreed that the debentures need not be registered if underwriters and their purchasers signed a covenant
regarding this restriction on offer and sale of the debentures. Thus F.O.F. Proprietary,
a Canadian mutual fund, purchased the debentures in violation of federal regulations,
the SEC-mandated agreements signed by underwriters and their purchasers, and the
proviso appearing in the offering circular.
In deciding whether to assume subject matter jurisdiction, the court first interpreted Bersch and 1IT to require an evaluation of whether Congress would have intended the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws to apply to F.O.F. Proprietary's purchase of the FOC debentures. The court held that since plaintiff was not
within the group of intended or lawful offerees of the FOC debentures, Congress would
not have intended to extend the protection of the securities acts to such a transaction
that was predominantly foreign. Moreover, subject matter jurisdiction could not be
upheld under the test of Bersch and HT,since no conduct within the United States
directly caused the plaintiff's loss.
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and the misleading information transmitted at closing, all of
which occurred abroad. 7 The drafting of the offering circular
in the United States was deemed merely preparatory. 8
6 the court upheld subject
In Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC,"
matter jurisdiction based upon the IT holding that the United
States was used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export.70 There, the United States was the locus
of the fraudulent payment of give-ups from one registered
broker-dealer to another in connection with the purchase and
sale of securities in the United States over-the-counter market,
although the payment of give-ups was at the expense of offshore funds only one of which had American shareholders.'
Of the cases applying the conduct theory, Straub v.
Vaisman 2 is most central to the reasoning of the court in SEC
67. Id.at 1223.
68. Id.
69. 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1976), reh. denied, 551 F.2d 915 (1977), cert. denied, 46
U.S.L.W. 3425 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1978) (No. 77-275). Here, the court considered the application of rule lob-5 to conduct which formed the basis for revoking petitioner brokerdealer's registration and barring petitioner principal owner from association with any
broker or dealer. The conduct involved payment of give-ups by Lipper Corp. to IPC
(a registered broker-dealer and subsidiary to 1OS) amounting to $1,450,000 out of
commissions earned by Lipper Corp. on over-the-counter transactions for three offshore funds for which IOS was investment adviser. The court held that Lipper and his
company wilfully aided and abetted IOS in committing a fraud on the funds by diverting to itself, through IPC, rebates which belonged to the funds while IPC was doing
nothing in return. Since the United States was used as the base for manufacturing
fraudulent security devices, the court upheld jurisdiction under the IIT test. The court
found that the activity in the United States was not merely preparatory.
70. Id. at 179.
71. Id.
72. 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976). Defendant was a registered broker-dealer in New
Jersey. In reliance on a telex from defendant and conversations with the defendant's
agent, the West German plaintiff authorized the purchase of 10,000 shares at $4 per
share through the defendant broker-dealer. The defendant had inside information that
the company whose stock it was recommending was almost bankrupt. The plaintiff
alleged that this failure to disclose was a 10b-5 violation. In deciding whether to
assume subject matter jurisdiction, the court began with the premise that this was not
a predominantly foreign transaction, as in Bersch and IT. The court then observed
that:
Conduct within the United States is alone sufficient from a jurisdictional
standpoint to apply the federal statutes, Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 17 (1965), and the question
may simply be whether, on policy grounds, we should apply the securities
legislation. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 478
F.2d 1326, 1334-35 (2d Cir. 1972).
540 F.2d at 595. However, the court upheld subject matter jurisdiction based on the
Bersch test that the conduct within this country directly caused the loss.
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v. Kasser. The Straub court held that jurisdiction would vest
under the Bersch test where the facts directly causing the loss
included (1) the fraudulent scheme was conceived in the
United States by American citizens, 3 (2) involved stock in an
American corporation traded over-the-counter, 4 and (3) a registered American securities broker from his office in New Jersey
was responsible7 5 for the wrongful omissions."

III.

SEC v.

KASSER

In SEC v. Kasser, the Third Circuit reversed the district
court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the
SEC's action for injunctive relief." The district court reasoned
that Congress did not intend to confer jurisdiction over an essentially foreign transaction unless that transaction had an
impact on domestic investors or securities markets."5 Since no
domestic impact was demonstrated where a Canadian Fund
was defrauded in an investment contract involving debentures
which were neither registered nor traded in this country, the
court declined to assert jurisdiction." The district court also
considered whether conduct by the American defendants in the
United States, although without effect here, was sufficient to
give rise to jurisdiction. It concluded that the various miscellaneous acts committed in the United States did not materially
alter the essentially foreign nature of the transaction."
The Third Circuit overruled the district court's holding
that a domestic impact was required in this country before
jurisdiction would vest under the antifraud provisions of the
73. Cf. the holding that mere preparatory activities do not support subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims of foreign plaintiffs. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519
F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519
F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975).
74. Cf. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), rev 'd in part
and remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969):
"Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in order to
protect . . . the domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities."
75. See note 16 supra.
76. The court could have held that the failure to disclose in the telex sent from
the United States was an act directly causing the loss which would have supported
subject matter jurisdiction. Cf. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
77. 548 F.2d at 112.
78. 391 F. Supp. at 1175.
79. Id. at 1176.
80. Id.
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securities acts. 8' The court relied on the decision in liT v. Vencap, Ltd., that an impact in the United States was not a jurisdictional prerequisite, and on a principle articulated in Straub
v. Vaisman, that conduct standing alone is enough for jurisdiction to attach under the federal securities laws. 2
In deciding that the conduct alone in the United States
supported subject matter jurisdiction, the court placed the
greatest reliance on the principle articulated in Straub. The
Kasser court held that "the federal securities laws do grant
jurisdiction in transnational securities cases where at least
some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs
within this country." 3
Notwithstanding this liberal standard, the Kasser court
also suggested that jurisdiction could be upheld based upon the
holdings of liT and Bersch.8s lIT held that jurisdiction would
vest for a foreign plaintiff's claim where conduct in this country
consists of "the perpetration of fraudulent acts themselves and
does not extend to mere preparatory activities or the failure to
prevent fraudulent acts .... "85 The Kasser court found that
the conduct of the defendants was not merely preparatory since
it was much more substantial than the United States based
8 This analysis, however, ignores the qualitaactivities in lIT."
tive difference in the lIT test between preparatory and fraudulent acts and applies the test in a quantitative fashion, by
regarding the Kasser conduct as more "substantial" than the
United States based conduct of liT. Moreover, while the
Kasser court finds the United States based activity is not
merely preparatory, it nowhere states that it amounts to perpetration of fraudulent acts themselves.
The Bersch case held that "the anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities laws . . . do not apply to losses from sales of
securities to foreigners outside the United States unless acts (or
culpable failures to act) within the United States directly
caused such losses." 87 While the Kasser court does not state
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

548 F.2d at
Id. at 113.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 115.
519 F.2d at
548 F.2d at
519 F.2d at

112-13.

1018.
115.
993.
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that the United States activity directly caused the loss, the
court did "question whether it can be convincingly maintained
that such acts within the United States did not directly cause
any extraterritorial losses.""8 The court found that there was
much more United States based activity in Kasser than in
Bersch, including the execution of a key investment contract
in New York and the maintenance of records in this country
which were crucial to the consummation of the fraud.89
Kasser stressed that policy reasons were important in its
decision to assume subject matter jurisdiction. First, the court
suggested that to refuse jurisdiction
might induce reciprocal responses on the part of other nations.
Some countries might decline to act against individuals and corporations seeking to transport securities frauds to the United
States. Such parties may well be outside the ambit of the power
of our courts . . . . By finding jurisdiction here, we may encourage other nations to take appropriate steps against parties who
seek to perpetrate frauds in the United States.

The court interpreted congressional intent that "the antifraud
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts were designed to insure
high standards of conduct in securities transactions within this
country in addition to protecting domestic markets and investors from the effects of fraud."" The court found it desirable
to "enhance the ability of the SEC to police vigorously the
conduct of securities dealings within the United States," com92
porting with "the basic purposes of the federal statutes."

While the court in Kasser holds that only "some activity
designed to further a fraudulent scheme" 3 is required within
this country, it is submitted that the holdings may be limited
by the facts of the case. The court deemed various activities
which occurred in the United States "significant conduct
which formed part of the defendants' scheme."" Elsewhere
the court observed that "the sum total of the defendants'
intranational actions was substantial,"9' 5 and that "the de88. 548 F.2d at 115.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 116.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.at 114.
94. Id. at 111-12.
95. Id.at 115.

1978

SEC v. KASSER

fendants' conduct occurring within the borders of this nation
was essential to the plan to defraud.""6 These descriptions
of the conduct in the Kasser case suggest more stringent
standards for jurisdiction than merely "some activity."
IV.

CONCLUSION

When a U.S. court is presented with a foreign plaintiff's
action for damages for violation of rule 10b-5, or when the SEC
sues to enjoin violations of rule 10b-5 perpetrated against foreigners, the Kasser decision provides a new tool for deciding
whether or not to assume subject matter jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the observation that the Kasser holding may not be
so liberal as to require merely "some activity" within the
United States before jurisdiction will vest, this case nevertheless examines the conduct occurring in the United States in a
quantitative fashion rather than following the qualitative distinction between fraudulent and preparatory acts of the Bersch
and IT decisions.
According to Bersch and HT, fraudulent acts occurring
within the United States updn which subject matter jurisdiction rests would include the misrepresentation, the sale, or acts
consummating the fraud. In the Kasser case, one of the investment contracts with misrepresentations regarding the defendants' equity investments was entered into in New Jersey. This
conduct would satisfy the Bersch and IT formulations, since
the misrepresentations would have been made in the United
States, and a transaction in securities would occur here where
the investment contract was executed in the United States.
However, the Kasser decision suggests a different theory
upon which to premise subject matter jurisdiction. After finding that at least eight activities forming part of the fraudulent
scheme occurred in the United States, the court held that only
"some activity" was required before jurisdiction would vest.
Under the lIT test, only the acts consummating the fraud are
relevant for subject matter jurisdiction purposes. However, a
fraudulent scheme may consist of many acts, not just those
consummating the fraud. Therefore, in cases where the theory
is a scheme to defraud under rule 10b-5(a) or a fraudulent
practice or course of business and rule 10b-5(c) which may
96. Id.
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consist of many acts, it is suggested that the quantitative
approach of Kasser is preferable to the qualitative one of
7

liT.9
Suzanne A. Schiro*
97. The Kasser approach has also been supported in the Federal Securities Code
of the American Law Institute, which permits United States antifraud law to apply
whenever conduct "occurs to a substantial (but not necessarily predominant) extent
within the United States." ALI FEDERAL SEcUnmEs CODE § 1604(a)(I)(D)(i) (Oct. 1974
revision of Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-3).
* B.A., 1975, University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D. candidate, 1978, University
of Denver College of Law.
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"War" almost inevitably generates national debate over
the prerogatives of the President and Congress with respect to
warmaking powers. Typical of such discussion was that engendered by the proposed amendment to the Foreign Military
Sales Act. Senator Strom Thurmond during Senate floor debate in 1970 urged that:
If we pass this amendment it will undermine the President in
carrying out his constitutional duty to do his utmost to provide
for the protection of our fighting men . . . . [Plassage of this
amendment would be met by jubilation in Hanoi, Moscow, Peking, and other Communist capitals throughout the world, as it
would signal the waving of a white flag to the forces of tyranny
and oppression.

116 CONG. REC. 11567 (1970).
Senator Church, on the other hand, defended the amendment by saying:
We in the Congress have been derelict far too long in placing
adequate restraints on the executive branch in the commitment
of our men and dollars abroad. As Senators we should concern
ourselves primarily with seeing that Congress carries out its responsibilities, not with the duties of the President. We should
worry, not so much about preserving the President's powers
which he will faithfully uphold . . . . This debate should be
focused, not on whether this proposal ties the President's
hands-it does not-but on whether it will help untie the knots
by which Congress has shackled its own powers.

116 CONG. REC. 18900 (1970).
I am hardly suggesting that students of foreign policy and
U.S. constitutional history prefer a state of war so they can
have such grist for their mills. However, the fact remains that
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it is usually through foreign and military intercourse with other
nations that constitutional doctrine regarding the powers to
conduct foreign affairs and military action is clarified.
It was indeed the passion of this country's Indochina involvement which brought the American Bar Association to
commission a study such as War, ForeignAffairs, and Constitutional Power. Under the aegis of the A.B.A., Professor Sofaer
set out to study the powers of the President and Congress with
respect to foreign affairs and the conduct of war. From his
study project, this first volume has emerged as a definitive
constitutional history of early U.S. foreign affairs.
The study covers the time period from the Constitutional
Convention through the administration of John Quincy
Adams, with initial references to British constitutional experience and early state attempts to conduct foreign affairs during
the American Revolution and the era of the Articles of Confederation. As in most constitutional histories, the central importance of George Washington in establishing standard operating
procedures is outlined; however, Professor Sofaer's study goes
somewhat more in-depth into congressional-executive relations
during the Washington administration than have most constitutional histories. The study also notes that during the administration of John Adams the power of the President did not
expand significantly because of open congressional resistance
and because the Supreme Court ruled that, while both Congress and the President could initiate foreign and military activities, Congress retained the final word in warmaking policies.
Sofaer chronicles the changes in Thomas Jefferson's doctrine and practice after he assumed the Presidency in the tumultuous election of 1800. While Jefferson intended to pursue
a presidential style which was less centralized and secretive
than that adopted by either Washington or Adams, he came to
act more and more in a manner resembling that of his predecessors. The final chapter of the book is a 150-page compilation
of diplomatic and military affairs in the post-Jefferson administrations of Madison and Monroe, with an afterthought given
to John Quincy Adams. In Sofaer's account, these administrations are marked by further territorial expansion of the United
States into Florida, often carried out by the military operating
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with vague and legislatively-contested authority from the
Commander in Chief.
In Sofaer's monumental attempt to document the constitutional history of U.S. foreign affairs until roughly 1829, we
read of numerous examples of prototypical executive behavior
which became so visible during U.S. involvement with the rest
of the world after 1945. Some of the more common examples
include congressional acquiesence to executive initiative, sporadic congressional attempts to limit executive discretion in
the use of military force, U.S. intervention in the domestic
affairs of other countries, and presidential difficulties in convincing overly eager (and occasionally ruthless) officials to
carry out policies within the bounds of executive authority.
Except for the cast of characters, it is difficult at times to tell
just which century's history the book presents.
However, Sofaer and his associates have gone to great
lengths to drive home a central point about the constitutional
balance between the Presidents and Congress. While there are
numerous precedents in the behaviors of these early presidents
and legislators for the actions of our more recent officials, a
most crucial difference exists. The early presidents went to
great lengths to find legislative bases for their actions, such as
through the argument that an appropriation for a military force
provides implicit authority for the President to use that force
in the absence of a congressional declaration of war. Modern
presidents, however, have often gone some distance farther by
arguing that they possess inherent constitutional powers to
commit the country to military engagements by the sole virtue
of being Commander in Chief, chief appointive authority, and
central contact figure for foreign diplomats. It is with this important difference that Sofaer concludes his first volume.
The author and his colleagues followed closely their mandate from the A.B.A. to "study and report on the respective
powers under the Constitution of the President and Congress
to enter into and conduct war." The 118 pages of references at
the end and the multitude of footnotes throughout the book
attest to the exhaustive nature of the research which culminated in this volume. However, the book generally omits analyses of events and evaluations of other historical writings on
the events of this time period. Without doubt, much will be
written about the author's overt choice to avoid an argumenta-
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tive tone and to downplay historiographical debate. From this
perspective, the passion which gave life to the study project is
not conveyed in the text of the book.
Still, I cannot fault the book on this count. To charge that
the author abstained from polemics is accurate, but to contend
that he neither provides nor supports conclusions is shortsighted. On the whole, I am delighted that the book does not
provide an evaluation of each and every action on the battlefield (for I enjoy arriving at my own conclusion about General
Jackson's ruthless exercise of military authority in Florida) or
every presidential motive (for I enjoy arriving at my own conclusion about Monroe's duplicitous treatment of Jackson). The
book's charter was to provide a study of constitutional powers,
and it does so admirably in spite of an organization and an
editorial arrangement which at times make the book appear
the written product of a multi-disciplinary university committee.
However, the main effect of the book's organization and
arrangement is simply to limit its market to readers who are
already familiar with the general historical outline of the period. Thus the book will certainly have great benefit for upper
division and graduate courses in constitutional history, foreign
affairs, and national security studies. The main readership is
likely to be drawn from the ranks of lawyers, historians, political scientists, and military affairs specialists who want a thorough, detailed view of the actions which have defined the constitutional balance between Congress and the President with
respect to warmaking powers. This important book goes a long
way toward satisfying this desire. We can eagerly look forward
to future volumes by the Sofaer study group.
M. Glenn Newkirk*
* Project Director, Legislative Information Systems, National Conference of State
Legislatures. Formerly Professorof International Relations and American Foreign Policy, University of Denver.
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Foreign Legal Systems
JACOBS,

M., THE LAW OF ARBITRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA;

Juta and Company, Ltd., Cape Town, South Africa (1977);
R 22.00 (cloth); ISBN 0-7021-0819-7; xxxiv, 225 pp.; index,
footnotes, table of cases, list of principal authorities and methods of citation, tables, appendices.
Since 1974, numerous major disputes have been resolved
through the use of arbitration in South Africa. Legal writing,
however, has not kept pace with the increasing importance of
arbitration in conflict resolution. This treatise explores both
the English and the South African approaches to arbitration.
The author considers the existing distinction between statutory
and common law arbitration in South Africa and concludes
that new legislation is needed to resolve existing inconsistencies.
Human Rights
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COLLECTED EDITION OF THE "TRAVAUX
PR19PARATOIRES" OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN

RIGHTS, VOL. III; Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, The Nether-

lands (1976); ISBN 00-247-1819-8; xvii, 339 pp.; index. In English and in French.
The eight volumes represent the "legislative history" of
the European Convention on Human Rights and contain the
various documents used during the drafting of the Convention
and the first Protocol. This volume contains the working papers
of an intergovernmental committee, the Committee of Experts,
which met during 1950. It was this Committee which accomplished a large part of the detailed drafting work and for this
reason provides the reader with a valuable understanding of
the meaning of the final text which emerged from the drafts.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, YEARBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS; Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, The

Netherlands (1976); ISBN 90-247-1863-5; xvii, 454 pp.; footnotes, index, appendix, bibliography, documents, charts. In
English and in French.
The yearbook represents the eighteenth compilation of
human rights information in Europe and covers the year 1975.
Part I commences with an exposition of the basic texts of the
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working documents of the Convention. Part II reviews the increasing number of individual applications made to the European Commission on Human Rights and points out that only
four individual applications were admitted, a decline of two
over 1974. The following parts include summaries of the deci,
sions handed down by the European Court of Human Rights
and the Court of Justice of the European Communities as well
as extracts of debates in national parliaments and judgments
of national courts relating to the Convention.
FOOD
TIONS,

AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NA-

BILLIONS MORE TO FEED; distributed in the United States

by Unipub, Box 433, Murray Hill Station, New York, N.Y.
10016; $3.50 (paper); ISBN 92-5-100229-0; 47 pp.; charts,
sources.
Published with the support of the United Nations Fund for
Population Activities, this booklet begins with a U.N. Population Projection forecasting a world population of around 6,500
million by the year 2000. The impact will be especially severe
in the developing countries, and FAO believes that a foodoriented economic plan provides the best way to break out of
the vicious cycle of undernutrition, underemployment, and low
productivity which characterizes these countries. The FAO
calls for a higher rate of investment in irrigation, fertilizers,
pesticides, and insecticides and for the creation of additional
jobs.
InternationalBusiness and Taxation
BEHRMAN, J., DEMAND FOR INFORMATION FROM MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES;

distributed in the United States by Uni-

pub, Box 433, Murray Hill Station, New York, N.Y. 10016;
$2.50 (paper); ISBN 0-915814-09-9; 30 pp.
The information required of international companies has
increased not only in extent but also in detail over the past
fifteen years. Behrman details the types of information being
demanded, the methods utilized in gathering the information,
the uses to which the information is put, and the ramifications
of providing or not providing the information. Behrman then
develops an approach to information dissemination which
centers on a continuing dialogue between the companies and
the information users.
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BEHRMAN,

J.,

REVIEW OF "MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN

BRAZIL AND MEXICO: STRUCTURAL SOURCES OF ECONOMIC.AND

distributed in the United States by
Unipub, Box 433, Murray Hill Station, New York, N.Y. 10016

NONECONOMIC POWER";

(1975); $5.50 (paper); 39 pp.; appendices, footnotes. Prepared
for the Council of the Americas.
The operation and activities of multinational corporations
fall within the legislative purview of the Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Behrman reviews a report prepared for that
Subcommittee by Richard Newfarmer and Willard Mueller.
The review raises questions concerning the interpretation of
data gathered from 197 multinational corporations. The conclusions and recommendations of the report are also analyzed
in terms of future congressional needs.
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS, STUD-

IES OF FOREIGN COMPETITION POLICY AND PRACTICE, VOLS. I & II;

Ministry of Supply and Services, Ottawa, Canada KIA 0S9
(1976); distributed in the United States by Unipub, Box 433,
Murray Hill Station, New York, N.Y. 10016; $25.00 (2 vols.
paper); 296 pp. (vol. I), vi, 440 pp. (vol. II); footnotes, bibliographies, appendices.
The seven contributors to this two volume study have examined the corporate anticombination policies of the major
industrial nations of the West. Although its emphasis is focused upon those policies which parallel the second stage revision of the Canadian Combines Investigation Act, the study
offers a concise summary of the administration and effectiveness of foreign antitrust legislation. Volume I treats regulatory
schemes in the United States. Volume H deals with the EEC,
Australia, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and West
Germany.
FELSBERG, T., FOREIGN BUSINESS IN BRAZIL: A PRACTICAL
LAW GUIDE; IBTN-Livreiros e Editora Ltda., Avenida Paulista,

1471 90 andar cj 919, Sdo Paulo-S.P.-Brasil (1976); 335 pp.;
index, glossary, appendices.
An updated and enlarged version of the 1974 edition, the
guide attempts to advise the foreign businessman and lawyer
in understanding the basics of the Brazilian legal system as it
relates to business negotiations conducted in Brazil. The study
is composed of eleven chapters, each dealing with a different
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aspect of foreign participation in the Brazilian economy. The
appendices summarize the procedures for legalizing foreign
documents and translate relevant Brazilian legislation. The
author lends his experiences as a practitioner with an established Sdo Paulo law firm and author of numerous articles on
foreign investment. His publication is a useful guide for those
businessmen or lawyers who transact business in or with Brazil.
LEECH, N., MILLER, S., & MUNDHEIM, R. (editors), JOURNAL
OF COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATIONS,

VOL. I, No. 1; North-Holland Publishing Company, 335 Jan
Van Galenstraat, P.O. Box 103, 1000 AC Amsterdam, The
Netherlands (1978); $36.50/Dfl. 87,50 (four issues); 97 pp.;
footnotes, tables.
This Journalwas created to meet the trend of the growing
internationalization of the securities markets and to act as a
mechanism for the exchange of ideas and information concerning the structure, operation, and regulation of worldwide capital markets. An interdisciplinary and comparative forum, the
Journal will describe and compare the practices of various national systems. The lead article in the first issue of Volume I,
The US. Securities and Exchange Commission, FinancialInstitutions Outside the U.S. and ExtraterritorialApplication of
the U.S. Securities Laws, was written by Philip A. Loomis, Jr.,
a Commissioner of the SEC. Other contributors include Dr.
Morris Mendelson of the Wharton School of Finance of the
University of Pennsylvania on disclosure requirements and
Professors Helmut Kohl and Rainer Walz of the University of
Hamburg on disclosure requirements in the Federal Republic
of Germany. This Journal is a valuable theoretical and practical tool for specialists in corporate finance and economics as
well as for legal scholars, practitioners, and government officials.
SANDERS, P. (editor), YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
VOLUME 1-1976 & VOLUME 2-1977; Kluwer B.V., Deventer, The
Netherlands (1976-77), also available from the American Arbitration Association, 140 W. 51st Street, New York, N.Y. 10020;
ISBN 90-268-0814-3 (vol. 1), ISBN 90-268-0923-9 (vol. 2); xii,
254 pp. (vol. 1), xii, 282 pp. (vol. 2); bibliography, list of members of the ICCA, list of journals on arbitration. Preface by
Jean Robert, President, International Council for Commercial
Arbitration.
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These annual sourcebooks, published under the auspices
of the ICCA, consist of several sections: national reports on
commercial arbitration, arbitral awards, new arbitration rules,
recent amendments to arbitration statutes, and court decisions
on the New York Convention in 1958. Volume 1 concentrates
on arbitration practice in the Comecon countries, while Volume 2 describes arbitration law in those countries where the
Anglo-Saxon system prevails. The forthcoming Volume 3-1978
will discuss Latin American arbitral practice. This is a must
series for practitioners of international commercial arbitration
and a valuable aid to those who wish to understand the role
arbitration plays in the settlement of commercial disputes on
a worldwide scale.
WILLETT, T., FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES AND INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY REFORM; American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20036 (1977); $3.25; ISBN 0-8447-3271-0, LC 77-13327;
146 pp.; footnotes, tables, figures, appendices. AEI Studies in
Economic Policy 172.
As part of the debate over fixed versus flexible exchange
rates upon which international trade is based, this monograph
analyzes floating exchange rates established by the 1976 Jamaica Agreements undertaken by the 100 member nations of
the International Monetary Fund. The author, a former director of international monetary research at the U.S. Treasury,
contends that acceptance of floating rates has led to substantial improvements with respect to all three of the major problems of any international monetary system-liquidity, confidence, and adjustment.
InternationalLaw
GREEN, L., SUPERIOR ORDERS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW; A.W. Sijthoff Publishing Co. B.V., P.O. Box 26,
Leyden, The Netherlands (1976); ISBN 90-286-04065; xix, 374
pp.; footnotes, table of cases, index.
The defense of obedience to superior orders when an individual is accused of such criminal atrocities as those committed at My Lai is examined in the context of international law
and the statutes, judicial decisions, and leading commentaries
on criminal law of over twenty-five countries. This survey was
conducted at the request of the Canadian Department of Justice on behalf of the Judge Advocate General's Department of
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the Department of National Defense. The author concludes
with several basic premises upon which regulations for any
future manual to be issued for the guidance of the armed forces
may be formulated.
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE PHILIPPINE
LAW; Malcolm Hall, College of
Law, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, The
Philippines (1976); $8.00; xii, 203 pp.; footnotes, documents,
list of members, list of publications.
Published yearly, this review is divided into articles, lectures, and speeches; book reviews; and official documents. It
purports to present a balance of national viewpoints through a
scholarly and pragmatic inquiry. Among the topics featured in
this issue include: the 1976 sessions of the U.N. Conference on
the Law of the Sea, the twenty-eighth session of the International Law Commission, the role of UNCTAD in international
law, extradition, and the UNCITRAL Draft Convention Rule
on liability of ocean carriers for damage or loss due to fire.
PLANTEY, A., DROIT ET PRATIQUE DE LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE
INTERNATIONALE; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique,
15, quai Anatole-France, 75700 Paris, France (1977); 80 francs;
ISBN 2-222-02059-X (paper); 499 pp.; footnotes, bibliography,
tables, index.
Dr. Plantey, a former delegate to the United Nations General Assembly and legal advisor to the Organization of European Economic Cooperation, has compiled a manual which
brings together for the first time the laws of administration of
international and European organizations. Covering 200 institutions operating within 140 countries, this ambitious volume
predicts the eventual reality of an international administrative
law. Plantey commences with a ninety-one page exploration of
the various definitions and concepts utilized by the different
organizations. An especially interesting chapter devotes itself
to the political problems faced by international public functionaries. The book is comprehensively indexed and provides
easy references with its numbered paragraphs.
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL

RESEARCH ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CENTER, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT;

International Legal Center, 866 U.N. Plaza, New York, N.Y.
(1974); ISBN 91-7106-090-1; 91 pp.; appendices.
In 1972 the International Legal Center appointed a group
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of distinguished international scholars to study the role of law
in the development of modern nations. This study represents
the report of that Advisory Committee. The conclusion, which
will be expanded in a future book-length edition of this report,
is that many kinds of research on diverse subjects, using different approaches, are necessary if legal scholarship is to contribute towards understanding the problems of development. It
also urges legal scholars to break outside the confines of legal
doctrine and confront a wide range of new questions.
InternationalLaw of the Sea
JOHNSON, B. & ZACHER, M. (editors), CANADIAN FOREIGN
POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA; University of British Columbia
Press, 2075 Westbrook Mall, Vancouver, British Columbia,
Canada V6T 1W5 (1977); $19.00 (cloth), $6.50 (paper); ISBN
0-7748-0073-9 (cloth), 0-7748-0076-3 (paper); xx, 387 pp.;
maps, footnotes, index.
The eight timely essays in this volume examine the development of Canadian policies on the major law of the sea issues
and analyze Canada's dramatic seaward expansion. Canada's
most significant role in recent law of the sea sessions has been
that of a leader of the "coastal-state grouping," which has
sought to expand a nation-state's jurisdiction over its fisheries,
seabed resources, scientific research, and pollution control
within a 200-mile economic zone and sometimes beyond. In
this role Canada has unaccustomedly aligned itself with the
coastal developing nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
International Organizations
BALZANO, M., THE PEACE CORPS: MYTHS AND PROSPECTS;
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1150
Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 (1978);
$2.00; ISBN 0-8447-1076-8, LC 78-50702; 21 pp.; footnotes.
American Enterprise Institute Special Analysis.
Balzano's brief study outlines the series of problems that
has plagued the Peace Corps throughout its seventeen year
history and discusses several reorganization alternatives. Balzano believes the Peace Corps' problems stem from a changing
international environment which Congress should recognize
when reviewing the alternatives for its impending legislation.
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FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NA-

TIONS, REPORT ON THE

FAO/SIDA EXPERT CONSULTATION ON

POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS FOR INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT,

VOLS. I & II; distributed in the United States by Unipub, Box

433, Murray Hill Station, New York, N.Y. 10016 (1977); $8.00;
ISBN 92-5-100295-9 (vol. I), ISBN 92-5-100284-3 (vol. I); ix,
43 pp. (vol. I), v, 95 pp. (vol. II); list of participants, bibliography, appendices, annexes.

Integrated rural development purports to consider multiple factors in planning for development that will allow progress
without sacrificing the quality of life unique to a region or to a
group of people. Volume I describes the goals of integrated
rural development in Africa, while Volume II contains the recommendations of the Consultation for further such development. Concerned agencies are given a primary role in the planning process, and by integrating the input from these agencies,
it is hypothesized that development will proceed more

smoothly.
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CENTER, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN

THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES; International Legal Center, 866

U.N. Plaza, New York, N.Y. (1977); LC 77-79100; ii, 275 pp.;
footnotes, tables, annexes, list of participating personnel.
This study represents an objective inquiry into the im-

pacts of two public international organizations, the World
Bank and the International Labor Organization, on legal and

institutional change in Colombia and Turkey. The historical
background and evolution of both the World Bank and the ILO
are explored with an emphasis on the particular organization's
perception of its own role. From there, the inquiry proceeds to
a discussion of the overall impact of the organization in each
country and its impact on the legal development of each. This
volume sheds light on the codes of conduct for Colombia and
Turkey developed by the World Bank and the ILO and the
means by which these codes are enforced. The study also attempts to discern whether the procedures utilized by these international organizations support or weaken the lawmaking
capabilities of the countries with which they deal.
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UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL
ORGANIZATION, MOVING TOWARDS CHANGE; distributed in the

United States by Unipub, Box 433, Murray Hill Station, New
York, N.Y. 10016 (1976); $4.00; ISBN 92-3-101365-3 (English),
ISBN 92-3-201365-7 (French), ISBN 92-3-301365-0 (Spanish);
137 pp., appendix. Foreword by Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow,
Director-General of UNESCO.
This study presents UNESCO's views on the establishment of a new international economic order for eliminating the
widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and to ensure steadily accelerating economic and social
development. Recognizing the special contributions toward
this goal which have been made by various international organizations, UNESCO sees its own contribution as stemming from
its promotion of education, science, and culture as a means
toward economic development. In this context, UNESCO foresees an enormous amount of work to be accomplished in gauging the obstacles to be overcome, defining the most effective
practical steps to be taken, and foreseeing their consequences,
as well as giving the idea impetus for the future.
InternationalPolitics and Government
IKLE, F., How NATIONS NEGOTIATE; Kraus Reprint Co.,
Millwood, N.Y. 10546 (1976); $15.00 (cloth); ISBN 0-52744220-8, LC 76-8398; xiv, 274 pp.; footnotes, bibliographical
notes, index. Reprint of the 1964 edition published by Harper
& Row, Publishers, New York, N.Y. Written under the auspices of the Harvard University Center for International Affairs.
In an age of increased communication between nations,
the reissue of this work is timely. Dr. Ikl., a former director of
the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has
written a study of diplomatic negotiation which presents and
analyzes how nations determine objectives, negotiate for side
effects, make accommodations, evaluate, and come to terms.
Included is a chapter on East-West negotiations.
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United States Foreign Policy
LABRIE, R. & PRANGER, R. (editors), NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY POINTS OF VIEW; American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1150 Seventeenth Street,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 (1977); $6.75; ISBN 0-84473275-3, LC 77-15624; 515 pp.; footnotes, tables. AEI Studies
175.
This work skillfully brings together official documents,
policy statements, informative articles, and commentary in an
effort to focus public debate on the array of vital defense issues.
The rationale for current nuclear strategy and doctrine, the
increasing vulnerability of fixed land-based missiles, and the
feasibility of civil defense are examined, together with the impact of these issues on SALT. The thirty-eight contributors
represent a broad range of defense viewpoints and present the
contrasting assumptions underlying the debate over American
nuclear policies.
PAIGE, J., THE LAW NOBODY KNOWS; Vantage Press, Inc.,
516 W. 34th Street, New York, N.Y. 10001 (1977); $10.00
(cloth); ISBN 533-02730-6, LC 77-075438; 209 pp.; endnotes,
appendices, bibliography.
The author analyzes the enlargement of the U.S. Constitution through treaties and executive agreements and details
what he believes to be the erosion of the personal and property
rights of Americans as a result. Utilizing primary sources,
Paige outlines the constitutional authority for treaty-making,
the judicial development of treaty law, and the status of treatyimplementing acts. He concludes with a cross-section of informed opinion on the subject and proposals for change.
World Peace
SIsco, J. (moderator), PROSPECTS FOR PEACE INTHE MIDDLE
EAST; American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20036 (1977); $2.00; ISBN 0-8447-2110-7, LC 77-17276; 42 pp.
AEI Forum 11.
The forum is an edited version of a round table discussion
on the Arab-Israeli conflict by four recognized foreign policy
experts: former U.N. Ambassador George W. Ball; J. William
Fulbright, former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee; Senator Jacob Javits, ranking member of the Sen-
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ate Foreign Relations Committee; and distinguished international lawyer, Rita Hauser. The discussion contains excellent
insights into the policy considerations motivating the negotiating policies of the relevant Middle East actors.
Miscellaneous
ABBOTT, R. (editor-in-chief), CAREER OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW; American Bar Association, Section of International Law, 1155 E. 60th Street, Chicago, Ill. 60637 (1977);
$5.00 (paper); LC 77-18576; xi, 125 pp.; bibliography. Monograph 1. Introduction by Seymour J. Rubin, Executive Vice
President, American Society of International Law.
This monograph consists of twelve essays by practitioners
in the various international law areas: legal research and teaching, the federal government, private practice in the United
States, private practice abroad, and international organizations. The essays concentrate on analyzing in-depth the experience of international law practitioners. While the book does not
purport to be a source listing for specific positions, the bibliographical material at the end of each section will lead the prospective international lawyer to a number of resources. The
book provides answers to the questions most often asked by
students and young lawyers interested in careers in international law.
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, THE U.S. NAVY: WHAT Is ITS FUTURE?; American Enter-

prise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1150 Seventeenth
Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 (1977); $2.00 (paper);
ISBN 0-8447-2113-1, LC 77-25268; v, 38 pp. AEI Forum 12.
An edited transcript of an AEI forum consisting of moderator John Daly, former ABC News chief, Representative Charles
Bennett (D-Fla.), Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), former Secretary of the Navy John Warner, and Captain John Moore,
editor of Jane'sFighting Ships, this publication addresses such
topics as the maintenance of the U.S. fleet strength and the
importance of the Navy in future U.S. global strategy.
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G. (editor), ARAB AND AMERICAN CULTURES; American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 (1977); $9.75
(cloth), $4.75 (paper); ISBN 0-8447-2116-6 (cloth), ISBN 08447-2115-8 (paper), LC 77-94069; 236 pp.; footnotes, appendices, list of contributors.
This book represents the published proceedings of a November 1976 conference held to examine and explore the views
that Americans and Arabs hold of their own cultures. The volume addresses four broad considerations: history, literature,
culture, and politics, and concludes with a roundtable discussion of whether the two cultures can communicate. This collection of commentaries and essays is instructive for those theorists of comparative politics who contrast differing governmental policy considerations by comparing the underlying difference in cultures.
ATIYEH,

